

India Future – China Relations: Threats and Opportunities

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Abstract

The current discussion between members of the strategic and academic community on India-China relations has posed a range of concerns including the future prospects and the significant issues facing bilateral ties. India-China relationships over the past six decades have seen more mutual distrust and skepticism than friendliness and a cordial atmosphere. Such mutual mistrust and suspicion has grown over the years and, throughout the current sense, has gone beyond proportions. The task has always been to overcome the differences of opinion on both sides and find a shared consensus on a variety of sensitive issues like issues concerning the Sino-Indian border. Around the same time, one should not say that these India and China were always on complete odds. Both India and China have made a series of serious attempts to bridge the differences more directly on the border issue. Despite many divergences over several related issues affecting bilateral ties, ties between India and China are growing and deepening. The strengthening of connections was expressed when in 2005 the two nations formed the Political and Collaborative Alliance for Peace and Prosperity, and in 2008 they also signed A Shared Vision for the 21st Century.

Keywords: Relationships between China and India, Shared interests, Investigated the reaction, Historic Viewpoint, HindiChini bhai bhai (हिंदी चीनी भाई भाई)

Date of Submission: 08-09-2020

Date of Acceptance: 23-09-2020

I. INTRODUCTION

The real controversy among members of the strategic and academic community on India-China relations has posed a range of issues regarding future prospects and the significant issues facing bilateral relations. India-China relationships over the past seven decades have seen more mutual distrust and scepticism than niceness and a cordial atmosphere. Such mutual distrust and scepticism has grown over the years and, throughout the current sense, has gone beyond proportions. The task seems to be to overcome the differing views and from both sides and find a common understanding on a variety of sensitive issues like border issues between Sino-Indians. Simultaneously, one must not reach the conclusion that the both India and China were still on odds with the rest. India and China also made a series of serious attempts to bridge the differences more particularly with regard to the border problem.

It should be emphasized here that, despite many divergences on several related issues affecting bilateral ties, India and China ties are growing and deepening. The enhancement of relations between India and China was reflected when the two countries formed the Strategic and Cooperative Alliance for growth and harmony in 2005, and in 2008 they also signed A Shared Vision for the 21st Century.

There is certainly a very important element guiding India-China relations and that is the growing shared interests on a number of issues including trade and commerce. China and India have become important trade partners. Unquestionably, India and China also emerged as major fastest rising markets, and their security cooperation have taken on global and strategic importance to a greater extent. Introspecting India – China experience in the past, and then exploring the processes by which international ties can take a robust form, would be essential.

The goal of this paper will be to evaluate and analyze the broad outlines of ties between India and China and to explore the areas where the two countries can work together in areas of cooperation. There are several positively and negatively overtones to the reciprocal partnership pathway. It will illustrate both the synchronizations and regional differences in the ties between India and China, and then propose ways to bridge the current discrepancies. It will also try to clarify the reason for a vigorous to positive interaction with readjusting regional dynamics in the emerging new world order.

II. EVOLUTION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA

India and China are probably the only countries around the world to have a history of ancient civilizations and culture. They also have a common colonial history. All of these are the world's most populous nations. China and India continue to be underdeveloped countries in Asia. Faced a range of differences, they have often been investigated at high poles, particularly on longitudinal contemplation. However, cooperative efforts have often been made on a variety of fields other than contentious ones. Obviously, the past 60 years of India-China relations have shown that both countries are finding mutually satisfactory solutions to the big border problem contention. This is also widely assumed that these nations never enabled gaps in mutual observation and collaboration to emerge. [1]

The main challenge facing ties between India and China has been building mutual confidence and trust. The deficit of confidence generated by both sides has demeaned the reliability of bilateral relations. The confidence factor is an important component in building ongoing bilateral cooperation. The lack of trust and confidence between both the two countries somehow created a lot of confusion on a variety of bilateral issues.

Despite the government one of the first few countries to recognize the [2] People's Republic of China, a lot of downs than ups were seen in the bilateral relationship. More precisely during 1949 – 1958, the past of India-China initial years of ties depicts [4] a period of politeness. China and India both needs to achieve agreement and signed the Panchsheel Agreement, which deals fundamentally with trade and exchange between India or China's [5] Tibet zone in Beijing. China Tibet Area in Beijing. Panchsheel became the core principles for the diplomatic cooperation between China and India. Zhou Enlai 's June 1954 trip to India was a symbolic message about Chinese culture and purpose. It has been notable in the sense that a Marxist form of state was visiting a noncommunist country in peacetime.

During the decade of 1959-1976, hostility and tensions developed which saw the rough spell in the relationship during the 1962 war. The strongest conclusions imaginable – the Hindi-Chini bhai bhai era has been turned into the Hindi-Chinni bye time.

The period from 1976 to 1988 was described as an age of dispelling doubts and incomprehension. 1988 was a landmark year since relations between India and China took a new turn after a visit to China by India's Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. The time between 1988-1998 undoubtedly saw a new atmosphere and a new bonhomie in ties between China and India. After India detonated a nuclear device in the post-1998 scenario, China emerged as one of the biggest critics and thus weakened the relationship. However, the situation has changed when the two nations learned about each other's contribution to the global economy and began to extend the existing bilateral relations to a greater extent. The tension had been supplemented by friendliness in the relationship. The period during the first decade of the first twenty-first century was an age of economic collaboration and also a combination of diplomatic front confusion.

2.1 Historic Viewpoint

This must be reiterated here that India recognized China as a People's Republic of China in 1949, shortly after it came into being. Both China and India expressed a variety of similar issues and problems facing their relations after developing diplomatic ties. Both China and India have reached a shared understanding on the number of big foreign issuances. The signature of the Panchsheel Agreement in 1954 was a step towards gaining trust and yet this trust did not last long. The Treaty preamble represented the the unity between both the two nations. India recognized Tibet as part of China, and through the Panchsheel Agreement it also relinquished British duties and obligations in Tibet. The joviality generated a really supportive environment and during the period 1954-1957 it paved the way for the then Chinese Premier Chou En-lai to visit India [3] times. In October 1954, India's Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, only visited once. Nehru 's visit to China was a milestone affair, as China welcomed a wet, welcome mat. The exhilaration and hope produced for the future of relations between India and China was unparalleled. Such exhilaration and hope were certainly short lived though.

India was certainly aware of China's plan to draw its bordering zone with India. Nehru had brought this subject for discussion with the Chinese about the wrong boundary lines and Chou En-lai somehow overlooked it and did not take it seriously. The MacMohan Line's Chinese perspective was completely different and had ignored the perspective of India. Chou En-lai previous trend visits to India have seen a decline in shared trust on some of the other related issues, including the frontier. The intentions of China and its designs were reflected when a report appeared in the Chinese media that China's Sinkiang Province was connected to Tibet by road in the Aksai Chin region.

As regards the evolution of the international dimensions of relations between India and China, India has been very consistent in its approach from day one. By sponsoring resolutions during 1950 – 1958, India had appealed to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) forty times that the People's Republic of China should represent China at the UN. India also displayed great maturity when it took a stand on the Korean War (1950 – 53). India had voted explicitly against the draught resolution of the United Nations that deemed China to be an aggressor and refused to vote to place a moratorium on China.

Despite clear and sustained efforts by India to achieve a mutually acceptable [6]position on border issues from each side, it has failed to persuade China. Here the Indian position on the trust issue was largely a reflection of its position on the Tibet dispute. The Tibetan crisis of 1959 became a turning point in downward sliding ties between China and India. It only happened because of India's compassionate attitude to Tibet, granting Dalai Lama political asylum. Since that time, China has shifted its approach to India. The one-level track (government-to - government) conference between China and India on the 1960-1961 border issue had not produced any substantive and desired outcome. The scepticism grew even more. The joviality the two nations had produced was very short-lived.

2.2. China - India Schism and the 1962 Confrontation

During the early part of 1962, signs of China's – India decline in bilateral ties became quite prominent. The rising distrust and suspicion led in October 1962 to a brief China – India war. It had been a really easy victory over India for China. It also happened because of the miscalculations made by India and its inherent capacities. The post-1962 dispute among China and India also saw the emergence of a very unique relationship between China and Pakistan, centered to a greater degree on the subcontinent's countering of India. India's distrust of China's motives and India's mistrust of China continued to rise due to some of the China 's actions. China's anti-India policy was not only in the form of promoting and supporting boko haram activity in India but also in the form of training Nagas and Mizos in China to fight toward India and continue to stir up trouble by sending them back after the training came to an end. The consequences of the 1962 dispute between India and China were also expressed in China's policies towards India during the 1965 and 1971 wars against Pakistan. In 1963 China already concluded a treaty of friendship with Pakistan.

The border row brought about crucial improvements in China's approach to India. China's 1964 nuclear test added more fear between Indian brains and core policy-makers. Both countries had lost mutual trust and belief and, since then, leaving behind misconceptions and forging a new partnership has been a significant obstacle. A very method of forging friendly relations involves firm commitment and greater effort to cultivate their friendship. It is clear that the 1962 India-China border dispute caused significant harm to the Chinese-Indian peoples' relations, resulting in a long-term end to friendly ties between the two countries. The impact of the dispute of 1962 has not yet disappeared. Thus, changing the attitude and searching for zenith in India – China relations, which had reached nadir in the aftermath of the conflict in 1962, was really one of the greatest challenges. As stated earlier, China-Pakistan relations had drastically and significantly strengthened and improved over the years and decades, particularly after the conflict in 1962.

III. A PERIOD OF ALLEVIATING SUSPICIONS OR MISMATCH: 1976-1988

Between 1976 – 1988, India and China witnessed and saw a significant period in which both nations made maximum efforts to alleviate doubts and misunderstandings. These measures were again primarily intended to create a more positive environment in terms of knowing one another. The year 1976 was a milestone year in China - India relations because by recalling their ambassadors, both countries had been able to restore their diplomatic ties. It's also been really interesting from a different perspective. Chinese authorities were jolted by Sikkim 's merger with India in 1975. China had declined to recognize its denunciation strategy and continued with it. Despite such negativism on the part of Chinese mentality, India has been able to restore trust among Chinese and has reactivated its positions of ambassador.

In 1979, especially at a time when India's then foreign affairs minister Atal Behari Vajpayee was in Beijing, Chinese invasions in china had many adverse consequences on China – India relations. However, the effort was made by both countries' officials to address the unsettled frontier question once again. It could not achieve a reciprocal agreement and failed to deliver the desired outcome. [7]

After nearly two decades, a first visit by a very popular Chinese leader to India took place in June 1981. The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs Huang Hua went to India and this visit became not only exceptional but also very important as there was consensus and understanding that both sides had reached during the negotiations, Ties with China.[8] India had changed its stance to a greater degree and then decided to resume bilateral talks. India had always focused on one aspect before that, unless and until China vacated the Indian Territories it had controlled.

Certainly, there was a quantum change in India 's approach to China during Huang Hua 's visit afterwards. Both India and China decided in the mid-1980s that the border issue had to be resolved on a priority basis and it would be in their interest. After Arunachal Pradesh was granted statehood by India in 1986, China started protesting openly, and disavowed the action of India. The situation has deteriorated again, but high-level discussions from both sides have been able to recover sense of stability at national level. Two countries revived and expanded reciprocal relations to address nearly all the contested issues. The final segment of the eighties saw an increase in comprehension but this was only possible because of the one dialogues ongoing series.

The visit of Rajiv Gandhi was also significant, because it happened after the famous [9] Incident at Sumdorong Chu Valley. The two nations agreed to foster security ties in a variety of fields, covering scientific and technological, civil aviation and cultural exchanges. The take a tour's hallmark was the formation of a Joint Working Group (JWG) to discuss the issue of boundary. The JWG 's broader goal was to express the interests of one another and to evaluate the choices before both nations. At the same time, the goal was also to ensure that peace and tranquilly across the border was preserved throughout the negotiation.

3.1 An Period of Bilateral Relations Establishing New Atmosphere and Trust: 1988-1998

The period from 1988 to 1998 was characterized as a time of building a new atmosphere and faith in bilateral ties between India and China. When India's then Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, visited China in December 1988, the ice in the relationship broke. It was significant [10], since after more than three decades, India's prime minister visited China. India and China both sides agreed to co-operate on a variety of areas for mutual progress. So far, rounds of border talks have been organized since the formation of JWG in the year 1988. But sadly nothing substantial has happened to address the border problem. However, the mutual traction was established but of no major importance and effect. What may have happened over the past two decades has meant that both countries are not only talking about border issues on a regular basis, but also exploring the processes by which economic and cultural interaction takes a robust form and giving a broader basis to the bilateral relationship.

In 1991 Chinese Premier Li Peng made a reciprocal visit to India. It was again a historic one, since in the last more than three decades a Chinese Premier had not been. In Li Peng's visit to India both India and China signed five agreements. These five agreements were relating to the Consul treaty between India and China, Agreement on Restoration of Consulate General in Bombay and Shanghai, Memorandum on the Restoration from Border Exchange, India – China Trade Agreement for the year 1992 and Outer Space Scientific and Technical Collaboration for Peaceful Use by China-India Aviation Ministries [11].

The strategic partnership received a new lift or further improved once India's after which-President R. Venkatraman visited China in May 1992. On R 's arrival China performed a nuclear test. Venkatraman and it had paved a really tough message to India. But it was done with maturity by both China and India.

The adoption of an agreement on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China during the visit of India's Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in September 1993 brought a new thaw into the bilateral relations. The India-China Border Areas LAC Agreement on Peace and Tranquility Preservation meant that the border problem will be resolved in a friendly manner through fair and respectful discussions. It was implicit in the Agreement that neither side could use force against the other or threaten to use force. Before the border issue is resolved, the two sides should strictly respect and obey the LAC and each side should hold its military forces to a minimum level in the areas along the LAC. It was definitely an entrance into India's new age-ties with China. [12]

In India – China ties came other signs of change when Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited India in 1996. It further improved bonhomie and built a very optimistic attitude and approach environment. China and India had signed four important agreements during Jiang 's visit-a) Arrangement on confidence-building measures (CBMs) in the field of military deployment along the LAC in the border regions of India – China; b) Agreement on the establishment of the Consulate General of India in the PRC's Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong; c) Agreement on cooperation in the fight against illegal drug trafficking and other related matters; and d) Agreement on maritime relations. The resolution on CBMs gained much salience because it was specified that the proposed steps would be aimed at an equal, equitable and mutually acceptable resolution of the boundary issue. It was also important because it was decided that no nation could take advantage of its military capabilities against some other side. [13]

IV. POST 1998 AND CHANGING PATTERNS IN RELATION TO INDIA-CHINA

India's nuclear detonation in May 1998 earned lots of criticism from China to a greater degree. The standardization mechanism, that had been developed over the years, was thus derailed. China was a vocal critic of India's nuclear test and made a strong argument that the experiments against the international trend were also against it. For some time, the nuclear problem has been featured as an irritant in India-China relations, bringing bilateral ties in real limbo. But in a period of nine months, both sides were able to resume talks again. The visits made in 1999 by then Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh and in 2003 by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee opened up a number of new perspectives for collaboration. The frontier issue that has always been an obstacle to building faith and trust has been overwhelmed by globalization and security concerns. Opening up border regions to trade like Sikkim's Nathu La really signalled a quantum change in India 's strategy to China. This change also acknowledged Sikkim as a part of India in some way. The re-opening of trade routes through Nathula Pass has surely helped to forge greater economic relations between such two developing economies

economic forces. Historically, in terms of trade, Nathula was a very important frontier from time immemorial. It is very well proven fact that after the Sino-Indian War of 1962, Nathula was closed.[14]

The two nations had undergone an unprecedented rate of growth in bilateral trade by then. Economic relations have significantly strengthened, and bilateral trade has so far exceeded the amount of \$50 billion in US dollars. In particular after the global economic crisis, there was a downslide in trade volume slightly in between. Since day one, however, China has maintained that Mac Mohan line is not reasonable to them, and that they contribute to all of Arunachal Pradesh. India's often opposed to this. India has the Tsangpo problems that rise up in Tibet and as Dihang flows into Arunachal Pradesh and becomes Brahmaputra as it reaches Assam. India has the persistent question in Ladakh, where China occupies one third of its Aksai-Chin territory and claims it as the legitimate part of their country. Thus, India and China definitely have significant problems and issues. In the current international security climate, many of those unresolved concerns definitely demand attention from both sides. [15]

The very first generation of the first twenty-first century saw many visits from both sides of high level. It also pointed out that both countries must give paramount importance to many of the unresolved issues. In April 2005, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao 's visit to India recognized the unique advantages of India in the technology sector. China and India have announced the creation of a Strategic and Cooperative wealth and stability Alliance. By then, the two countries had undergone a phenomenal rate of growth in trade agreements. Economic relations have significantly strengthened and so far bilateral trade has exceeded the mark of \$50 billion in US dollars. [16]

It should be noted that the visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao to India in 2006, and the visit of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to China in 2009, due to the deepening of mistrust on both sides, could not have much effect on bilateral relations. Even so, a ten - point plan to strengthen the Strategic Relationship was written. In the last few years, China has been intervening throughout I China'-India borders and making a variety of anti-India actions, both openly and covertly. [17] The China-Pak nexus, the establishment of a number of China Study Centers in Nepal and its tacit support for the Maoists in Kathmandu 's ongoing imbroglio and wider implications for Indian national security added to the increasing distrust India. [18]

The very first decade of the first twenty-first century have also seen a lot of military cooperation. A framework for bilateral dialogue to build greater relations in defense cooperation has been developed. Is part of a wider confidence-building activity, both countries performed joint military training and activity in the army. Because both nations were the targets of piracy, India and China have agreed to collaborate on the counter - smuggling initiatives together. [19]

Indeed, the ongoing Chinese military and strategic modernization programmes have not affected India much. Chinese demands are different from those of India. [20] And hence India is very experienced in recognizing the latest developments in China. China's decisions regarding its existing strategic capabilities are often driven by US innovations. The only worry India still has is the degree to which the Sino-Pakistan nexus is rising. Even so, there is definitely a concern that Pakistan will benefit from China's essential management expansion project which will undoubtedly have negative implications which wider consequences for India's national protection afterwards.

The current stance China has against India suggests otherwise. Security issues in India have been growing. It is definitely not "Pakistan-specific," and it will have to take environmental and geopolitical concerns into account in its neighborhood. Thus, the all-weather Sino-Pakistani relationship will be one of the biggest hitches when we envisage ties between China and India in 2020. Certainly, by expanding its presence in South Asia China benefits more from strong relations with Pakistan.

V. CONCLUSION

There is no doubt in saying that the degree of collaboration among China and India has unquestionably expanded undeniably. Simultaneously, India needs a nuanced way to deal with address the developing Chinese administration issues. Notwithstanding the way that China has become increasingly more proactive not just at the commonplace scale just as at the worldwide level, India has so far indicated no discontent in the most grounded potential terms. Sooner rather than later, the outskirts strife with China won't be settled. It is pertinent in the accompanying conditions that exchange has come to be viewed by the two sides as an inexorably significant driver of relations; especially in the light of waiting political doubt over various wide based issues extending from the long-running contested outskirts to China's just those-climate organization with Pakistan. Normal updates of Chinese troop attacks and significantly more dynamic watches in the challenged regions will unquestionably positioned strain on relations among China and India.

The opportunity has already come and gone that both China and India began to pressure the need to address the genuine fringe issues so as to improve the relationship and in the long run fashion more noteworthy or amicable coordinated effort. India likewise needs to find a way to battle China over its fringes. Another soundness blending authenticity and neo-authenticity. The neo-reasonable perspective of foreign relations,

whereby intrigue amplification turns into the primary component that would coordinate India – future binds with China. China's development as India's biggest exchanging accomplice 2008 proposes that the two nations have left on another period of ties, to a great extent passed through exchange and venture factors.

The mark by both China and India of a concurrence on "Sacred Conditions and Guiding Principles for Border Conflict Resolution" has demonstrated that both China and India are pushing ahead in discovering agreement on this huge aggravation. It has additionally been concluded that the two sides on the outskirts would protect harmony and serenity.

China likewise embraced the 'Monroe Doctrine' ideas. The goal was consistently to decline presentation to numerous other local forces which it sees as being exclusively inside its territory of impact. Such Chinese acts have been inconvenient to the interests of different areas, especially the East and Southeast Asian nations. The vast majority of China's activities in this aspect of the world will include Indian taking care of with incredible consideration. In the current setting, it might be vital for India to comprehend the aims and essential destinations of China. India will consistently underwrite positive China commitment and stay away from any clear clash. It will likewise be in light of a legitimate concern for China in the event that it framed a more grounded and more grounded relationship with India.

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- [2]. India recognized the People's Republic of China as the legitimate government of China on April 1, 1950.
- [3]. During September 1959, India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru tabled the First White Paper on India-China relations. It contains notes, memoranda and letters exchanged between India and China between April 1954 and August 1959.
- [4]. Both India and China entered into Panchsheel Agreement based on the following principles: a) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; b) Mutual non-aggression; c) Mutual non-interference in each other's affairs; d) Equality and Mutual Benefit; and e) Peaceful co-existence
- [5]. In 1958, Chou En-lai formally laid China's claim to Arunachal in Eastern Sector and Aksai Chin in the Western Sector. It was a great surprise for India.
- [6]. Despite the nine rounds of talks from 1981 to 1988, it became impossible for both the countries India and China to reach to a conclusion. There was a consensus that the border question should not become a hindrance in the development of relations in a number of other domains including trade and commerce.
- [7]. Five sub-groups were set up in a number of fields including scientific, technological, cultural and economic during Huang Hua's visit. It was done mostly to improve the atmosphere and inculcate positive mindsets in both the countries so that the process of economic interaction and exchange can soften the process of bilateral relationships.
- [8]. In the meeting with Rajiv Gandhi, the then Chairman of China's Central Military Commission Deng Xiaoping remarked "Let us forget the unpleasant phase in our past relations and do everything with an eye on the future".
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Sunil Kumar Saroha, et. al. "India Future – China Relations: Threats And Opportunities." *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS)*, 25(9), 2020, pp. 05-11.