IOSR Journal of Humanities And Social Science (IOSR-JHSS)
Volume 25, Issue 12, Series 4 (December. 2020) 40-41
e-ISSN: 2279-0837, p-ISSN: 2279-0845.
www.iosrjournals.org

The Most Encompassing Absolute

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Abstract
This paper is about The Liar Paradox, language, logic, and the differences between opposing, and negating: the truth may never be told but that does not mean one always lies.
Keywords: Liar, paradox, logic, language, translation

Date of Submission: 28-11-2020 Date of Acceptance: 13-12-2020

I. INTRODUCTION

The root of the success of The Liar, when this paradox is put against its competitors – say sorites or dichotomy – is that there is essential misconception in language deriving from computer science reasoning being applied to other realms: negating a sentence is not necessarily stating its opposite.
A very special set of words, which we call soritical, allows for the largest amount of confusion: the negation of I LIE is not I DON'T LIE.
That is the contrary instead.
The negation of I LIE is I MAY TELL THE TRUTH.
That is equivalent to I SOMETIMES TELL THE TRUTH, and I DON'T LIE.
This sometimes could still, when put to the strongest side of the spectrum, mean I OFTEN TELL THE TRUTH or I ALMOST DON'T LIE or I DON'T LIE.
Language has to be richer than logic, also in the opposite direction to that of the previous analysis, and here part of such a proof is.

II. DEVELOPMENT

If we are matching logical tags with natural language, what is missing is studying the metalanguage deeper: if something is false, then the negation of that something is true; not its opposite.
I DON'T LIE ~ (A) I ALWAYS TELL THE TRUTH/I OFTEN TELL THE TRUTH/I ALWAYS DON'T LIE
I LIE ~ (B) I OFTEN DON'T TELL THE TRUTH/I NEVER TELL THE TRUTH/I SOMETIMES DON'T TELL THE TRUTH
The paradox exists for those without a mind that can see beyond what the classical machines see, so not trained in the ways of communication or human language, since, for them, A is equivalent to {there is at least one x such that x belongs to X and x is not in Y}, where X is all that is said, and Y is all that is false.
Therefore one sentence, for those, means all three sentences defining A. That is then the most encompassing absolute.
Yet, in language, the meaning of 'often', and 'always' is completely different at least sometimes.
B is equivalent to {there is at least one x such that x is in X implies x is in Y}.
Once more, in language, the three sentences will be distinct: 'never', and 'often' offer remarkable contrast.
Either we deal exclusively with the truths of the logic or with the truths of language therefore so far.
Here, once more, there is validation: the world of purely human language is much larger than both the world of objective language, and the world of logic.
Going back to the past should not be possible if time is all (Pinheiro 2016), so if we include a coordinate of placement in time to go together with the assertions. As said before, 'if I told you' is on t_0, 'would you believe me?' is on t_1. Then …(Pinheiro 2012).
Believing still equates truth values for the person answering the question, and, according to the constraints of Classical Logic, the truth values are the most commonly seen, so TRUE, and FALSE.
If I told you I always lie (all in t_0)
- FALSE: You sometimes tell the truth
- TRUE: You have just lied, then you sometimes tell the truth
Now ½, or undefined, can lead to undefined, then no contradiction.

III. CONCLUSION

If the 3-value logic is applied, Kleene's version [(Gottwald 2015), (Maddy 2007)], the problem is solved, but it was missing connecting such a logical system (True, False, Indeterminate) to the right linguistic expression plus connecting it to the right description of the problem, which is what we have just done.

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Marcia R Pinheiro. "The Most Encompassing Absolute." *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS)*, 25(12), 2020, pp. 40-41.