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The Economic Impact Of The 1997 And 2008 Financial Crisis On Asia

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Abstract
This study investigates the factors that made Asian economies more resilient during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) compared to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC). The research addresses the question: What made Asian economies more resilient during the Global Financial Crisis than the Asian Financial Crisis? Through a comparative analysis, the research highlights the proactive reforms implemented after the AFC, such as the adoption of adaptable exchange rate regimes, enhanced banking supervision, and the development of deeper capital markets, which collectively fortified the region's financial systems. In this respect, it is observed that such reforms provided an enabling environment that, together with strong current account balances and large foreign exchange reserves, helped the Asian economies weather the GFC. The research has also attempted to explain how strategic international cooperation and financial policies updated were helpful in sustaining financial stability. Despite these successes, the research underscores ongoing vulnerabilities, such as high levels of corporate and household debt, that require attention to safeguard against future crises. The findings offer valuable insights into the importance of readiness, flexibility, and regional cooperation in ensuring economic stability and growth.
Keywords: *resilience, financial, crisis, reform, stability, policy*

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I. Introduction

The rise of the Asian economies since World War II has been one of the great success stories in the history of economic development.[1] These ‘role model’ economies that came to be known as the ‘East Asian Tigers’ were for years admired as the paragons of emerging market economies owing to their rapid economic growth through prudent fiscal policies, and their remarkable gains in raising populations’ living standards.[2] However, the very element that catalyzed their phenomenal growth—openness to global trade and finance—precipitated their vulnerability.Consequently, these countries found themselves ensnared in two of the gravest financial crises ofthe postwar era that not only underscored the fragility of the region's financial institutions but also highlighted the intricate linkages between national economies and the global financialsystem. The two crises in question are - The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 (AFC), followed by The Great Recession of 2008. The Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) of 1997 and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008-2009, although separated by more than a decade, were significant economic events that had profound impacts on Asian economies. However, the nature, causes, and consequences of these crises were distinct, leading to different implications for the region.

The 1997 AFC was a period of financial crisis that gripped and destabilized much of Eastand Southeast Asia during the late 1990s.[3] The crisis was rooted in economic growth policiesthat encouraged investment but also created high levels of debt, and risk to finance it. Thereafter,this crisis exposed the masked financial vulnerabilities of these ‘role model’ Asian economies. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) played a crucial role to bail out many countries but imposed strict spending restrictions in exchange for the help.[4] By 1999, observers recognized signs of an Asian economic rebound as East and Southeast Asian countries cooperated on financial stability and oversight. Strong policy actions by the affected nations and international cooperation helped control the crisis and spur a rapid recovery.[5]

Even though the Asian Financial Crisis was well finished by 1999, the Great Recession of 2008 had hit Asian economies with unexpected speed and force due to their deep integration into the globally interconnected financial and trade systems. This exposed them to the swift and severe downturn in global demand.[6] While Asian output and exports were hit hard, their monetary and financial systems were largely resilient, leading to an unexpected faster andstronger recovery from the crisis.[7]

Understanding global financial market vulnerabilities and interconnections requires studying the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and 2008 Great Recession. Asian economies were resilient during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) compared to their fragility during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC). This significant

gap highlights a basic concern that this research addresses: What made Asian economies more resilient during the Global Financial Crisis than the Asian Financial Crisis? This paper then compares the economic effects of both crises on Asian countries to identify the dynamic mechanisms that helped them recover faster from the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) than from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC). Due to its lessons on financial regulation and international monetary systems, particularly the interaction between national economic policies and global financial markets, this research is crucial to economic theorists and policymakers.

The significance of this research lies in addressing the gap in fully understanding how Asian economies enhanced their resilience following the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) to better weather the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). While the positive effects of macroeconomic reform and deepened financial systems have been recognized, a comprehensive analysis connecting these reforms to tangible economic resilience is less explored. Additionally, the potential role of evolved regional cooperation mechanisms in reinforcing financial stability presents an avenue for deeper inquiry. This study aims to fill these gaps through a cross-country comparative analysis of the political, economic, and institutional reforms post-AFC and their direct impact on fortifying Asian economies during the GFC. By doing so, it seeks to illuminate the intricate relationships between policy reforms and economic robustness in a globally integrated economic landscape, contributing valuable insights into effective crisis management and prevention strategies.

To answer the research question the first section of the paper performs an in-depth study and analysis of the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) of 1997, delving into its country specific and regional impacts on the Asian economies, the main crisis catalysts and its origins, the diverseresponses to the crisis in terms of economic reforms and policies. From the analysis, it highlightsthe crucial lessons arising from the aftermath of the crisis. The second section explores the 2008 Global Financial Crisis from the Asian perspective, delving into its impact on major Asian economies highlighting their resiliency compared to the Asian Financial Crisis. The analysis examines macroeconomic performance and government responses during both crises to determine resiliency during the GFC. Strategic adaptations and economic management changes from the GFC are addressed next. Finally, Asian economies' policy recommendations and future implications offer better resilience and crisis management. The study concludes that the enhanced resilience of Asian economies during the GFC can be attributed to stronger economic foundations and improved macroeconomic policy frameworks.

II. The Asian Financial Crisis (1997 - 1999)

In 1997, decades of economic policy planning that featured close relationships among government policy planners, regulators, the industries they regulated, and financial institutions came to a head when markets began putting downward pressure on Asian currencies.[8] Banks in Asia came under significant pressures, investment rates plunged, and some Asian countries entered deep recessions, producing significant spillovers to trading partners across the globe suchas the United States, the emerging economies of Latin America, and Eastern Europe, including Brazil and Russia. These countries faced significant balance-of-payments pressures in 1998, reflecting spillovers from the Asia crisis.[9] Sequenced events of currency devaluations, stock market declines, and a significant increase in private debt that spread far beyond Asia and transcended geographical and economic boundaries, soon earned its name as the “Asian Contagion”.[10]

Originating in Thailand, in July 1997, where it was known as the ‘*Tom Yum Kung’ crisis* began when the country had substantially depleted its official foreign exchange reserves. Unable to support its exchange rate, the Thai government was forced to float the ‘baht’ to support its currency peg to the U.S. dollar.[11] In subsequent months, Thailand’s currency, equity, and property markets weakened further as its difficulties evolved into a twin balance-of-payments and banking crisis. In the face of intense market pressure, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia were forced to devalue their currencies, with Indonesia progressively sliding into a complex financial and political catastrophe. Hong Kong had multiple significant but failedspeculative attacks on its dollar-pegged currency. Severe balance-of-payments pressures in SouthKorea brought the country to the brink of default. Across East Asia, private debt increased, capital inflows slowed or reversed direction, and growth slowed sharply. This marked thebeginning of the financial contagion, wreaking neighboring economies, as foreign creditors pulled back from other countries in the region seen as having similar vulnerabilities.[12] Thereafter,South Korea, Indonesia and Thailand were the countries most affected by the crisis as they had high levels of debt and insufficient financing to pay it. The crisis was soon followed by an international chain reaction spreading to several other countries with a ripple effect, raising fears of a worldwide economic meltdown due to the financial contagion.[13] The scope and the severity of the collapses led to an urgent need for outside intervention. Thereafter the International Monetary Fund (IMF) launched a $40 billion initiative to stabilize the currencies of South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia, which were severely affected by the Asian financial crisis.[14] For the most affected countries, the IMF developed several bailouts (also known as "rescue packages") that were contingent on changes to the currency, banking system, and financial sector.[15]

The significance of the Asian financial crisis is multifaceted. Despite being called an economic or financial crisis, the 1997–1998 crisis was also a governance problem at all major political levels, including

national, international, and regional. The crisis revealed the state's prior regulatory failures and inability to manage globalization or foreign parties. The majority of nations' inability to endure IMF reforms and pressure highlighted state authority and governmentcontrol decline.[16] As the severity of the crisis deepened, it became clear that the strong growth record of these Asian economies had masked important vulnerabilities. Years of rapid domestic credit growth and lax supervisory supervision had led to financial leverage and problematic lending. Overheated local economies and real estate markets increased reliance on foreignsavings, current account deficits, and external debt, escalating dangers. Heavy foreign borrowing, sometimes at short maturities, exposed enterprises, and banks to exchange rate and finance concerns that long-standing currency pegs had hidden. When the pegs became unsustainable, firms' external commitments rose sharply in local currency, causing financial problems and even insolvency.[17] The crisis also serves as a case study in asset bubbles and how quickly panic selling can trigger contagion that central bankers cannot control.[18]

This section guides a complete Asian Financial Crisis study. It begins by reviewing the crisis's economic damage and its effects on Asian economies. It then examines the reasons for the economic crisis. The section then discusses crisis responses, particularly the IMF and international community's role in stabilizing afflicted economies. Further, it examines the practical actions and economic adjustments taken to stabilize the economy and prevent further crises. The section ends with a reflection on the Asian Financial Crisis's lessons, which are essential to understanding its effects on economic theory and practice which have shaped policy and economic initiatives to prevent repeat disasters.

Ripple Effects: Regional Impacts

As Thailand lacked the foreign reserves to support the Baht peg to the US dollar, the Thai Baht lost more than half its value in the foreign exchange market leading to the chain reaction of events, eventually culminating into a region-wide crisis.[19] Thailand's booming economy came to a halt amid massive layoffs in finance, real estate, and construction that resulted in large scale unemployment. As the Thai stock market dropped down by 75%, Thailand's largest finance company, Finance One, collapsed in January 1998.[20] Poverty and inequality increased while employment, wages and social welfare all declined as a result of the crisis.[21] The crisis spread to Southeast Asia, Japan, and South Korea, causing rising private debt, declining stock markets and asset values, and dropping currencies. The ratio of foreign debt to GDP in the four major ASEAN economies rose from 100% to 167% in 1997 and soared above 180% during the worstof the crisis.[22] In August 1997, the IMF stepped in with a support package and "conditionality" measures that included the freezing of many finance companies. This was the start of what Sachs calls the IMF's screaming fire in the theater. The freezing of finance companies sent uninsured depositors into a panic.[23]

Global economic crisis measures did not stabilize Indonesia's domestic condition. After Thailand floated the baht in July 1997, Indonesia's monetary authorities raised the rupiah's trading range from 8% to 12%. As free-floating exchange rates replaced floating exchange rates, the Indonesian rupiah fell. Fears over company loans, massive selling, and strong dollar demand drove the rupiah to a record low in September 1997 on the Jakarta Stock Exchange. Dollars wereworth 2,600 rupiah before the crisis. On 9 January 1998, the rate dropped to over 11,000 rupiah per dollar, hitting over 14,000 between late January and mid-1998.[24] The country lost 13.5% of its GDP that year.[25] In Indonesia, the ensuing economic crisis transformed into a political crisis which led to the collapse of the three-decade-old dictatorship of President Suharto.[26]

In October and November of 1997, terror had taken hold of the entire area. Investors started to take notice of Korea's foreign debt's term structure. At $110 billion, they calculated Korea's short-term debt, which is more than three times its declared foreign exchange reserves.[27] South Korean chaebols absorbed excess investment, resulting in huge debts, industry failures, and takeovers. The crisis bankrupted big Korean enterprises, prompting government andcorporate wrongdoing. The early 1997 Hanbo affair revealed South Korea's economic flaws and malfeasance to international financiers.[28] Kia Motors, South Korea's third-largest automaker, requested emergency loans in July. Collapsing huge South Korean enterprises caused interest rates to rise and overseas investors to leave. Due to concerns about stringent IMF reforms, South Korean stocks fell 4% on November 7, 7% on November 8, and 7.2% on November 24 (1997).

The South Korean government suffered like the chaebol. Its debt-to-GDP ratio doubled from 13% to 30% during the crisis.[29]

At the beginning of the Asian crisis in mid-July 1997, the Philippines central bank raised the overnight rate from 15% to 32% to preserve the peso after Thailand started the financial crisis. The peso fell from 26 per dollar at the outset of the crisis to 46.50 in early 1998 to 53 in July 2001. During the crisis, Philippine GDP fell 0.6% and the peso fell to 55.75 per dollar. Political unrest and protests sparked the "EDSA II Revolution" and the resignation of Filipino President Estrada.[30]

In October 1997, years of considerably higher inflation in Hong Kong than in the US put speculative pressure on the Hong Kong dollar, which had been pegged at 7.8 to the US dollar since 1983. Over $1 billion was spent by monetary authorities to safeguard the local currency. Todefend its currency, the Hong Kong government

boosted overnight interest rates from 8% to 23%and even to '280%' in October 1997 after the stock market fell 23%. The stock market fell as interest rates rose, allowing short sellers to profit. In response, the HKMA began buying Hang Seng Index shares in mid-August 1998. Under Financial Secretary Donald Tsang, the government bought shares for about HK$120 billion (US$15 billion) to fight speculators and lead several businesses.[31]

Within days of the Thai baht devaluation in July 1997, speculators heavily traded the Malaysian ringgit. By the end of 1997, ratings were junk, the KLSE plunged from over 1,200 to below 600, and the ringgit sank to 4.57 to the dollar by January 23, 1998. Malaysia's first recession in years occurred in 1998, when construction fell 23.5%, manufacturing fell 9%, and agriculture fell 5.9%. In September, the KLSE and ringgit fell below 270 and 4.7 points, respectively, promptingprotective measures.[32]



Figure 1 *- Annual Growth of GDP per-capita, 1995 - 2000*

Singapore managed a brief recession through strategic government actions, including a controlled 20% depreciation of its currency and accelerating public projects, allowing a swift economic recovery within a year. In Japan, the crisis exacerbated trade imbalances, leading to a sharp recession as the yen plummeted and GDP growth dropped dramatically. Japan's attempt to establish the Asian Monetary Fund for economic autonomy failed due to lack of support from China and the U.S. China's controlled foreign exchange and investment strategy minimized its crisis impact, though it faced a slowdown in GDP growth, underscoring the need for structural reforms to address banking vulnerabilities and reduce U.S. trade dependency.

Significant in terms of both its magnitude and its scope, the Asian financial crisis becamea global crisis when it spread to the Russian and Brazilian economies.[33] Asset values throughout Asian economies plummeted during the Asian Financial Crisis. Larger banks had bought smaller,less stable banks, especially in Malaysia. Singapore was the only country to demonstrate some resilience, but it incurred considerable short-term losses due to its location near Malaysia and Indonesia and its status as a financial center. By 1999, Asia's economy was showing signs of recovery.[34] East and Southeast Asian economies agreed to increase financial control and stabilityafter the crisis. Many publicly traded companies were delisted due to inadequate financialregulation. Most crisis-affected nations stabilized growth at a slower but more sustainable rate.[35]



Figure 2 *- Selected Asian Exchange Rates Against US$*

The Crisis Catalysts

The Asian financial crisis was caused by industrial, financial, and monetary government policies that altered lender–borrower incentives. Many economists think that structural problems in the banking industry, notably non-market lending, regulatory blunders, and handling massive surges of mostly short-term capital flows, caused the East Asian confidence crisis.[36] Macroeconomic concerns included uneven capital inflows and outflows, high foreign debt, rising budget deficits, excessive bank lending, low debt-service ratios, and current account deficits. These challenges stemmed from export-led economic growth policies in the years before the crisis. [37] The large-scale financial inflows that the Asian economies encouraged led to increased demands on policies and institutions, especially those safeguarding the financial sector; and policies and institutions failed to keep pace with these demands.[38] Financial crisis debates showed the growing state's role in East Asia, with local and foreign issues cited. Various neoliberals blamed the collapse on global political economy structural issues, crony capitalism, and state interference. This section discusses how monetary policies, market weaknesses, and external influences caused the Asian Financial Crisis.

Capital Liberalization & Crony Capitalism

As Wade (1998) identifies, the preconditions of the Asian crisis in the 1990s were: (i) Very high rates of domestic savings, intermediated from households to firms via banks, creating a deep structure of domestic debt. (ii) Fixed exchange rate regimes, with currencies pegged to the US dollar (apart from Japan, and partially, Korea), that created the perception of little risk in movingfunds from one market to another. (iii) Liberalization of capital markets in the early to mid-1990sand deregulation of domestic financial systems at about the same time, without a compensating system of regulatory control. (iv) Vast international inflows of financial assets, coming from excess liquidity in Japan and Europe being channeled through financial institutions scouring Asiafor higher returns and lending at even lower nominal rates than domestic borrowers could borrowfrom domestic sources, creating a deep structure of foreign debt.[39]

AFC was caused by forceful financial liberalization, structural flaws from crony capitalism, and mid-1990s external economic shocks. Rapid capital liberalization in the mid-1990s, especially in Thailand and South Korea, allowed inexperienced domestic banks and firms to obtain huge, dollar-denominated loans from international lenders. The 1999 financial capital and foreign direct investment in Southeast Asia, paired with the fixed exchange rate regime, increaseddomestic money supply and inflation. Without strong regulatory oversight, dollar-denominated debts rose and Asian currencies devalued, causing economic bubbles, notably in real estate and certain industrial sectors.[40] Asian economies, especially Thailand, became an economic bubble fueled by hot money requiring more as the bubble grew.[41] In the meantime, Asian firms with high levels of debt to equity ratios, became vulnerable to financial shocks causing illiquidity, default and bankruptcy. With deep debt structures, the role of the state became crucial as the government became a powerful instrument for influencing the behavior of both firms andbanks.[42] This symbiotic relationship between businesses and governments created an environment that began in Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia and added complication to what was called "crony capitalism".[43] The Asian financial crisis grew due to insufficient bank regulation, financial rule enforcement, and hazardous government-directed lending. Governance issues and political uncertainty exacerbated the catastrophe. The preference for debt over equity left corporations unprepared for economic shocks. Due to key trading partners' currency devaluations, Asian economies were squeezed from all sides. The stronger U.S. dollar made Southeast Asian exports more expensive and less competitive in global markets. Additionally, Southeast Asia's export growth slowed considerably in spring 1996, worsening its current account balance. Due to high domestic inflation and dwindling export opportunities, investors shifted their money to real estate, creating a bubble. This bubble burst caused a financialcatastrophe that spread to foreign exchange markets, revealing fundamental flaws that crony capitalism and capital liberalization had hidden.[44]

Credit Crunch: Panic Among Lenders

The economist’s explanation for the Asian Crisis was the distortion of the lender-borrower relationship caused by inappropriate policies.[45] Through a series of financial panics, policy reactions, and economic contractions, the credit crunch turned into a crucial primary cause of theAsian Financial Crisis (AFC), ultimately intensifying the crisis's effects throughout Asia. The financial turmoil triggered panic among major lenders and investors who had earlier invested large amounts of capital, witnessing the successful prospects of Asian economies. This led to significant withdrawal of credit from the crisis countries resulting in a severe credit crunch and further bankruptcies. As foreign investors rushed to withdraw their assets, there was an overabundance of local currencies in the exchange markets leading to depreciation pressures on these currencies. In attempts to stabilize their currencies the governments of the most affected countries raised domestic interest rates to attract investors and used foreign reserves to buy up domestic currency, attempting to uphold fixed exchange rates. However, the very high interest rates proved detrimental to the economies as it resulted in the further depreciation of the Asian currency values in the foreign exchange market, leading to further and more serious bankruptcies.[46]

As discussed before, the burst of asset bubbles in real estate and stock markets, further forced the lenders to withdraw large amounts of credit from the Asian economies. The rapidity of the crisis has been emphasized by academics such as Joseph Stiglitz and JeffreySachs, who compare it to a traditional bank run caused by an abrupt shock to risk. They contend that the mechanics of the financial markets were more important than actual economic fundamentals.[47]

Political Dynamics

In explaining the AFC, economists frequently overlook political systemic factors that are profoundly ingrained in the power structures and political economy of these Asian economies. The convergence of political elements, relations between businesses and governments, and the principles of international political economy significantly influenced the commencement and culmination of the crisis. Since the financial crisis, close business-government relations, which were advantageous during the period of rapid economic expansion, have caused moral hazard, distorted the liberalization process, increased susceptibility to shocks, and complicated the adjustment process.[48] Before the crisis, South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia had reasonable government policy discussions. Deep-rooted political and institutional problems, frequently disregarded as corrupt activities, impacted business-government dynamics throughout Asia's economic disasters. In Indonesia, political commitments to favored private sector sectors, the absence of countervailing political checks, business influence, and the lack of transparency in business-government relations were structural issues. Political uncertainty prevented business-government cooperation from addressing growing issues quickly. These countries' authoritarian regimes, such as Indonesia under President Suharto, also affected decisive action. Late 1997 revealed the limitations of authoritarian control in Malaysia and Indonesia, including the potential of arbitrary reaction, the lack of transparency in business-government contacts, and the uncertainty of succession. Government credibility plummeted after Suharto's demise. The country with the most political transition also had the worst economic disaster.[49]

Recovery Frameworks: National and Global Responses to the AFC

The structural nature of the crisis is by itself enough to explain the protracted nature of the recovery process.[50] After the crisis escalated, the international community provided $118 billion in loans to South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia and other efforts to stabilize the affected states. US, European, and Asia-Pacific governments, the IMF, and the Asian Development Bank gave financial help. The main goal was to minimize long-term disruption to countries' relationships with external creditors while helping crisis-ridden nations rebuild their official reserve cushions and buying time for policy changes to restore confidence and stabilize economies.[51]

This section discusses the comprehensive steps, tactics, and policies taken by the most affected nations to stabilize their economy and avert repeat crises after the Asian Financial Crisis. National and international recovery efforts are examined. In addition, the part explores theIMF's crucial role in providing large rescue packages to these countries. It also highlights bilateral aid, regional cooperation frameworks, and other international financial entities.

National Strategies

Significant domestic policy changes were required before receiving aid in order to solve the fundamental flaws made clear by the crisis. Each nation had a different combination of strategies, but they all aimed to reduce debt, strengthen, and clean up weak financial institutions, and increase the economies' flexibility and competitiveness.[52]

The Thai government sought to revive economic development, continue economic transformation, and safeguard the most vulnerable during a recession. Thailand gradually lowered interest rates to stabilize the currency and boost economic growth. In mid-1998, money market rates returned to pre-crisis levels, and by September 1999, they had dropped to their lowest level in over a decade. Fiscal policy shifted from a 1% GDP budget surplus in 1997–1998to a growing deficit. Recapitalizing the banking system, stabilizing weak banks, and dissolving financing businesses were top priorities in financial sector restructuring. The administration expanded social safety net spending and medium-term fiscal consolidation to limit the national debt to protect crisis victims.

South Korea resolved crises by restoring trust and stabilizing financial markets. This policy combined macroeconomic and structural improvements. South Korea initially boosted interest rates to stabilize the won and avert a cycle of depreciation and inflation. This restored financial stability by early 1998. After the won stabilized, expansionary fiscal policy was implemented to ease the slump. Government, business, and labor reached an agreement tomodify laws and expand the social safety net, including public works and unemployment insurance. The structural reforms reorganized the corporate and financial sectors and deregulatedcapital accounts. The liquidation of nonviable institutions and liquidity support were needed to stabilize the financial sector quickly.

In August 1998, Indonesia began a thorough reform program under a new IMF deal. Tight monetary control, emergency imports, and subsidies reduced inflation and improved food security. Reforms included bank

and corporate restructuring, insolvency, deregulation, privatization, and better governance. These moves stabilized the rupiah, lowered inflation, interest rates, and foreign exchange reserves, boosting the stock market and market attitude.After the collapse of President Suharto in February 2000, the new administration and the IMF negotiated a $5 billion, three-year agreement to restructure state institutions, boost asset recovery, build financial markets, and improve banking control. Consumption and de-stocking drove the recovery, like in other Asian countries. Since inflation has been flat since June 1999, interest rates returned to pre-crisis levels.

Malaysia had stronger deposits, inflation, and external debt than other crisis-stricken nations. Finance and corporate sectors were stronger than in other afflicted countries. Thegovernment tightened fiscal and monetary policy and prioritized financial sector supervision, regulation, and intermediation. It adopted capital restrictions in September 1998 to regulate short-term portfolio movements and the Singapore offshore ringgit market. Malaysianconfidence rose due to optimistic macroeconomic management, corporate and financial restructuring, and regional recovery.

The Asian financial crisis forced the Chinese government to address its massive financial deficiencies, such as too many non-performing loans in its banking system and reliance on US commerce.[53] China made a highly regarded symbolic gesture by refusing to devalue its own currency (which presumably would have touched off a series of competitive devaluations with serious consequences for the region). Instead, China contributed $4 billion to neighboring countries via a combination of bilateral bailouts and contributing to IMF bailout packages.[54] In 1999, because of these actions, the World Bank described China as a "source of stability for theregion" in one of its reports.[55]

Instead of allowing labor markets to run, the National Wage Council of Singapore preemptively reduced the Central Provident Fund to lower labor costs without affecting disposable income or local demand. Unlike Hong Kong, the Straits Times Index fell 60% without direct financial market intervention. The Singaporean economy fully recovered and restarted growth in less than a year.[56]

Japan announced plans for cooperation loans with international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank. In October 1998, Japan proposed providing $30 billion to support Asia, and in December 1998, it proposeda total of $600 billion in special yen credits over the next three years.[57]

Role of IMF

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was called in to provide financial support for the three countries most seriously affected by the crisis: Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand. The strategy to address the crisis had three main components: Financing, Macroeconomic policies, and Structural reforms.[58] The policies reduced private money outflow and implemented stringent financial reforms. Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand received $35 billion, plus $85 billion from bilateral and multilateral sources. The IMF provided Thailand with $17 billion in financial aid onAugust 11, 1997. On August 20, 1997, another $2.9 billion bailout followed. These endeavors achieved considerable socioeconomic gains. From 1998 to 2006, income in Thailand's poorest areas climbed 46%, poverty rates fell, and income inequality fell. Thailand recovered by 2001 and paid off its IMF loan by 2003, three years early.[59] Indonesia signed a $10 billion, three-year IMF standby arrangement on November 5, 1997. The amount was increased by $1.4 billion in July 1998. Despite bilateral and international donor pledges, plan implementation faltered amid social and political upheaval. The newly elected Indonesian government renegotiated a $5 billionIMF pact in 2000 to stabilize the economy. [60] On December 4, 1997, Korea was granted approvalfor an IMF financing of about $21 billion spread over three years. Rebuilding foreign reserves, stabilizing Korea's external balances, and restructuring the business and financial sectors were allmade possible by this assistance. Due to its strong recovery, Korea was able to stop using the IMF money and even pay off part of its debt nine months ahead of schedule.[61] In addition to the financial assistance for programs of policy reform in these three countries, the IMF extended andaugmented the existing IMF-supported program for the Philippines in 1997 and arranged a stand-by facility in 1998. It also intensified its consultations with other countries affected by the crisis and provided policy advice on steps to help ward off contagion.[62]

In macroeconomic policies, monetary policy was tightened (at different times in differentcountries) to stop the collapse of exchange rates, which went far beyond fundamentals, and to stop currency depreciation from spiraling into inflation and depreciation. Indonesia and Korea kept fiscal policy constant, but Thailand tightened to reverse a deficit increase from the year before the crisis.[63]

The Asian Financial Crisis saw more intensive IMF structural reforms in partnership with local authorities and the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. The reforms focused on necessary financial sector adjustments due to the crisis's origins, including (a) closing insolvent financial institutions to prevent further losses; (b) recapitalizing viable institutions, often with government help; (c) improving central bank oversight of weak institutions; and (d) gradually strengthening financial supervision and regulation to international standards. Corporate debt restructuring was necessary but slow, slowing economic recovery. Changes included improving market efficiency and competitiveness, expanding social safety nets, and increasing corporate, financial, and

governmental transparency to protect vulnerable populations.[64]

Role of the International Community

Beyond IMF efforts, the worldwide community helped resolve the Asian Financial Crisis. To stabilize the economies, private sector creditors and international institutions provided financial aid, debt restructuring, and technical help. In addition to providing extensive analysis andmonitoring American bank threats, the Federal Reserve coordinated domestic and international policy reactions. The Fed helped large banks in South Korea avoid a disorderly default and secured a bridging loan for Thailand on behalf of the U.S. Treasury. At meetings like the FederalReserve Bank of New York's on December 24, 1997, American banks agreed to roll over their short-term debt to South Korean banks to convert it to medium-term loans. Similar cooperation occurred across the G-10. In response to the IMF's $18 billion rescue package, the AsianDevelopment Bank (ADB) provided $2.8 billion in quick loan payments. The Paris Club and London Club helped impacted countries restructure their foreign debt, easing debt repayment. These initiatives by international financial institutions and creditor groupings helped Asiannations recover from the crisis.

Figure 3 *- Timeline of the AFC (1997 - 1998) (Source: Corporate Finance Institute)*

Key Takeaways and Lessons Learnt

The AFC illustrates the dangers of cronyism over competition and rapid financial integration without regulatory control. The 1997–98 financial crisis showed the perils of early financial liberalization without regulatory frameworks, inappropriate exchange rate regimes, IMF prescriptions, and the lack of social safety nets in East Asia.[65] Below are some of the key lessons arising from the crisis:

(1) ***The Moral Hazard and Criticism of IMF*** - From the Asian Financial Crisis, we learnt to critically examine the IMF and moral hazard in international financial support. The IMF was criticized for its "one size fits all" approach, which transplanted Latin American policies to East Asia and imposed invasive and rigid criteria. The prescribed fiscalausterity measures intensified East Asia's economic and political issues, making this method unsuitable. The criticisms of the IMF diminished its prestige, resulting in heightened calls for a new international architecture to regulate the global economy.[66] Thecrisis also raised concerns about moral hazard, the idea that international aid like that from the IMF may encourage nations and investors to take more risks because they believe it can reduce losses. Based on the Great Depression, some believe IMF interventions reduce financial crises and their global impact, while others believe they encourage more hazardous policies and lending practices.[67]

(2) ***Preventive Measures -*** First, the crisis exposed asset bubble risks and the need for monitoring and good economic management to mitigate them.[68] Crisis prevention has become crucial, since the events highlighted the difficulty of containing crises. In this context some key lessons are -

(a) Improved Surveillance: The crisis showed the need for greater surveillance to spot vulnerabilities early, especially in exchange rates and financial systems, to prevent major catastrophes.

(b) Transparency: Increasing economic and financial openness is crucial. Publishing comprehensive economic statistics and financial indicators helps discipline markets, smooth financial information adjustments, and minimize crisisshocks.

(c) Cautious Liberalization: The crisis showed the perils of capital account liberalization before domestic financial system stability. It also raised concerns regarding liberalization sequencing, suggesting that short-term flows overlong-term ones can enhance susceptibility.[69]

(3) With the crisis, it became obvious that these economies' rapid expansion had disguised fundamental weaknesses. Years of fast domestic credit growth and poor supervisory control have built up financial leverage and dubious loans. Overheating local economies and real estate markets raised risks and reliance on foreign savings, resulting in current account deficits and external debt. Longstanding currency pegs had hidden exchange rate and funding problems, but heavy foreign borrowing, frequently at short maturities, exposed firms, and banks. The unsustainable pegs caused enterprises' external obligations to rise sharply in local currency, causing misery and even insolvency. The Asian financialcrisis highlighted the shortcomings of regional organizations, such as APEC and ASEAN, sparking discussion on their future. Both organizations were criticized for their unstructured, non-legalistic institutionalism. ASEAN was more open to institutionalreform, while East Asian regional forums still use informal institutions.[70]

III. The Global Financial Crisis (2008)

The consensus is that Asia's quick progress can be attributed to the region's receptiveness to international trade and finance. Despite the general agreement, the significant advancements made by these nations in establishing internal organizations, strategies, and industrial capabilities, along with their robust growth during the initial stage of the current worldwide financial crisis, prompted certain individuals to theorize that the Asian economies had become independent from the advanced economies of North America and Europe. Given the significant shocks experienced by advanced economies in the past two years, along with their strongeconomic and financial connections to Asia, it is not surprising that Asia was severely affected by the global downturn, despite the fact that the initial causes of the crisis were elsewhere.[71] The widespread default of U.S. subprime loans in 2007 erupted into a major financial crisis that spilled over to Asia and the rest of the world. The initial impact of the global financial crisis (GFC) recalled the trauma that engulfed Asia only a decade ago[72] Many emerging marketeconomies, both in Asia and elsewhere, strengthened their financial and economic foundations inthe years after the late 1990s financial crisis by improving their external debt and fiscal positions,increasing their foreign exchange reserves, and restructuring their banking industries. Therefore, when the financial crisis started in the summer of 2007, the economies of Asia seemed well-positioned to evade its harshest consequences. But the challenges facing the economies of Asia seemed to amplify towards the end of 2007, at the same time as the US economy went into recession. Asian equity markets began to decline yet again; they would underperform international markets for the majority of 2008. Additional indications of financial strain also surfaced, such as expanding credit spreads. Many of the region's economies were slowing down by the second quarter of 2008, and growth had stopped in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan—small, open economies that are especially vulnerable to changes in the world economy.The global financial crisis reached unprecedented heights in September and October of 2008. Global demand and production fell precipitously as a result of the crisis' effects on asset values, loan availability, and corporate and consumer confidence.[73] The scale of capital outflows and thecollapse in real activity in late 2008 were as large as those experienced during the height of the Asian financial crisis (AFC). The crisis soon spread to the real sector, pushing the economy into a deep recession, and putting millions of Asians out of work. Although the regions staged a V shaped recovery in 1999, the crisis was a game changer that put a rude stop to the vaunted “East Asian miracle.”[74]

Yet this time outcome was different from 10 years ago and from other similar economies,there was no full-blown financial crisis or sharp destructive external adjustments.[75] Several Asian economies, including Indonesia, continued to grow, while others like Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore quickly recovered after initial declines in output. The crisis had a limited short-term impact on Asia, primarily affecting the real economy through reduced trade. Comparing the terrible effects of the East Asian crisis ten years prior to the Global Financial Crisis, Asia showedremarkable resilience. Given the severity of the global shock and the region's extensive integration into the global economy, its resilience is especially impressive. Asia's capacity to sustain systemic stability over such a large global downturn, while not impervious, underscores the region's increased economic resilience.[76]

This section investigates the question - “Why did Asian countries fare better during the global financial crisis than during the Asian financial crisis?” It begins by examining the geographical impact of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) on Asian economies, emphasizingtheir resilience compared to the Asian Financial Crisis. Next, the analysis examines macroeconomic performance and policy responses during the GFC, emphasizing the stability of interest rates and exchange rates compared to the AFC. The section then compares macroeconomic performance and policy responses during both crises to identify characteristics that increased resilience during the GFC. The study then examines GFC lessons, focusing on strategic adaptations and economic management changes. Final policy recommendations and future implications for Asian economies provide strategies to maintain resilience and manage future crises.

The Asian Experience - Regional Impacts

The financial crisis that began in the West spread across Asia through the most important transmission

channel - international trade. With trade falling sharply around the world, countriesmost open to trade, such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Malaysia, suffered, on average, the greatest declines in growth relative to trend. In fact, during that time, theGDP contractions in a few Asian economies were comparable to those that occurred during the late 1990s Asian financial crisis. In the final quarter of 2008 and the first quarter f 2009, real GDP growth in the six Asian economies indicated above—plus Japan—declined by around 13 to20 percentage points at an annual rate in comparison to pre-crisis trends.[77] The GFC hit Asia hard in two ways: capital fled the region and exports fell.[78] BIS-reporting banks' cross-border claims on Asia declined by about 15 percent between the third quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009. This was roughly twice the reduction experienced in other regions and surpassedthe decline seen during the worst of the AFC.[79] Between September 2008 and February 2009, exports plummeted by 30 percent. This was comparable to the decline seen in other regions, and three times more severe than during the AFC. Industrial production for highly export dependent economies such as Hong Kong SAR, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, was sharply lower. Even the larger economies that were not as export dependent, such as China and Indonesia, experienced a small decline.[80] Asia's overall output decreased as a result for two quarters in a row. On an annualized basis, the real GDP of Asia, excluding China and India, decreased by 8% in the first quarter of 2009 and 11% in the fourth quarter of 2008. Compared to other areas, notably the countries in the center of the crisis, the initial decline in output was more severe.

In many countries, there was also a notable decline in exchange rates subsequent to the external shocks. The initial shockwave primarily struck nations with very open capital markets, such as Korea and Indonesia, or those with current account deficits and growing foreign liabilities in their banking systems.[81] The depreciations were nevertheless smaller and smoother than during the AFC, as were the current account adjustments (Figure 4). The relatively modest adjustment in the exchange rate and current account reflected external imbalances that were not as large as during the AFC.[82] Remarkably, financial stress still harmed emerging market economies even if the collapse of the market for structured credit products and other asset-backed securities did not directly affect these countries' financial institutions. Even though many of these countries appeared to be far better positioned to weather an economic crisis than in the past, capital flowedaway from those that had historically been seen as more vulnerable, including some emerging Asian economies, as international investors' appetite for risk vanished.[83] Asia's financial sector remained stable through the crisis. While Asian output and exports were hit hard, their monetary and financial systems were largely resilient. The financial shocks from the advanced economies were felt in Asia through a variety of channels, including the drying up of trade credit and cross-border capital flows, the pullback by global banks, heightened risk aversion, and a sharp fall in asset values.[84] There were no full-blown banking or balance of payment crises, or very sharp current account adjustments, as there were during the AFC (Figure 2). Most countries did not see a significant deterioration in financial soundness indicators and Asian currencies strengthened relative to their pre-crisis levels in a short span of time.[85]



Figure 4:Asia: Financial and Trade Shocks during the Global Financial Crisis



Figure 5. Banking Crises and Credit Growth



***Figure 6**- Asia: Recovery from the Global Financial Crisis*

Asia used fiscal and monetary stimulus measures immediately to lessen the impact of the global financial crisis. Numerous Asian nations were able to implement a thorough and forceful countercyclical policy response because of their low levels of inflation and public debt, credible monetary policies, and fiscal surpluses. The crisis was lessened by aggressive monetary easing, which included cutting reserve requirements and policy rates, significant fiscal stimulus plans, and hitherto unheard-of measures by central banks to guarantee that financial systems hadenough liquidity and support.[86] Asia's economy and exports started to recover in March 2009 (Figure 6). By the second quarter of 2010, three quarters ahead of the full recovery of global trade, strong competitive positions—in certain cases boosted by exchange rate depreciation—andstrong import demand within the area, particularly from China, helped push Asian exports above the pre-crisis level. For the first time, Asia's contribution to the global recovery exceeded that of other regions at the end of 2010 and into 2011. Asia was leading the global recovery. Capital inflows also quickly resumed. Within just 6 quarters, BIS-reporting banks' cross border claimson Asia rose from a trough in early 2009 to a new high in late 2010, much shorter than the decade it took to recover from the AFC.[87]

Macroeconomic Performance and Policy Responses

The main factors underpinning Asia's resilience were: (i) the regions' macroeconomic performance and (ii) policy responses. The AFC demonstrated the potential danger to macroeconomic stability posed by financial imbalances in banks and corporations, highlighting the interconnectedness between them and the necessity of financial sector reform to mitigate critical vulnerabilities. In response, policymakers in Asia implemented a more assertive and rigorous strategy for overseeing the banking sector to guarantee idiosyncratic hazards were actively observed and resolved. They also utilized macro-prudential tools to address rising systemic concerns in the financial industry. Asia was at the forefront of implementing various measures to control unsustainable financial imbalances. These measures included restrictions on loan-to-value, debt-to-income, and credit growth, as well as limits on currency and maturity mismatches. Additionally, modifications were made to reserve requirements and risk weights. The move to a more flexible exchange rate policy in the region also acted as an effective shock absorber. [88] Specifically, the financial sector in Asia was not heavily reliant on borrowing money or obtaining funding from wholesale sources to grow. It was also considered to be well regulated. In this context three observations can be made - (1) Private sector borrowing in the five years leading up to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) was relatively low compared to advanced countries, and in some cases, it grew at a slower pace than the overall economic growth rate measured by GDP. In the nations that saw the most significant impact from the AsianFinancial Crisis (AFC), there was a prolonged period after the crisis where there was a reduction in private lending by approximately 40-50 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP); (2) Prior to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the credit to deposit ratios in most Asian countries were approximately 100 percent or

below, which is significantly different from the situation in many industrialized countries and developing European economies; and (3) The banking system had a strong capital base consisting of high-quality capital. The proportion of nonperforming loans in relation to total loans was small, and the risk associated with subprime loans or complex credit products, such as collateralized debt obligations, was minimal due to rigorous regulatory limits.[89] Banks primarily maintained a positive net foreign asset position and showed reduced susceptibility to external shocks during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). They did not experience a prolonged and severe shortage of funds and were also capable of readily absorbing losses on their international securities holdings. The ASEAN-5 countries made substantial effortsto enhance prudential regulation and supervision, specifically in response to the AFC. [90] Furthermore, Asian countries had limited exposure to immediate external debts, and the risk of not being able to renew these debts was minimal. As a result, the declining exchange rate was able to absorb the first impact. Most countries had current account surpluses, which varied from 2 percent to over 25 percent of GDP, hence reducing the necessity for net external funding. In the nine Asian countries, the ratio of short-term external debt to foreign reserves was less than 100 percent. Following the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), nations with floating exchange rates as well as managed or pegged arrangements experienced a substantial increase in their foreign reserves. This buildup helped to prevent speculative attacks from occurring.[91]Among the Asian countries, the economies that were most impacted by the spread of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), such as Korea, were specifically those that had rapid growth in creditand had higher deficits in their current accounts. These deficits were financed by borrowing in foreign currencies. Nevertheless, many economies managed to prevent the most severe consequences by implementing effective policy measures, such as receiving assistance from central banks in the form of liquidity support. In Korea, the exchange rates were permitted to decrease in relation to the U.S. dollar, resulting in a depreciation of roughly 30 percent. This depreciation played a role in transforming Korea's current account from a deficit in the third quarter of 2008 to a surplus in early 2009. In addition to its substantial foreign reserves, Korea also established U.S. dollar swap lines with the Federal Reserve to enhance market trust. Asia's resilience was also influenced by its regional dynamism and China's robust economic performance, despite certain unique characteristics.[92]

Stronger Than Expected Rebound in Asia - What was different?

Asia's surprising resilience is one of the most striking stylized facts about the global financial crisis. Contrary to the widespread fears, Asia never suffered a financial crisis, although it did suffer a trade crisis that halted its growth. From the Asian perspective, the root cause of both the AFC and the GFC was the sudden outflow of foreign capital. During the Asian financial crisis, the region suffered a massive reversal and withdrawal of capital inflows as investor Confidence in the region evaporated. During the global crisis, US and European financial institutions withdrew their funds from Asia to support their badly damaged balance sheets at home. However, despite the common central role of foreign capital in both the crises, the Asian crisis had a more market deep impact on east Asia economy than the global financial crisis.[93] Apart from the initial stresses that affected all markets, there were no severe financial dislocations— interest rates and exchange rates remained stable in most countries. In this section, the paper sheds some light on why this is the case, and to do this the paper makes a comparative analysisof two factors - (a) macroeconomic performance of the Asian economies during AFC and GFC, and (b) policy responses of the Asian economies during the two crises.

Park, et al (2013) in their empirical assessment of the level of depth and recovery of the GFC show - first, economic factors have a substantial impact on the probability of a crisis. Foreign exchange reserves, real exchange rate, appreciation, domestic credit, pre-crisis, real GDPgrowth, the current account, inflation, and export shares significantly contribute to the likelihood of a crisis; second, the severity of a crisis is indeed influenced by economic fundamentals. The key factors that appear to be of utmost importance are the inflation rate, domestic credit expansion, and the pre-crisis GDP growth rate; third, the policy stands during the crisis matters while monitoring and fiscal tightening have an impact, countercyclical, expansionary, monetary and fiscal policy, can mitigate the impact of a crisis and contribute to a more robust recovery.[94]

In the context of the macroeconomic performance of Asian countries, the paper categorizes them under two time periods - (a) macroeconomic behavior during both the crisesand (b) macroeconomic behavior prior to both the crises.

During the Crises - Figure 7 and Figure 8 illustrates the comparative behavior of several significant macroeconomic indicators during the two crises. The global crisis resulted in arecession that was noticeably less severe and a recovery that was significantly rapid. The decline of the currency rate versus the US dollar was far less during the global crisis. Following the Asian crisis, the five countries had a significant increase in external demand, leading to a boom in exports. Exports had a significant decline following the global crisis. This is logically reasonable considering exports to the developed economies. The United States played a crucial role in driving the economic revival of Asia in 1999. During the global crisis, the advanced economies served as the focal point of the crisis and played a significant role in the decline of global trade. Investment declined following.

The Asian crisis, although it endured, fared relatively better compared to the global crisis. Fiscal policy exhibited divergent trends during the two crises, with Asia experiencing a robust fiscal boom following the global crisis. A widespread implementation of significant fiscal contraction was followed by the Asian crisis. During the Asian crisis, these countries implemented fiscal contraction in line with IMF policy prescriptions, which exacerbated the slump. However, the Asian countries swiftly and effectively enacted substantial fiscal stimulus programs, which boosted overall demand and laid the groundwork for economic recovery. Subsequently, the data suggests that Asian countries fared significantly better throughout the global crisis due to their stronger domestic demand. During the 2008 crisis, the central bank swiftly implemented expansionary monetary policy to stimulate growth by injecting money into the financial sector. Conversely, central banks increased interest rates throughout the Asian crisis. The purpose of implementing higher interest rates was to reduce capital outflows and rebuild the trust of financial markets. They had a detrimental effect on the economy. The Asian crisis was mostly caused by internal structural issues, while foreign demand played a significant role in helping the five countries recover by boosting their exports. From the perspective of the five countries with strong domestic fundamentals in 2007 to 2008, the global crisis was mostly an external problem.[95]



Figure 7 - Real GDP growth rate and exchange rate of Asian economies during the AFC and theGFC. Source: Park, D., Ramayandi, A., & Shin, K. (2013) Pp 106



Figure 8 - Real export growth rate and Investment rate of Asian economies during AFC andGFC. Source: Park, D., Ramayandi, A., & Shin, K. (2013) Pp 107

Pre-Crisis Indicators - Prior to both crises, the EA-5 countries had a substantial increase in their economic growth, surpassing their potential output and leading to notable output disparities. Nevertheless, the disparities before the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) werefar less significant in comparison to those preceding the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC). This indicates that although both periods had economic overheating, the intensity was more pronounced in the years leading up to the AFC.

In the years leading up to the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), inflation rates were generally higher than in the years preceding the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). This wasa result of increased aggregate demand pressures prior to the AFC. During the decade leading up to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), nations such as the Republic of Korea and the Philippines experienced inflation rates that were lower than their usual rates, suggesting that inflation was not a major concern at that time.

Prior to the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the proportion of investment in relation to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) wasnotably greater during the AFC compared to the GFC. Prior to the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), there was a strong correlation between high investment rates and significant imports, leading to current account imbalances. By comparison, the period before the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) experienced investment levels that were more moderate and current account deficits that were narrower. However, after the crisis, the current account deficits turned positive as a result of reduced imports and increased exports, which were made possible by competitive devaluations.

The exchange rate policies of the EA-5 countries were also highly influential in relation to external debt. Before the AFC, exchange rate regimes that were regulated or actively manipulated resulted in currencies being overvalued, which made imports more affordable and promoted borrowing from outside sources. Consequently, there was a significant increase in external debt, which became unmanageable due to the fast depreciation of currencies during the crisis. In contrast, prior to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), these countries had implemented exchange rate regimes that were more adaptable, therefore decreasing the probability of experiencing comparable crises.

The fiscal and monetary policies during the two crises exhibited notable differences. Prior to the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), it was necessary to implement high interest rates to prevent the outflow of capital, which had a negative impact on the actual economy. Nevertheless, before the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), there wasa larger opportunity to decrease interest rates, which effectively boosted domestic demand. The AFC led to more limitations on fiscal policy because of the necessity to handle substantial public debts and rescue collapsing institutions. Conversely, prior to the GFC, more favorable fiscal circumstances enabled the implementation of assertive stimulus measures that bolstered growth within the crisis.

To summarize, the macroeconomic conditions and policy responses in the EA-5 countries before the AFC and GFC were significantly distinct. The period preceding the GFC was characterized by well-managed economic policies, less excessive growth, and stronger financial institutions. The resilience of these economies during the Global Financial Crisis was stronger compared to the Asian Financial Crisis due to these characteristics.

IV. Conclusion

This paper highlights the significant knowledge gained by Asian economies from the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) of 1997, which later improved their ability to withstand the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008. The paper outlines a distinct path of policy reforms and macroeconomic adjustments that strengthened Asia's economic systems, allowing for a stronger reaction to global financial instability.

Through a rigorous comparative analysis, it becomes clear that the proactive reforms implemented following the AFC, such as the adoption of more adaptable exchange rate regimes, enhanced supervision of the banking sector, and the development of more extensive capital markets, playeda crucial role in reducing the effects of the GFC. The changes not only brought stability to the financial sector but also protected the economies from possible shocks.

The study emphasizes that Asia greatly profited from its robust current account balances and substantial foreign exchange reserves during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Theseadvantages were a direct result of the strict economic measures implemented during the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC). The combination of these variables, along with the purposeful implementation of expansionary fiscal and monetary policies during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), stands in stark contrast to the contractionary policies utilized during the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), highlighting a trend towards more agile economic management.

In addition to the achievements mentioned, the report highlights persistent weaknesses, such as the substantial amounts of debt held by corporations and households in several Asian economies. To protect against future crises, it is necessary to address these weaknesses and improve regional cooperation and financial integration.

This study makes an important contribution to economic discourse by not only examiningthe factors that lead to increased economic resilience in Asia, but also by proposing potential directions for future economic

policy and research. Furthering this research could entail a more thorough examination of the socio-political determinants that impact the formulation of economic policies in Asia, so enhancing our nuanced comprehension of the intricate relationship between policy, economic stability, and growth.

Overall, this research confirms the significance of flexible policy frameworks in handlingcrises and highlights Asia's active involvement in the global economy. Asia is well-prepared to tackle future challenges with strong tactics influenced by past experiences.