Obstacles to the transfer of political power by social forces in the Islamic Republic of Iran

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ABSTRACT

Today, social forces play a significant role in shifting political power. The small role of social forces in the transfer of political power after the Iranian Constitutional Revolution in 1907, even in the era of the Islamic Republic, has attracted the attention of political scientists, especially political sociologists. The study of why the role of social forces in the transfer of political power is dim is of special scientific and social necessity and importance. A study whose result can be effective in consolidating a religious democracy of its kind. The research method is library. Research findings; there is a significant relationship between the failure of social forces in the transfer of political power and the prevailing political culture and the immutability of social forces from the theory of Velayat-e-Faqih. Conclusion; Iranian social forces, regardless of the theoretical foundations of the rule of the Islamic Republic, are seeking to play a role in the transfer of power. The pattern of social forces desired by political rule is also unclear. The purpose of this article is to study the causes and dysfunctional factors of social forces in the transfer of political power in the period of different political systems in the contemporary history of Iran with a focus on the era of the Islamic Republic.

KEYWORDS: Political Power, Social Forces, Islamic Republic of Iran

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I.   INTRODUCTION:

Concepts:

Social forces

Social forces are a set of classes and forces that influence political life in the general sense and may directly seize or influence power. Social forces are composed of individuals who have similar aspects of social, economic, value, cultural, trade union and similar interests. They are also interested in participating in political life and for this purpose they have organized themselves and are ready for political participation. (Bashirieh, 1999: from pages 123 to 125) The position of social forces in Islamic-Shiite thought is a matter of debate. (Farihi, 2009)

Political power

According to John Locke, he sees political power as the right to exercise power in the public interest. (Hinds, 2001: pp. 61-59) Hannah Arendt defines power as "the ability of man to act, in action with the group." (Rush, 1998: 59) The most important words synonymous with power in Arabic are "domination" and "authority", which are also found in Persian. (Eskandari, and Darbkalaei, 2012: 24)

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The concept of "republic" in the words and thought of the Imam has the same meaning that exists everywhere and in a way forms the form and form of government, and the concept of "Islamic" which expresses the content of that form which is the divine laws. He says:

"We want the Islamic Republic" The republic constitutes the form and form of government, and Islam, that is, the content of that form, is the divine law." (Sahifeh, Volume 5, p. 398)

A. Statement of the problem:

The problem that this research seeks to solve is the study of obstacles to the transfer of political power by social forces in the Islamic Republic. It is disputed among scholars that there is a significant relationship between political culture and political system on the one hand and the transfer of political power. In written articles and books, various solutions have been offered to solve this problem. These solutions mainly address the political, social and cultural roots of the issue. It seems that the fundamental solutions in this regard are more

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cultural than political and social, and the meaning of cultural solutions is the same as political culture and political system. This research has faced some limitations such as up-to-dateness, relative resource scarcity, and professional and social considerations. Despite the limitations mentioned, it is expected that the hypothesis can be reached from the above hypotheses.

B. Importance of the topic:

The importance of the issue is from the perspective that despite the fact that according to the theoretical foundations and constitutional rights of the country there is no obstacle to play the role of social forces and the title "religious democracy" is always based on the words of political leaders of the Islamic Republic. We will not encounter a social force that can formally and always be active in shifting power with a specific ideology and statute. This issue has always been of interest to historians, sociologists and political scientists. Continuation of democracy without effective social forces in the transfer of political power in the long run can produce serious challenges for the Islamic Republic.

C. Research literature:

There are significant articles and resources on the subject of research that, for the sake of brevity, suffice to mention only a part of them:

HosseinTabriznia's book entitled "Causes of Instability of Parties in Iran" which lacks a theoretical framework. BahramAkhavanKazemi's book entitled "Causes of party inefficiency in Iran" which has entered the relevant topics with a theoretical framework. HosseinGhodrati and Khalil Sardarnia's article entitled "Explaining the Dysfunction and Inefficiency of the Party in the Constitution" in the 2011 Quarterly Journal of Political and International Approaches focuses on the constitutional period. MansourehIttihadiyeh's book entitled "Political Parties in the Third Parliament", which has entered this field with a different time frame. (Sardar Nia, 2014, pp. 43-56)

In Iran, for historical reasons, "politics is crystallized in kinship networks and is often expressed in terms of filial piety and attachment." (Riviere, 2003: 124) Also, the social system of historical Iran has been a man-centered system. (Naqibzadeh, 2000: 79)

According to FarhangRajaei, four sources of identity for Iranians can be identified: a) Iran; B) Religion; C) tradition; D) Modernity (Rajaei, 2003: 3) In another classification, RuhollahBahrami distinguishes three periods of identity: a) ancient; B) Islamic; C) Contemporary. (Bahrami, 2002: 15)

Although more than a hundred parties have been established in Iran since the Constitutional Revolution, it is safe to say that none of them falls within the definition of a party and its characteristics. (Madani, 2007, No. 66) The first session of the parliament was held in the presence of Mozaffar al-Din Shah. At the same meeting of Shah Kaft, the delegates must do something so that they are not responsible to God and not ashamed to the Shah. (Abadian, 2004, p. 38)

The most necessary tool for establishing a system based on parliamentarism and then institutionalizing it is the creation and operation of civic institutions, especially political parties. (Ejlali, 2005: 66) The primary institutions that were formed for this purpose during the Qajar period, under Masonic organizations and then associations, although not officially named after the party, but in the society played the role of the party. (Alam, 2004: 345) Perhaps the first the official Iranian experience of the party organization in its true and new sense is related to the leadership of the Social Democratic Party Hemmat in the Caucasus of Russia. (Ettehadieh, 1982: pp. 58-72)

Political parties have not yet reached professional maturity in about a hundred years after the constitution and more than three decades after the victory of the Islamic Revolution. In other words, Iranian parties are postmodern or super postmodern. (Tabriznia, 2008: from pages 151 to 158)

Most political parties in Iran start their activities on the eve of the elections and usually remain silent until the end of the elections. (Ayubi, 2011: 96)

In the theory of Imamate and Ummah and Velayat-e-Faqih, basically civil society and political society are not two separate things, Imam without Ummah and Ummah without Imam cannot have external realization. (Feyrahi, 2012: from pp. 310-287)

Social forces in the Islamic Republic of Iran have not yet entered the arena of political power transfer based on the theoretical foundations of the political system. (Mousavinia, 2014) The position of social forces in Islamic-Shiite thought is a matter of debate. (Feyrahi, 2009)

Questions:

1. What are the causes and factors of the failure of social forces to transfer political power in the Islamic Republic of Iran?

Hypothesis; we will first mention the titles of socio-political hypotheses and then cultural hypotheses.

In response to the first question, we can mention about 17 socio-political hypotheses: lack of consensus of elites and party leaders in Iran (Abrahamian, 1998: 208), internal conflicts of parties (Masoudnia, 2003), behavior of

political parties throughout the history of the party In Iran against each other based on the game with the result of zero and not double the sum (Rahbar Ghazi et al., 2016: 125-146), conflicts and conflicts (Rahmani et al., 2016: 74-73), an instrumental view of the elites Non-governmental institutions (see: Ali Nejad, 2016), The growing growth of political excitement of social forces in Iran (Seifzadeh, 2007: 90), the monopolization of the leadership of non-governmental institutions by certain individuals or individuals (Masoudnia, 2005: 133), weakness Functioning of political organizations (Khodayari, 2020, p. 211), disregard for the nature of political mobilization leading to the transfer of political power and the formation of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. (Eivazi, 2012: 40) Lack of analysis of the issue of social forces retreat in the form of the theoretical structure of the province and the Imamate of the Ummah (Khodayari, 2020, p. 217), the non-class system of the Islamic Republic and the lack of party formation based on social and economic gaps, Nomadic culture (AkhavanKazemi, 2008), the superiority and independence of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Towards classes (Taheri, 108), weak state capitalism and civil society (Farajpour, 2004: 187), unpredictability of political loyalty of the Iranian people (Kafi, 2013), foreign intervention and its impact on the security of social space (Masoudnia, 2005: 135), the formation of parties during the occupation of the country by foreigners (Maghsoudi, 2001: 220-205), the support of foreigners to the local democratic governments of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan (Najmi, 1991: 806).

II.   CULTURAL ROOTS OF THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF SOCIAL FORCES ON CHANGING POLITICAL POWER IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN?

Hypothesis:

2.1. Lack of growth and maturity of social parties and organizations in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Political parties have not yet reached professional maturity in about a hundred years after the constitution. In other words, Iranian parties are postmodern or super postmodern. (Tabriznia, 2008: 151-158) One of the most important characteristics of political parties in Iran is their cross-sectional activity. (Ayoubi, 2011: 96) The seasonal activity of political parties in Iran has caused Iranian parties to be interpreted with the word "mushroom".

Parties deprived of membership fees, some elites even expect rewards for party activities instead of membership fees. (Masoudnia, 2003: 147-144) The seasonal nature of political parties in Iran has led to the formation of countless parties in different periods of party history in Iran. (Ashrafi, 2016: 85-65)

2.2. Building vertical social relations among party elites

Among the Iranian groups, the elite-oriented spirit prevails to some extent with ups and downs and with a few differences. Transforming vertical public relations in the private and collective spheres into horizontal relations based on social agreement is the most important challenge facing Iranian society. (Rafipour, 2012: 75)

In the discussion of socialization, when we pay attention to the relationship between political structure and political culture, socialization is of the secondary type, ie the influence of social institutions such as government and political system is greater than primary socialization, and the influence of institutions 2.3. Lack of formation of strong developmental social classes

The lack of a strong and independent social class or classes in Iran that can limit the power of the government has led to the lack of growth of civil society and the expansion of government power. (Faramarzian, 1997: 524) Political parties were less dependent on the social classes of society and the basis of their party competition was ideological. (Saeedi, 1998: pp. 1198)

Despite the centralist policies of Mir HosseinMousavi's government, the bazaars were in the upper class position in the economy and were replaced by the industrial bourgeoisie attributed to Hashemi Rafsanjani's government at the end of his government. Brought. (ZibaKalam, 2010: pp. 66-67)

In the 2005 elections, the economic divide became the basis of electoral competition. The year 1997 was a political-economic gap. The revolutionary middle class in 1997 became the conservative middle class in 2005. The formulation of social classes after the election of June 12, 2009, but suddenly collapsed. The middle class did not live up to its political demands, and for the second time, its alliance with the upper class against the lower class failed. At the same time, the common demands of this class led to their cohesion for the 11th presidential election in 1392. (Darabi, 2015: 15-16) such as family and religious education. (See Bashirieh, 2001: 162-161)

2.4. The growing fragmentation of Iranian society

The political culture of Iranian society has a special composition that is the product of historical developments. According to one expert, the current feature of Iranian society is the fragmentation of political culture that is the result of the historical coexistence of national culture, religious culture and Western culture. The existing gap in society, including the class gap, the elite and government gap, the generation gap and the elite and mass gap, are all the result of the fragmentation that exists in the sources of political culture. (See: Al-Ghafoor: 2009)

2.5. Weak participatory culture

Basically, there was no experience of active political participation in the pre-revolutionary systems due to their lack of political legitimacy, and governments controlled, directed, organized, and used social forces through institutions derived from the context of society or through the governmentalization of organizations such as parties. They did not act for their own interests and did not oppose any claim of dissent and faced repression. (See: Khosravani, 2014)

In fact, under the influence of political developments after the revolution and the war, especially with the passage of the era of reform and fundamentalism, the political culture of our society has become integrated, complex, pluralistic and heterogeneous in nature.

This situation indicates that in an elite environment, access to multiple sources, information and media has led to the evolution of their values, feelings and political evaluation; at the same time, it should not be overlooked that "participatory political culture" has not become a continuous and non-seasonal model for everyone in politics. (Khaniki, 2013)

2.6. Lack of fundamental changes in the contrast between tradition and modernity

Influenced by the theory of modernization, American scholars since the 1960s have viewed Iranian society as a society in transition between tradition and modernity. This theory became the dominant theory, especially after the Islamic Revolution and the collapse of the Soviet Union. And so far there has been no stable interaction between tradition and modernity. (Tawfiq, 2008)

In Iran, political structures, which are largely derived from Western models, are so intertwined with kinship and tribal culture and religious issues that it is difficult to compare Iranian political structures with Western types in terms of content. Structures in Iran have found a simultaneous presence due to the fact that they are imported and the fields are not available and the desired time does not pass. In Iran, economically, we are witnessing both a livelihood economy and a commodity economy. Culturally and politically, the simultaneous presence of conservatism and traditionalism with reformism and modernism is significant. (Bashiriyah, 2004: 14)

2.7. Negative Iranian mentality of parties and party activities

One of the most important tools of the Iranian rulers to intimidate the people has been to resort to the conspiracy theory of foreigners. Although conspiracy is a reality and conspirators exist all over the world, but they are very visible in this region, perhaps one of the reasons for the abundance of conspiracy mentality in Iran is the cultural context of our society.

In our culture, politics has always been so trivial in the history of this web, that there is reluctance, pessimism and withdrawal from politics among the masses of people, so it is well known that "politics is orphaned". (Rezaei, 2006: 246) In this culture, membership in the party, even for the new middle class, is not a necessity but a necessity. So much so that some of the country's elites and political activists
One of their honors to be "non-partisan." (See: ZibaKalam; Moqtadaei, 2014)

2. 8. Lack of struggle of socio-political forces based on social divisions

By considering how social struggles are conducted in advanced and democratic societies, the question can be asked, on what basis is the struggle of social forces in the West formed? Political parties in the West are, firstly, the result of class divisions, and secondly, each party represents the views and values of a particular class (Lipst and Rokan, 1977: 64).

The lack of class formation in Iran along with the formation of social gaps between the government and the pregnant social forces caused political parties in Iran to be formed more on the basis of family, ethnic, linguistic and sometimes religious criteria.

Social divisions caused the revolution, the clergy, the market, and industrial sub-capitalism to oppose dependent capitalism, technocrats, and secular intellectuals to influence political construction. (Kolaei; Shokooh, 2011: 290) In this context, the differences in the functioning of institutions such as Friday prayers and congregations, Islamic Propaganda Organization, traditional market against new social institutions such as universities and art centers or, media, stock market and goods, played a key role. (Ibid, 290- 291)

2.9. Cultural system "together" (normative)

The cultural system is the "normality" or normality of human beings with each other and with others. Its similarity is of two types; thoughtfully and blindly. Based on this cultural context for the political system and decision-making in the current situation, the tendency of political coexistence on the part of the people and the coexistence of officials as two important issues should be considered. But officials need to pay attention to both. But as far as the people are concerned, colonialism tries to spread dissatisfaction and opposition to the system by resorting to a similar mechanism (Rafipour, 2014: 245-231).

2.10. Iranian society as a chaotic society

Iranian society behaves in a chaotic manner according to the properties defined in turbulence theory for turbulent systems. Whereas in complex structural societies, the process of expansion leads to structural differentiation and consequent functional coordination. In a chaotic society, in addition to the process of expansion (structural differentiation), the process of folding also occurs and prevents the establishment of functional coordination. (Safari, 2011: 78) The main feature of turbulent systems is sensitivity to initial conditions. This is because external force does not allow the system to form an internal and natural order. (Safari, 2011: 79) Disorganization and instability in a chaotic society is due to the unpredictability of people's behaviors. (Clawson and Rubin, 2005, 159)

2.11. Family and the process of democracy in Iran

Among all social institutions, organizations and institutions, the family has a great role and importance. Religion, government and family are the main pillars of Iranian social life.

There are various explanations for the formation of authoritarian views of the family: Some biologists have attributed the formation of the roots of power to hormonal factors or the superiority of physical strength or the different evolution of men and women. (Bostan et al., 2004: 154)

Iranian authoritarian and authoritarian culture at different levels of social relations (family, relations with each other and people's relations with the government) has been ruled for several thousand years and with it the regression, instability of landed aristocracy, industrial and commercial backwardness and perpetual turmoil and crisis. Has brought. (Arianpour, 2002: 132-130)

Experimental findings show that the index of authoritarianism in the Iranian family is still high. Thus, it should be said that authoritarian political construction is the result of authoritarian political culture and authoritarian political culture is itself the result of mass production of authoritarian personality in the authoritarian family system. (Mousavi et al., 2016: 183-204)

2.12. Religious class and political participation

Differences in religiosity cause differences in political culture. Religious moral cultural values, religious education and socialization have religious implications. Religiosity and political culture are two intertwined categories in Iranian society. In Iran, most social orientations are based on religious beliefs. On the other hand, the existence of a religious government in Iran is the bedrock of religious culture based on political power. (Qalibaf, 2013: 7)

2.13. The tribal cultural system is dependent on the lord and serf system

This cultural system causes family ties to take precedence over social ties and national interests. This feature today threatens the system of government and the social system of Iran in a destructive way. This culture is characterized by characteristics such as blood ties, internalization of the role of each tribe, cohesion and order of individuals, very strong social interactions, strong solidarity, social commitment, honesty, trust, strong identity, high social satisfaction and homogeneity. The interests of the tribal system take precedence over the individual interests of the tribe. The extent of family ties between Iranian officials is unimaginable and many officials and celebrities have established family ties through marriage. (Rafipour, 2014: 223-225)

2.14. Iranian society is a modern but ugly society

One sociologist, referring to some of the characteristics of Iranian society, types: "developing society"; "oil society"; "Peripheral community"; "Religious community"; Criticize and evaluate "mass society" and "cultural society" and explain why these theoretical titles are not currently relevant. The article then defends the theoretical type of "Iran: and the ugly modern society" and explains why Iranian society is a modern society, and then highlights four categories of the ugliness of this society. (Jalaipour, 2014: 8)

2.15. Short term community

The theory of "short-lived and old-fashioned society" is Katouzian's analytical model of Iran's historical sociology, arguing that "Iran, unlike long-standing European society, has been a short-lived society in which change - even significant and fundamental change - often "It has a short life." By referring to the title of "short-term" and "old-fashioned" for the Iranian society in the historical field, he means the lack of stability and continuity in the position of social classes and the political and social life of the inhabitants of Iranian society in the historical field and its structures. (Sadeghi; Bahrami, 2014: 20-22)

III. WHAT IS THE MAIN REASON FOR THE FAILURE OF SOCIAL FORCES IN THE TRANSFER OF POWER IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC?

Hypothesis: Political culture, political system and impersonality of social forces are the theoretical foundations of the Islamic Republic.

According to Imam Khomeini, all political organizations, even Marxist groups, can operate within the framework of the constitution and express their views. The boundaries of the freedom of parties in the system of Velayat-e-Faqih are determined by issues such as conspiracy, betrayal and dependence on foreign countries (Hosseini, 1999, p. 211).

According to Imam Khomeini, the Islamic government does not have any kind of political regimes; That is, it is neither monarchical, nor constitutional, nor authoritarian, nor absolute, and what is important in Imam Khomeini's political thought is the content of the Islamic government, which must be based on Islamic law. However, such content must meet the public's approval and satisfaction and be implemented. This is the compatibility between the Islamic government (Velayat-e-Faqih) and democracy, which from the implementation of Sharia to the acceptance of the Wali-e-Faqih, is based on public opinion (DidariArdakani, 1999, pp. 211-212).

3.1. Coordinates of social forces in the government of the Islamic Republic

For the social forces in the government of the Islamic Republic, the characteristics are mentioned, including; Existence of parties with ijtihad and jurisprudential nature, existence of parties based on different ijtihads in government and administration of society, parties believing in Shiite principles and principles of Imamate and Wilayah, parties believing in the close connection between religion and politics, parties believing in non-customary laws and Belief in the Qur'an and Sunnah and Sira as sources of inspiration for laws, protection of the unity of the Islamic Ummah and avoiding divisions outside the framework of ijtihad, non-class system of the Islamic Republic and as a result of not forming parties based on social and economic divisions, belief in foreign policy principles The basis of Islam is neither the exercise of domination nor the acceptance of domination. (Feyrahi, 2001)

Imam Khomeini (ra) says about the unity of social forces in the Islamic government: "... When the Islamic government is formed, everyone is subject to Islamic law and Islam is a single faction; our government is an Islamic Republic that relies on Quranic verses and its law "It is the law of Islam and the political factions there are free to express their opinions." (khodaie, 2006: 145)

3.2. Religious democracy is the latest version of political Shiism

The legitimacy of the Shiite state along the system of Velayat-e-Amr and the Imamate of the Ummah, the depiction of Velayat-e-Faqih, and the combination of appointment and election is a puzzle of Shiite political thought that is gradually formed and experiences a more complete formulation. (Safari Foroushani, 1997)

3.3. The changing nature of the evolution of social forces and government

Shiites have historically been present in the form of traditional-civil institutions and after the Shiite Safavid rule, with the exception of the government of the Islamic Republic, did not form a government directly and as the Shiite government in the Islamic Republic of Iran has experienced changes in its structure. . It seems that the evolution of the Shiite state will lead to the evolution of civil institutions. But we will never see the existence of civil institutions such as civil institutions in the West. Nevertheless, it is possible to strengthen the functioning of civil institutions in the Islamic Republic in some way through its internal religious channels. (PegahHozeh, 2007: No. 214)

3.4. Civil society and political society overlap

The Government of the Islamic Republic seeks to establish a kind of balance between the components of progress in Iran. There are many components of growth in the Islamic Republic, but the combination of FIMA between them has reduced the role of some components. If we take the criterion on the role of social institutions and political parties in the constitution, not all principles of the constitution can be summarized in the parties. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the principle of sovereignty and its divinity, Islam as the religion of the Iranian nation Velayat-e-Faqih, political and social participation and the existence of civil institutions and the existence of parties, etc. are considered together. (Azghandi, 2006: 108)

3.5. The way to reach political power in the heart of the Imamate system

If it is decided that parties will be formed in the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the future, they will be the same social forces or provincial-jurisprudential parties. The existence of provincial-jurisprudential parties is not and will not be in opposition to the government, but according to this theory, the

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political and civil society is two cohesive and overlapping societies that are both complementary and in the same direction.

The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran mentions in a very novel way the basic concepts in the four sides of a square that the survival of each side can be ensured in interaction with the other sides. With the first axis, ie "the origin of legitimacy in the Islamic Republic of Iran", the "Islamism" side has been formed, and with the second and third axes, "how to study and exercise political power in the Islamic Republic", the "Republic" side has been formed. How to limit power in the Islamic Republic of Iran the "side" of civil society has been established. (Mohajernia, 2009)

IV.   RESEARCH FINDINGS

The failure of social forces to influence the transfer of political power throughout the contemporary history of Iran is an undeniable fact, although this failure in each period has been due to its own causes. The role of social forces in the first Pahlavi era from 1925 to September 1941 in the equation of political power transfer was the result of the rule of an authoritarian political system. During the second Pahlavi regime, with the exception of the years of Allied occupation of the country and also during the nationalization of the oil industry; Although parties and social forces were seen as seemingly active within party frameworks, it was clear to everyone that they were more the handiwork of society and the political system than of the people.

In the era of the Islamic Republic of Iran, despite the provision of a platform for social forces to influence the transfer of political power, social forces due to lack of readiness to emulate the theory of Velayat-e Faqih and social forces compatible with it, always faced with conflicts and contradictions.

V.   CONCLUSION:

There are still ambiguities as to whether social and political activity can take place within the party according to the theory of Velayat-e-Faqih. The failure of the Islamic Republic Party, despite the membership of all figures and leaders of the revolution in it, has always provided the doubt that this is not a serious obstacle from the political system and cultural causes and factors even challenge the government itself in continuing party activities. And has doubted.

On the one hand, Iranian social forces, regardless of the theoretical foundations of the Islamic Republic's sovereignty, seek to play a role in the transfer of power.

Considering that the ups and downs of social forces in the realm of the transfer of political power, whether in the formation of government or parliament, are not solely rooted in civil society, nor are they rooted solely in the will of the decisions of political society; The need to reconsider political culture, social culture, and at the same time the cultural roots of this failure requires simultaneity.

According to the theoretical foundations of the political system of the Islamic Republic, the overlap and integration of political society and civil society in the government of the province and the Imamate of the Ummah, paves the way for the formation and role of groups and parties in political power based on these theoretical foundations.

Government-compatible parties in civil society can be provincial-jurisprudential and ijtihad parties due to the convergence and overlap of government and civil society.

Due to the non-class nature of the system, parties are not formed on the basis of stratifications. And provincial and jurisprudential parties are the main spokespersons of social classes.

The rise and fall of social forces has been based on the degree of adaptation of the movement of social forces to the formal and content requirements of the government of the Imamate of the Ummah and the province.

The form of socio-political forces of the country is not homogeneous and in one direction with their spirit and content. In form, socio-political forces are similar to socio-political forces in secular countries, but in terms of content they are different.

Systematization requires discourse. The Islamic Republic is the social and political formulation of the theory of Velayat-e-Faqih and Velayat-e-Amr and Imamate of the Ummah. It seems that the combination of republic and Islam is a very delicate and complex work, and the combination of both is like the combination of oxygen and hydrogen. The higher the share of each endo, the less an element called water is formed.

Research suggestions:

A) The system of the Islamic Republic of Iran should look at the relationship between political permanence and the existence of parties and social forces with an inclusive view.

B) The Islamic Republic of Iran should pay attention to the existence and security of social forces as the key to the continuation of their activities.

C) Instead of the involved and active social forces, the Islamic Republic should use its efficient forces and its model, ie jurists and authorities, in the field of socio-political participation.

D) If the elders and jurists do not want to play a role in the form of social forces, the government should pursue a policy of management and tolerance in the face of possible slips of some forces.

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