

Game Theory As An Art of Making Strategic Decision

Mobin Ahmad

Department of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Jazan University, Jazan 45142, Saudi Arabia

Corresponding Author: Mobin Ahmad

Abstract: Game theory, the investigation of strategic decision-making, unites dissimilar teaches such as mathematics, brain research and theory. The importance of game theory to current investigation and decision-making can be gagged by the way that since 1970, upwards of 12 driving market analysts and researchers have been granted the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for their commitments to game theory. Game theory is connected in various fields including business, bank, financial aspects, political science, brain research, mathematics, computer science, military, and sports. For this situation, we investigate the establishments of game theory and break down the game theory strategies for the decision-making in business firms. Game Theory is a powerful tool for Decision-making particularly in the Oligopoly Markets where a reliance of the merchants exists. With respect to that the reason for this paper is twofold. To start with, it speaks to the primary models of oligopoly and in addition the idea of their strategic behavior; second, it examines how the Theory of Games might be connected for strategic decision-making.

Keywords: Game theory, strategic, decision-making, mathematics, importance.

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I. Introduction

In game theory, the term game means a specific kind of contention in which n of people or gatherings take part. A rundown of standards stipulates the conditions under which the game begins, the conceivable legitimate "moves" at each stage of play, the aggregate number of moves constituting the whole of the game, and the terms of the result toward the finish of play. Result, or result, is a game theory term alluding to what occurs toward the finish of a game [1]. In such games as chess or checkers, result might be as basic as pronouncing a victor or a failure. In poker or other betting circumstances the result is typically cash; its sum is foreordained by risks and wagers amassed amid the course of play, by rates or by other settled sums figured on the chances of winning, et cetera.

A game is said to be a zero-sum game if the aggregate sum of settlements toward the finish of the game is zero. Thus, in a zero-sum game the aggregate sum won is precisely equivalent to the sum lost. In financial contexts, zero-sum games are equal to stating that no generation or pulverization of merchandise happens inside the "game economy" being referred to. Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern appeared in 1944 that any n -person on-zero-sum game can be lessened to a $n + 1$ zero sum game, and that such $n + 1$ individual games can be summed up from the extraordinary instance of the two person zero sum game [2]. Subsequently, such games constitute a noteworthy piece of mathematical game theory. A standout amongst the most important theorems in this field sets up that the different parts of maximal minimal system apply to every one of the two people zero sum games. Known as the minima theorem, it was first demonstrated by von Neumann in 1928; others later prevailing with regards to demonstrating the hypothesis with an assortment of strategies in more broad terms. These outcomes demonstrate that sound decision in strategic games can be portrayed by the same psychological standards at play in nonstrategic settings, and that models in view of imperative fulfillment can give an extensive variety of important bits of knowledge with respect to the intellectual premise of human thinking, judgment, and decision-making [3].

II. Review Of Literature

Applications of game theory are boundless and represent relentlessly developing enthusiasm for the subject. Von Neumann and Morgenstern showed the quick utility of their work on mathematical game theory by connecting it with economic behavior [4]. Models can be created, truth be told, for business sectors of different wares with differing numbers of purchasers and dealers, fluctuating estimations of free market activity, and occasional and repeating varieties, and also critical basic contrasts in the economies concerned. Here game theory is particularly significant to the examination of irreconcilable situations in maximizing profits and advancing the most stretched out circulation of merchandise and enterprises [5]. Impartial division of property and of legacy is another region of lawful and financial worry that can be contemplated with the procedures of game theory [6].

In the social sciences, n-individual game theory has fascinating utilizations in considering, for instance, the circulation of energy in authoritative methods. This problem can be translated as a three-person game at the congressional level including vetoes of the president and votes of agents and congresspersons, investigated in wording of successful or fizzled coalitions to pass a given bill. Problems of greater part lead and individual decision-making are additionally manageable to such investigation. Sociologists have built up a whole branch of game theory committed to the investigation of issues including bunch decision-making [7]. Disease transmission experts likewise make utilization of game theory, particularly as for inoculation procedures and methods of testing an immunization or other medicine. Military strategists swing to game theory to examine irreconcilable circumstances settled through "fights" where the result or result of a given war game is either triumph or annihilation. Generally, such games are not illustrations of zero-sum games, for what one player loses as far as lives and damage is not won by the victor [8]. A few employments of game theory in investigations of political and military occasions have been scrutinized as a dehumanizing and conceivably unsafe distortion of essentially entangling factors. Investigation of monetary circumstances is additionally generally more confused than zero-sum games in view of the generation of products and enterprises inside the play of a given "game." [9]

III. Game Theoretic Decision Making

In strategic games, two or more players make choices over a set of strategies. Crucially, the strategies chosen by the players collectively determine the outcomes of the game, so that each player's utility depends on the other's choice as well as on their own. We define a finite-strategy two-player game with a set of pure strategies for each player, $S_1 = \{s_{11}, \dots, s_{1N}\}$ and $S_2 = \{s_{21}, \dots, s_{2M}\}$ respectively, and a pair of payoff functions u_1 and u_2 that give each player's utility for each profile of pure strategies (s_{1i}, s_{2j}) . Thus if player 1 selects s_{1i} and player 2 selects s_{2j} the utility for player 1 is $u_1(s_{1i}; s_{2j})$ and the utility for player 2 is $u_2(s_{2j}; s_{1i})$. we use the notation u_{ij} as a shortcut for $(u_1(s_{1i}; s_{2j}), u_2(s_{2j}; s_{1i}))$.

The most standard solution concept for a strategic game is Nash equilibrium, which relies on common knowledge of rationality and accurate (so-called "rational") expectations. Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile in which no player can obtain higher utility by unilaterally changing her strategy; each player is already playing a best response to the equilibrium strategy profile. We define the set of best responses for player μ to an opponent's strategy $s_{-\mu}$ as $BR(s_{-\mu}) = \arg \max_{s_\mu} u_\mu(s_\mu; s_{-\mu})$. then a pure strategy Nash equilibrium can be defined as a strategy profile (s_{1i}, s_{2j}) such that $s_{1i} \in BR(s_{2j})$ and $s_{2j} \in BR(s_{1i})$.

The concept of Nash equilibrium can be generalized to relax the assumption that players somehow have correct expectations about what others will do. The solution concept of rationalizability retains the assumption of common knowledge of rationality, but imposes no additional constraints on behavior. As in Nash equilibrium, player's best respond to the strategy they expect their opponent to select, but in contrast to Nash equilibrium, this expectation is not necessarily correct. Players must only be able to "rationalize" their strategy choice as a best response to one of the opponent's rationalizable strategies. We define the set of rationalizable strategies for each player as the maximal sets R_1 and R_2 such that any $s_1 \in R_1$ satisfies $s_1 \in BR(s_{2j})$ for some $s_{2j} \in R_2$ and any $s_2 \in R_2$ satisfies $s_2 \in BR(s_{1i})$ for some $s_{1i} \in R_1$. clearly, any Nash equilibrium profile is rationalizable, and if the sets of rationalizable strategies are singletons, then these strategies form Nash equilibrium.

IV. Game Theory Strategies For Decision Making

Expect that two Business Firms in Srikakulam are seeking Market Share for a specific item. Each firm is thinking about what special technique to utilize for the coming time frame. Expect that the accompanying result matrix describes the expansion in piece of the overall industry for firm A and diminish in piece of the overall industry for firm B. Decide the discretionary system for each firm.

Firm	B			
A		Low advt.	Medium advt.	High advt.
	Low advt.	10	12	15
	Medium advt.	14	13	16
	High advt.	11	09	12

Applying saddle point approach in game theory strategy

Firm	B				Row Minimum
A		Low advt.	Medium advt.	High advt.	
	Low advt.	10	12	15	10
	Medium advt.	14	13	16	13
	High advt.	11	09	12	09
Column Maximum		14	13	16	

From the above table it is observed that the maximum value of row minimum was equals to minimum value of column maximum ad both equals to the corresponding value i.e. 13 Hence we can conclude that the value of the game is 13.

Also applying the dominance rule in game theory strategy

Firm	B			
A		Low advt.	Medium advt.	High advt.
	Low advt.	10	12	15
	Medium advt.	14	13	16
	High advt.	11	09	12

All the elements of Low advt. row were dominated by corresponding elements of Medium advt. hence the inferior low advt. row to be deleted.

Firm	B			
A		Low advt.	Medium advt.	High advt.
	Medium advt.	14	13	16
	High advt.	11	09	12

Similarly all the elements of High advt. row were dominated by corresponding elements of Medium advt. hence the inferior high advt. row to be deleted.

Firm	B			
A		Low advt.	Medium advt.	High advt.
	Medium advt.	14	13	16

Also the column wise, all the elements of Medium advt. column were dominated by corresponding elements of Low advt. hence the superior Low advt. column to be deleted.

Firm	B		
		Medium advt.	High advt.
A	Medium advt.	13	16

Similarly all the elements of Medium advt. column were dominated by corresponding elements of High advt. hence the superior High advt. column to be deleted.

Firm	B	
		Medium advt.
A	Medium advt.	13

Hence the selected strategy to be implemented was Medium Advertisement is needed for the promotion of market share.

V. Types Of Games

a) Symmetric and asymmetric: A symmetric game is a game where the settlements for playing a specific methodology depend just on alternate techniques utilized, not on who is playing them. In the event that the personalities of the players can be changed without changing the result to the methodologies, at that point a game is symmetric. Huge numbers of the usually considered 2×2 games are symmetric. The standard portrayals of chicken, the detainee's situation, and the stag chase are all symmetric games. Most ordinarily contemplated asymmetric games are games where there are not indistinguishable methodology sets for both players [10]. For example, the ultimatum game and comparably the dictator game have diverse methodologies for each player. It is conceivable, be that as it may, for a game to have indistinguishable systems for both players, yet be awry. For instance, the game pictured to the privilege is lopsided regardless of having indistinguishable technique sets for both players.

b) Zero-sum: Zero-sum games are a unique instance of consistent sum games, in which decisions by players can neither increment nor diminish the accessible assets. In zero-sum games the add up to profit to all players in the game, for each mix of systems, dependably includes to zero (all the more casually, a player benefits just at the equivalent cost of others). Poker embodies a zero sum game (overlooking the likelihood of the house's cut), since one wins precisely the sum one's rivals lose. Other zero-sum games include coordinating pennies and most established board games including Go and chess.

c) Simultaneous and sequential: Simultaneous games are games where both players move at the same time, or on the off chance that they don't move all the while, the later players are uninformed of the earlier players' activities (making them successfully synchronous). Sequential games (or dynamic games) are games where later players have some learning about prior activities. This need not be ideal data about each activity of earlier players; it may be next to no information. For example, a player may realize that an earlier player did not perform one specific activity, while he doesn't know which of the other accessible activities the first player really performed. The distinction amongst synchronous and sequential games is caught in the diverse portrayals talked about above. Frequently, typical shape is utilized to speak to simultaneous games, and broad frame is utilized to speak to consecutive ones; despite the fact that this isn't a strict manage in a technical sense.

d) Perfect information and imperfect information: An important subset of consecutive games consists of games of culminate data. A game is one of immaculate data if all players know the moves already made by all other players. In this manner, just consecutive games can be games of consummate data, since in simultaneous games not every player knows the activities of the others. Most games examined in game theory are blemished data games. Perfect-information games incorporate chess. Culminate data is frequently mistaken for finish data, which is a comparable idea. Finish data requires that every player know the techniques and adjustments of the other players however not really the activities.

e) Infinitely long games: Games, as contemplated by financial specialists and true game players, are for the most part completed in limitedly many moves. Pure mathematicians are not all that obliged, and set theorists in specific study games that keep going for vastly many moves, with the champ (or other result) not known until after every one of those moves are completed.

f) Discrete and continuous games: Much of game theory is worried about limited, discrete games that have a limited number of players, moves, occasions, results, and so forth. Numerous ideas can be broadened, be that as it may. Continuous games allow players to pick a system from a ceaseless methodology set. For example, Cournot rivalry is commonly displayed with players' methodologies being any non-negative amounts, including partial amounts (this is a game for duopolies).

VI. Conclusion

Game theory has numerous applications. It can be connected to numerous fields of study and numerous different situations. It is utilized as a part of both everyday life and in mathematical analysis. We can utilize result grids and game trees to represent games. There are two primary sorts of games: zero-sum games and non-zero-sum games. We can utilize the minima theorem to examine zero-sum games, and we can utilize the Nash equilibrium to break down both zero-sum and non-zero-sum games. Game theory is the investigation of reasonable conduct in circumstances including relationship. It is a formal approach to break down communication among a gathering of reasonable people who carry on deliberately. A game consists of a set of players, an arrangement of moves (or techniques) accessible to those players, and a detail of adjustments for every blend of systems. Most helpful games are introduced in the trademark work frame, while the broad and the ordinary structures are utilized to characterize no cooperative games. Game theory is an investigation of strategic decision making. Specifically, it is "the investigation of mathematical models of contention and participation between insightful balanced decision makers".

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