

International and Regional Security and Intelligence Institutions Cooperation and its Effectiveness in the Horn of Africa (2010-2021): Mockups from Somalia, North and South Sudan

Getachew Toma Bilate

PhD Candidate, School of International & Public Affairs, Jilin University. Changchun, City, 130012, China.

ABSTRACT

Horn of Africa region members countries have been affected by domestic conflicts and cross-border destabilization for decades. This study examines the international and regional security institutions effectiveness on cessation of conflicts in region based on illustrations, examples and samples from Somalia, North and South Sudan. The main question is why the security and intelligence institutions are not effective on ending the war? The argument is, the inability of institutions to pursue rational policies, poor cooperation and lack of rational ideological frameworks that creates questions during the processes of resolving conflict situations. The detailed analysis made based on critical analysis of the roles and efforts of institutions on ending the war and conflicts and finding indicates, war and conflicts that set states against states and communities against communities resulting in political turbulence and human tragedy in the region. Response of international, regional security and intelligence institutions efforts are so weak. Conversion of civilian populations into military and growing numbers of fighting junta groups are becoming a common feature. Therefore, the war and conflicts in the horn of Africa caused loss of human life and instability. Security and intelligence institutions are facing challenges of resources, technology and cooperation. Furthermore, the regional and international security institutions efforts on ending the war are less productive in the region. The study applied the qualitative research methods and based on secondary and primary data sources.

KEY WORDS: Peace and security, international institutions, Conflict

Date of Submission: 06-12-2021

Date of Acceptance: 21-12-2021

I. INTRODUCTION

Africa encompasses several conflict complexes, with major regional dimensions. The conflicts are mainly intra-states and inter-state in its nature. Internal conflicts such as civil wars, and ethnic fights are increasing in North Sudan, Mali, Ethiopia, Chad, Somalia, Niger, Congo and Nigeria and others. In the Africa the internal conflicts have proven to be difficult for international institutions cooperation. The cost of letting such wars and conflicts go unchecked is often high which requires an in-depth examination of various approaches, tactics and conflict management systems. Recently, it is emerging a new literature which addresses the African regional security dynamics in the beginning of the 21st century, almost needs regional institutions capacities and initiatives on the stabilization of the continent (Nilton,2016).

Horn of Africa is one of the regions which has been facing long wars, internal and cross boards conflicts. The region is one of the most unstable, due to the rising number of armed groups and political instability since the mid-1950s. The region is marked by high level of extra-regional actors' penetration within regional security agenda. The region is known for decades as one of the hottest interstate conflicts (Nilton,2016). Simple examples are the case of the Somalia war, North and South Sudan war and Ethio-Eritrean war are among others. States have been crumbled in the Horn (Samson S. Wassara, 2002). The absence of a recognized government in Somalia, military and civil conflict in Sudan constitute the basis of anxiety in the region. But the region has been trying to realize of nation-state, generally well-thought-out highpoint of political modernization (Markakis, 2021).

Based on these issues this study aimed to analyze the effectiveness of security institutions cooperation. This paper is designed to provide a more systematic examination of the security institutions role in the Horn of Africa over the past decade. The argument is the efforts of security and intelligence institutions less effective. The conflicts severely affecting the region and states economy, politics and human life. The question is: Is the security and intelligence institutions completely eliminated the war from the horn of Africa members states?

Thus, this question remains critical. The paper seriously investigated the security and intelligence institution's role during the war and nationalism conflicts. The assessment of factors can contribute to contemplates potential effects of complex security, political tensions within domestic and among the neighbors. It also examined the institutional environment in the region based on qualitative research methodology and primary data sources.

Statement of the problems

The critical threats to security and peace in the horn of Africa countries are related to insurgent groups in different territories, as 'al Shabaab' and others military groups in Somalia, junta groups in Uganda, maritime piracy in the coast of Somalia, the military groups in Sudan: 'Darfur, Blue Nile', 'nuba' mountains, are among critical ones (Doop, 2013). On an interstate level, the dispute between Sudan and South Sudan for the oil region of Abyei, the territorial dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti, the rivalry and the dispute for the Migingo Island between Kenya and Uganda (Mesfin,2009) disputes remain critical. The challenges for human security, as the poor social indicators in most states of the region and the large number of internally displaced persons and refugees are serious. In Kenya alone there are currently 442.170 Somali refugees and the situation is even more complex if the Somali refugees in the other countries of the region are taken into account. The Sudanese and South Sudanese and the Ethiopian refugees are increasing recently (Nilton,2016)

Countries in the region are thus in conflict and in fact the link among the security systems of the Middle East and the Mediterranean by virtue of the strategic importance of and competition for influence over the Red Sea is not undermined. The states depend on borders for trade and transit. Hence, developments in the Horn region not only are shaped by these but also have a direct impact on their political, economic, and security environments (USA institute of peace,2020). Civilians participate in different capacities in military-like activities in areas affected by armed violence. Prospects for containing civilian militarization depend on concerted pressure of security and intelligence institutions, civil societies and the international community. The states and armed opposition movements demand peaceful settlement of disputes. Therefore, prospects for social stability depend on security and intelligence institutions (Samson ,2002). The security intelligence institutions demand the cooperation to end the war outbreak.

The region recently has been trying to reform the institutional cooperation systems in order to solve the challenges. In January 2020, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia proposed to form a new regional bloc, occasionally referred to as the Horn of Africa Cooperation. The aim is creating the cooperation systems that links with states, international institutions and regional institutions. However, the region is at risk due to increasing conflicts among nations, military and government. The main partners in the region security efforts are international and regional organizations, most importantly the UN, IGAD, the African Union (AU). Thus, the promises and pitfalls of this bloc could shape the regional architecture and impact politics and security in the region (Henneberg, 2020). The regional and international institutions are facing challenges to end the conflicts in the region due to weak cooperation and lack of commitment of leaders as well as the nature of conflicts.

Highlights of literature Review about War and National Conflicts in Horn of Africa Region

IGAD established in its present form in 1996, is coordinates peace and security, economic and others social issues in the region and main operation areas includes: conflict prevention, management and resolution, political affairs and humanitarian affairs and encompasses 'specialized institutes', including the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism and the Security Sector Programme. Institutionally IGAD coordinates peace and security operations (Camilla Elowson ,2016). The region, from the late 1950s to the present, has experienced several devastating inter-state wars, including the Ethiopian-Somali wars (1964, 1977-78, 2006-9), the Kenyan-Somali war (1963), the Ugandan-Tanzanian war (1978-79), the Ethiopian-Eritrean border war (1998-2000) and North and South Sudan conflict from long years up to 2011 (<https://www.google.com/search?q=Security&and\Conflicts\in\Horn\Africa>).

Horn of Africa is host of AU headquarters, the center of international and continental cooperation and peace and security efforts. But, region itself faces serious challenges for state and human security caused by armed conflict, political crisis, democracy and governance deficits. Due to competing ambitions for hegemony between states in the region, there is no principal organization for security cooperation. Instead, there are different regional structures with varying mandates that jointly constitute horn of Africa's contribution to the African Peace and Security Architecture (Nilton,2016). Horn of Africa region is the most conflict-ridden region for so long decades, due to armed conflicts have fumed within states, between states, and among proxies whether at the hubs or the peripheries. Among these conflicts: internal conflicts in the failed state in Somalia, the North South civil war and the long decades war among North and South Sudan. Many armed groups from Sudan's Darfur region also violently oppose the governments. The security and intelligence institutions of the UN, IGAD and AU generally contribute to stability and peace within their defined spheres of influence. However, the region and the countries in the region as whole are said to lack a clear regional power. They have

been facing the constraints in terms of economic capacity and lack of internal political consensus (KidistMulugeta, 2014).

Horn of Africa encompasses several conflict complexes, with major regional dimensions including interstate, intrastate and non-state conflicts, alongside one-sided violence against civilians. From so long years to 2021 Somalia is under internal conflict. Since 2019 North Sudan is under damaging internal conflict which caused loss of tens of thousands of human beings and displaced millions of peoples. Moreover, Ethiopia is under internal conflict with the Tigray province military groups since 2020. The region also suffers heavily from humanitarian emergencies, natural disasters, extreme poverty and famine, while struggling with massive refugee flows and the world's largest population of internally displaced people (Frieden und Sicherheit, 2020).

Horn of Africa is also one of the strategic bases for militaries and terrorist groups. In 2002, the USA has launched the institutional operation, focusing on the 'fight against terrorism in the Horn of Africa', particularly in Somalia, and the fight against piracy in the eastern coast of Africa. In February 2007, the Pentagon publicized the formation of the United States Africa Command, accountable for operations, exercises, soldiers training and security and intelligence cooperation with the African countries. Moreover, in 2011, the IGAD Security Sector Program was formed, concentrating on maritime security and the contest against systematized crime and terrorism, and the Security Sector Reform (Nilton,2016). In the domestic governances and national scope, countries of the region adopted institutional policies to the prevention and combat against terrorism in Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya. They ratified all twenty-one international conventions and protocols on fighting terrorism and passed laws to prevent terrorist attacks Al-Itihaad-al-Islami, al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda network, junta groups in North Sudan, 'Kuawarjja' military groups movements in Eastern and Southern parts as well as junta groups in Western parts of Ethiopia and others neighboring countries. The terrorist cells and networks are increasing in many parts of the countries of horn and sizing to eastern Africa and red sea areas (Nilton,2016).

In December 2013, a political dispute within the highest stratum of the SPLM and SPLA led to civil war and ethnic mass killing. Critics on South Sudan's civil war have attributed this to political contentions, ethnic hostilities between the Dinka tribe of President Salva Kiir Mayardit and the Nuer of Riek Machar TenyDhurgon, unresolved complaints interneccine war in the 1990s (Alex de Waal, 2015). South Sudanese after independence, returned to violent and conflict in December 2013. These indicates long before the world's newest country achieved independence in July 2011 but had entered to conflict again and the consequences of the renewed conflict have been serious. Tens of thousands of people have been killed, and almost 2 million peoples displaced, with at least 400,000 South Sudanese having fled to neighbouring countries by July 2014 and as many as 715,000 refugees anticipated by the end of the year. Its independence marked a change in the dynamics of the Horn of Africa long a source of worry and insecurity for African and non-African partners alike. These trends shows that the region is one of the world's most politically unstable. They have been shaped and reshaped by a shared history of cross-border conflict, socio-economic and cultural ties, and competing claims over territory (United States Institute of Peace, 2020). The institutions are facing lots of challenges in order to resolve the problems. For example, the conflict that escalated in central Darfur in 2001–2 at first observed much the same: local disputes over land and local government boundaries. Khartoum's political-business managers discounted signs that Islamists such as Khalil would turn to rebellion, partly because intelligence institutions operatives found them living in humble situations in N'djaména. The Darfur war between the al Fashir airport attack of April 2003, and the end of mass burning of villages in January 2005, shows broadly the same pattern except on a much larger scale. The rebel groups attacks humiliated the army. In three huge counter-offensives, the army and militia killed perhaps 30,000 civilians, caused a famine that killed several hundred thousand more, and displaced millions of citizens. From 2005 to 2011, about 1,500–2,000 civilians and fighters died violently each year. Tabulating violent incidents shows diverse kinds of combat, crime and attacks on civilians counting, most intriguingly, incidents in which government-armed paramilitaries fought against one another and in contradiction of the army, police and security forces, and even diverse arms of the official security formation fought one another (Alex de Waal,2015).

In the region, the ongoing crisis of multilateralism and the decline of international security order coincide with fragile political transitions which matters greatly. Likewise, the recent political transitions in north Sudan and Ethiopia require sensible attentions of International and Regional institutions. But the lack of institutional and coordinated support from regional and others actors along with adequate financial frameworks for peaceful transitions to remain critical. Countries and citizens are worries about the future security. Particularly due to conflicts and wars the situations in North Sudan and Somalia are at risk. Additionally, new actors and changing conflict constellations have emerged in several of the countries of the wider. These ongoing dynamics and challenges potentially can change the way peace and collective security can and will be organized in the future (Frieden und Sicherheit, 2020).

In Somalia, despite experiencing significant success in pushing back al-Shabaab, the lack of joint military action between troop contributing countries has likely reduced the mission's effectiveness in countering

the terrorist group. Al-Shabaab became an affiliate of al-Qaeda and others militaries groups are main causes of insecurity of the region. As a consequence of this and the military set-backs experienced within Somalia, al-Shabaab came to adopt a more regional strategy, involving increased clear-cut terrorist tactics such as attacking civilian targets in neighboring countries, resulting in it evolving in to a major transnational threat (Camilla Elowson,2016). Furthermore, the region is continually distressing by tense ideological confrontations, territorial disputes, cross-border destabilization and continued militarization. Beyond the histrionic redrawing of its political map, the region still hosts the deadliest bunch of conflicts globally. Many people have been deceased in the regions by the recent wars and conflicts. War and conflicts have produced a greater number of demises and destruction. Hence, in terms of cost of human life and the highest rate of inhabitant's displacement are inter-linked conflicts in the Horn of Africa (Frieden und Sicherheit, 2020). The Al Shabaab may decline, as al-Qaeda did in the Horn decades prior. Somalia is an exposed place for militaries movements and international jihadists to operate, despite the political cards of nationalism, Islam and anti-corruption that they can play. Many in the jihadist camp will perhaps find it more lucrative to switch to the counter-terror business, and will find that they can organize an optimal level of terrorist threat such that US counter-terror aid continues. Hartsheik in Ethiopia quickly became the world's largest refugee camp, with more than 250,000 inhabitants. On the other hands, the Somaliland authority, acting de facto at the behest of the business community, successfully regulated violence. Punt land is also in critical challenges (Alex De Waal 2015).

Republic of Somaliland is the new state to emerge from the revision of the geopolitical map of the Horn. The former British Protectorate in northern Somalia, home of the Ishaq clan, had a fleeting moment of autonomy in 1960, enough to designate a legislature that voted to join the Somali Republic in a union that was wrapped almost immediately. This period was the prime of Somali nationalism and the union was a voluntary expression of it. Even so, there was anxiety rising from the comprehension that the cohesive states would inevitably be dominated by the much larger Darod family of clans in central Somalia with Mogadishu at the Centre. The northern favorite for a decentralized state structure with local self-sufficiency was made clear when the population there voted against the unitary, centralized arrangement intended by the Somali Youth League and accepted in a national referendum. Northern dissatisfaction manifested directly afterwards in a rebellion of northern army officers. Ensuing events were to thoroughly justify northern doubts (Markakis, 2021). Since 2006 it is projected that about 16,000 civilians have been murdered and over 870,000 escaped Mogadishu of which about 400,000 ended in refugee settlement camps stretching some 30 Km along the Afgoye- Mogadishu corridor only to find that the war in Mogadishu had expanded to follow them there. Those who chose to travel extra have encountered even worse misuses from ad hoc militia, human contrabandists in the Kenya border. Freelance looting gangs have plundered, killed and raped displaced peoples on the roads towards Kenya and thousands have sunk in their desperate attempt to cross the Gulf of Aden to Yemen. More than 80,000 crossed to Dadaab refugee camps in Kenya and more than 23,000 crossed the Gulf of Aden into Yemen in 2008 (United States Institute of Peace, 2020). These situations are increasing by numbers and context in the Horn of Africa region.

The region is characterized as a militarized areas by pervasive rent seeking patronage, with violence routinely used as a tool for extracting rent. The interstate wars and civil wars, conventional wars struggled in trenches with air-to-air combat upstairs and irregular wars fought by jihadists and followers of a messianic trendy, international military intrusions and maritime piracy, genocidal annihilations and non-violent popular uprisings (Alex de Waal,2015) . Therefore, the horn region is one of the worlds politically unstable. The conflict dynamic within Somalia has transformed into a less manageable dynamic, dividing international attention between conflicts on both sides of the Horn of Africa in the context of increasing global uncertainty. Thus, Somalia is still in war with different groups, terrorists, and independence seekers. Moreover, South Sudan independence marked a change in the dynamics of the region long a source of worry and insecurity for African and non-African partners alike (Jeremy Astill-Brown, 2014). The current conflict in North Sudan and Ethiopia is also one of the critical matters which needs the regional intelligence, peace and security institutions cooperation with domestic government.

International and regional Security and Intelligence Institutions Cooperation and its Effectiveness in Horn of Africa

Africa is at a critical turning point in its long and complex history and AU has aimed to providing more efficient solutions to problems since 2002. In Africa the security dynamics is critical. Hence, the UN and AU's initiatives more focusing on the stabilization of the continent. Through its sole capacities, the UN institutional frameworks played a crucial role in coordinating assistance of all kinds to Africa (<http://www.un.org> > global-issues).

UN security institutions played critical roles in Africa between the periods 1960 and 2021, which includes in a peacebuilding and post-conflict rebuilding model (Nagar D., 2022). Moreover, the UN and its affiliated institutions have urged to strengthen its partnership with the AU, at highlighting the growing influence of cooperation to resolving war and conflicts, peace and security challenges. UN commended that the efforts of

AU strengthening its capacity, including through the advancement of the African Peace and Security Architecture, and underscored the importance of further alliance of their cooperation. Particularly, UN institutions played advanced roles in early warning, preventive diplomacy, mediation, and promotion and protection of human rights, international humanitarian law and the rule of law. For example, the military coup d'état in Sudan and other pressing security challenges in the region, and was based on annual report on strengthening the partnership between the UN and the AU on issues of peace and security in Africa. Donald Kaberuka, African Union High Representative for the Peace Fund, worried that the regional organizations have demonstrated a comparative advantage in carrying out offensive operations in high-risk environment. AU has mandated 15 peace backing operations since the organization's initiation, mostly in contexts where UN peacekeepers were not deployed (UN, 2021).

Recalling Security Council resolution 2320 (2016), which opened discussions on cost-sharing between the AU and the UN for peace support operations, he said the time has come to further consider the matter of justifiable funding mechanism for AU-led missions. The UN works with the AU on regular joint consultations and analyses through cooperation frameworks for peace and security, humanitarian efforts with the UN office to the AU playing a key role in these regards. And once the ongoing discussions on the division of tasks among the AU and the regional economic communities are concluded, the UN looks forward to attaching the opportunities of each organization and building effective conflict prevention and resolution strategies (UN, 2021).

Regional institutions support efforts to stabilize Somalia through the advancement of the federalism process, including peaceful, inclusive, and democratic elections. Improving inter-state relations in the region is an important step on the road to greater trade and development, so they encourage the UN's Special Envoy to the region to facilitate more dialogue on improved cooperation and integration. UN look to countries in the region to improve cooperation for the sake of regional peace and stability. In particular, UN urge IGAD and its Member States to engage and encourage to re-affirm their commitment to the cessation of hostilities and implement peace agreement (Kelly Craft, 2019). But the response for conflicts in Ethiopia has problems of misunderstanding of Ethiopian politics. Hence, the position of USA and UN partners on conflict reinforce in the Ethiopia and in the horn region has encountered. Civil conflicts produce excesses and tragedies on all sides.

Furthermore, UN has long betrothed in efforts to bring peace and solidity to the Horn of Africa. In October 2018, the Secretary-General prolonged the responsibility of the Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan to cover the region, defined for this purpose to encompass members of IGAD. This command derives from an exchange of information's between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council. This primarily contains enhancing sub-regional capacities for conflict deterrence and arbitration and addressing cross-cutting issues. On this basis, the Special Envoy is tasked with carrying out good office's part and special coursework on behalf of the Secretary-General as compulsory (UN, 2001). This includes cooperation with the AU High-Level Implementation Panel in efforts to implement Security Council determination 2046 (2012), which calls on the Sudan and South Sudan to reach promise on critical issues under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and found good and peaceful neighborly relations between the two countries (UN, 2001)

IGAD is known as one of the RECs and agreeing organizations one of the five sub-regional African organizations, and signify the eastern part of the continent. Article 4(d) of the Constitutive Act of the AU calls for "the formation of a common defense policy for the African continent". The AU Summit held in Maputo, Mozambique in July 2003, took note, inter alia, of the policy context for the Formation of the African Standby Force that will be made up of sub-regional standby brigades with one in each of its five nominated sub-regions. In eastern Africa, IGAD authorized on an interim basis to harmonize the efforts of the sub-region towards the formation of the Eastern African Standby Brigade, one of the sub-regional brigades designated by the AU. Hence, IGAD establishment of EASBRIG within the framework of the AU's planned African Standby Force and officially launched on 11 April 2005, at the first Summit of Heads of State and Government, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Eastern African Standby Brigade operate on the basis of a memorandum of understanding. This is because Eastern African Standby Brigade will most probably have as many non-IGAD members as members of IGAD (Weldesellassie, 2011).

This new autonomous body replaced IGAD which had previously served in this function. The Coordination Mechanism is co-located with Eastern African Standby Brigade Planning Element in Nairobi. The Coordination Mechanism command structure will be the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the highest organ, the Council of Ministers of Defense and Security as the second highest organ, and the Committee of the Eastern Africa Chiefs of Defense Staff, which receives reports from Eastern African Standby Brigade Headquarters, Logistic Base and Planning Element. Nevertheless, IGAD actually exercises extremely inadequate capacities and powers, it also lacks its own law-making body that would ensure, internally and externally, a sound legal basis for drafting legal documents. IGAD Secretariat is characterized by constant dependence on member states' commitment (Weldesellassie, 2011).

UN institutional cooperation has faced challenges in the region. For example, leaders encountered many challenges in South Mogadishu. The UN cooperating with elders, tribal leaders and civilians' political authority to managed the Somalia situations is less effective (Redie, 2013). More opportunistic the international and regional intervention is the more likely it is that a significant proportion of the Somali people will be alienated, which will only embolden the extremists. The use of IGAD's platform to push this agenda through AU and the UN tarnished these organizations' credibility and has become a powerful recruiting tool for the extremists while at the same time discouraging Somali civic nationalists from organizing. The initiative on conflict management, its performance on efforts to achieve lasting peace in the Sudan and the establishment of specialized bodies are increasing and this adds value to the AU and the UN missions. Thus, in the horn of Africa the UN and IGAD security and intelligence institutions played roles during wars by collecting information for the use of policy makers when making their decisions and acting upon them (Weldesellassie, 2011).

The information springs from a variety of sources, such as code-breakers, and is analyzed and written by evaluators. The main purpose of intelligence is to enable policy makers to optimize their physical and psychological resources. Security and Intelligence operations are tactical, strategic institutional and structural. Intelligence has traditionally content wide ranging and crucial functions in security and statecraft. Though, in recent years the role of security and intelligence in conflict resolution has extended and now forms a core element of conflict management policies and strategies (<https://www.kas.de/en/web/israel/>). To reservation of peace by achieving agreements and resolve crisis, the security and intelligence institutions can conduct negotiations between groups and states representatives to influence decision by dialogue and non-violent means. Finding the interest of parties involved in war and basic information's about the details and the interest of the enemies and contending groups is essential for negotiations. The framework of international law can influence the belligerent parties (Berridge, G.R., 2001).

Horn of Africa, conflict and complex situations the security institutions played roles of: example, in the Sudan's interstate conflict and civil wars, IGAD, mainly through Kenya, played a leading role in collecting vital information to ensuring the peace agreement of 2005, which laid the ground for declaring South Sudan a new state in 2011 (Camilla,2016). Security and intelligence institutions provide information's using communications tools but the oldest method is human intelligence which is gathering information using agents. Such methods have risk, during wartime most countries execute foreign agents who have been caught often after a period of torture (UK report, 1996). Signals Intelligence is collection of data from the interception of not just radio signals but any kind of electronic data. Modern technology can 'leak' information which can be picked up by specialist equipment. Such collection of intelligence started with the arrival of wireless and radio technology. Mobile phones have become an integral part of modern western society. These types have been used by terrorist cells to communicate, posing new challenges to the security and intelligence services (Dugdall Pointon, 2007).

IGAD follows the negotiations of these conflicts and, but the institutions have less driving role in managing the conflict. Different dynamics are at work in South Sudan, where IGAD has taken a far more role. At the very outset of the civil war, IGAD took immediate action, hiring special envoys tasked with safeguarding mediation. Arbitration support structure was also set up at the organization's Peace and Security Department. Even though IGAD swiftly took the lead, a peace agreement only materialized once mediation evolved, with legislatures from the AU, EU, UN, US and others institutions. IGAD continues to be heavily involved in South Sudan, especially through the specialist care and substantiation task that it set up to verify compliance with the peace agreement (Dugdall Pointon, 2007).

IGAD has learned much from the South Sudanese experience. The timing of the South Sudan crisis existing IGAD with an opportunity to seize the initiative. Besides, the rapid IGAD action was to a great extent interested by the member states (IGAD,2012). Hence, the presence of the member states' strong own political interests is likely to be the decisive factor as to whether IGAD will mediate in a future regional crisis. The IGAD's involvement in South Sudan has been a stronger cooperative effort. IGAD has gained much visibility and goodwill from its actions. As a result, significant EU funding has been dedicated to build on the recent IGAD experience. The aims are to rationalize its peace and security institutions restructuring into enduring mediation structure (IGAD,2012).

Home to some 11 million people, South Sudan is a rising potential market, investor in efforts on the part of the region towards advancing the resilience and integration of its countries, and a cooperator for regional peace. Both the AU and IGAD, regional bloc mediating efforts to end the conflict, have been unequivocal about the behavior of the warring revelries. All sides have acted in a way that African countries contemplate to be beyond the pale. Countries of the region together with Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Kenya, while not always acting in ways likely to win approval from the wider world, have been clear about their interests. They have affianced robustly and sometimes individually to alleviate the spread of uncertainty into their own territories (Jeremy Astill-Brown, 2014).

Despite al-Shabaab being a key danger to many IGAD states in the region, the institutions have taken a more impartial stance towards counter-terrorism by concentrating on the phenomena of radicalization rather

than on al-Shabaab itself. IGAD is establishing a research Centre in Djibouti, dedicated to countering violent extremism and envisioned to be a hub for information sharing and best practices among member states. IGAD has an International Capacity Building Program against Terrorism, whose mandate in the last couple of years has expanded to include intelligence and police networking. There are also plans to set up regional security centers in various border regions, focusing on operative teamwork (Camilla,2016). IGAD has also adopted pacts on joint criminal repatriation that will make it easier to extradite criminals between member states, another measure that can be useful for counter-terrorism determinations. Moreover, IGAD appears to have played a noteworthy role in terms of back up in strengthening Somalia's local government structures, a crucial avenue by which to ensure that the country does not remain a disastrous state and breeding ground for terrorist groups. IGAD institutions continues to take an active role on the ground in Somalia peace processes (Camilla,2016).

In the light of years of state collapse in Somalia and the resulting absence of law and order, a number of sub-clan-based Sharia' Courts in Mogadishu amalgamated to form the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2000. The ICU rose to power in February 2006 by overwhelming all the warlords, who until then carved Mogadishu and most of south and central Somalia among themselves. The administration of the ICU was reinforced and funded by the salafi and wahabi businessmen based in Mogadishu who were mostly from the Hawiye clan for two reasons: firstly, they divergent any arrangement of governance that was not built on the Shariá and secondly, they anticipated the ICU would use the power of the state to favor them and the Hawiye clan. The ICU dramatically amended civilian security, revived the port and airport and providing public order in Mogadishu and most of south and central Somalia. It appeared as if Somalia's state collapse was over (IGAD,2012). The terrorist institutions are using Somalia's insecurity to laying claim on the country's resources, and likewise conducting cruel killings and piracy for a number of decades. In the relatively stable Somaliland and Puntland, Ethiopia established close friendly relations by providing security training and military materiel including light weapons, and intelligence information sharing. In the chaotic Central and South Somalia, Ethiopia pursued a different approach securing the institutional cooperation of a number of warlords and clan militias among the dozen (IGAD,2012).

AMISOM has been facilitating the distribution of humanitarian aid either directly and indirectly to the needy people in government-controlled areas and the EU was the major funding partner (IGAD,2012). Political power behind AMISOM is IGAD, AU and the UN intelligence institutions. A joint analysis between the three institutions joint military and political strategy, provides for a military strategic concept to safeguard an action is taken to stabilize the country. UN Security Council, in its resolution 2010 (2011) paragraph 28, requests the collaboration among the three institutions to agree on proper division of errands in Somalia. The AU-UN- IGAD tactical direction is built on the 2004 Transition Federal Charter Somalia and the 2008 Djibouti agreement, which opened the way for enlargement sharing the institutions. UN remains the international actor capable of summoning across the political fault lines within the Red Sea arena (United States Institute of Peace, 2020).

US should play role in catalyzing these efforts toward concrete action. The US military's Africa Command and Central Command played roles in multilateral, military-to-military engagements that strengthen diplomatic efforts to foster collaboration on shared maritime challenges. The US played an instrumental role in asserting the standing of this and providing inducements (Mesfin,2012). The US should designate the Horn of Africa as a priority region under the Global Fragility Act, unlocking access to the Prevention and Stabilization Fund, the Complex Crisis Fund, and the Multi-Donor Global Fragility Fund. US should also ensure that security assistance and security cooperation reinforce inclusive, legitimate governance. Train-and-equip programs centered exclusively on counterterrorism have often distorted governance in the states of the Horn, skewing it toward securitized responses to domestic opposition and away from efforts to foster inclusion and legitimacy, ultimately undermining efforts to prevent violence and promote stabilization (United States Institute of Peace,2020).

High ranking contributors from different countries, experts and representatives of civil society involved in peace processes, regional organizations such as IGAD and the AU, Special Envoys from the US and the EU to the Horn of Africa, came together to discuss the questions of peace in the region. During the 15th horn of Africa discourse in Nairobi, jointly hosted by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, the guiding question was how to develop collective security mechanisms that contemplate the fragility of enduring political transitions challenges. The aim was to develop new ideas on how to entrench such mechanisms regionally and continentally against a background of less probable actions of a more various set of external actors following transactional way of peacemaking. In the long-established arrangement the dialogue relishes, mainly frank debates under Chatham House Rule for innovative thoughtful and new ideas on how to brand peace work jointly in the horn of Africa region (Frieden und Sicherheit, 2020).

It can be witnessed, given the more diverse security interests from inside the region. Besides, more actors and a more transactional tactic towards bilateral and regional relations in the region threaten to challenge prevailing rules and norms. Against this contextual, contributors agreed that a more inclusive security approach in the region is required. EU cooperate with regional actors and primarily inhabitants of the countries. EU, needs

to ensure that national driven initiatives are strengthened region democratic values. The cooperation of regional institutions and the EU remains necessary. They can act when violent conflict has exploded, and also in order to make existing tools of conflict prevention more actual (Frieden und Sicherheit, 2020).

UN and other affiliated security and intelligence institutions efforts are assisted for the peaceful situations in the horn of Africa. They played great roles to lessen risks of war. They also make great collaboration to end the war. Particularly, IGAD and AU have played rigorous role. Whereas UN and EU also cooperated throughout the country, particularly the coordination is effective in South Sudan. But in Somalia still it seeks more support. The north Sudan issues is worsening recently. They can support a collective international effort to improve security in horn of Africa. UN roles can be instrumental in bridging across multilateral institutions and initiatives to minimize conflict and promote mutually reinforcing efforts. The numerous multifaceted initiatives currently underway include: the AU High Level Implementation Panel consultations, IGAD Task Force on the Red Sea, and the Council of Arab and African Coastal States of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden and these forums deliver ample opportunity for debates of new structures that can effectively promote horn of Africa peace and security (United States Institute of Peace,2020).

Ethiopia's military power, population size, and diplomatic strength have enabled it to position itself as a regional power. Ethiopia played as the drive of regional peace and security initiatives coordinator and has been able to influence regional security agendas through regional institutions. The convergence of Ethiopia's welfares and those of its Western cooperators more given as legitimacy in its regional status. Ethiopia's increasing appointment in regional peace and security issues further designates that it has the will to lead. Ethiopia's position in the region is inhibited by historical influences and vulnerability of neighboring states. Ethiopia maintains a central position in the region and plays an important role in regional peace and security issues. Ethiopia act as a fortification against extremist groups in the region as a mediator and as a peacekeeper. Ethiopia has also achieved to drive regional agendas through the regional institutions. Emerging as influential security player, Ethiopia has managed to secure the backing that it desperately needs to boost its economy and deal with the numerous internal and regional limitations to its regional power projection in the Horn of Africa. To consolidate its power position and receive credibility, Ethiopia needs to improve its internal political stability (KidistMulugeta, 2014).

Could International and Regional Institutions Completely Eliminated War and Conflicts from the Horn of African Region?

Throughout the Horn of Africa, a manifold, violent political struggle has caused loss of many human lives and displaced citizens. The war and conflict consume a large share of the region's sparse resources, and condemning future generations to enduring misery.

The regional and international institutions are supporting the region efforts to end the war and conflict. Horn of Africa countries the main questions of conflicts are the state of sovereignty, territorial integrity and legitimacy. Political actors in lieu of ethno-national groups who all face unequal access to power resources and the social acumen. These denominators are the crucial ingredients in the war, whether it is contest in the name of nation, region, clan, and religion (Markakis, 2021). The institutions played great roles in the Horn of Africa. Peace and security issues has been at the centre of global attention for several decades because of increasing armed conflict groups. Horn of Africa region needs comprehensive cooperation's from international and regional institutions to end the emerging conflicts in North Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia.

The crisis in the states is due to variously attributed to ethnic strife, resource competition, weak political institutions, inappropriate policies, corruption and authoritarian rulers. But some states in region have been able to adequately perform the functions. In generally the borders issues is critical. Some states are trying to exercise a monopoly on the means of force within its borders and enforce the law equitably throughout its domain. They are protecting the life and property of its subjects, and administer justice impartially in their boards. But majority of the states hold continental records for political unrest for example, some states are in conflicts and hot wars for example, some are secessions from existing states, and the other state to collapse.

In generally in the horn of Africa, almost all self-identifying ethno-national groups have started at least one "national liberation movement." Social conflicts include the competition for resources among social classes, clans and ethnic groups is critical, due to growth of population, urbanization and failure of economic transformation to offset their impact, competition is increasingly politicized. When the private sectors of the economy wasting, the states come to regulator the distribution of resources. Unavoidably, access to states powers secures access to resources (Markakis, 2021). States power becomes the object of critical social conflict. It is inevitable in this context that ethnicity will serve as the reference point of loyalty, identity, collective security and solidarity. Lingering negotiations on power sharing along ethnic lines delayed unconventionality in many instances. In several cases, including Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia, smaller and less advanced groups asked for separation. Elsewhere, they asked for a federal system of government. These were an early sign of the crashes in the body of politics and an ill warning. The many-sided conflict involved competing nation-state

building missions working at cross aims in a zero-sum game. The state, actual and imaginary, was the prize in the various conflict, with some actors seeking to reserve existing states, others trying to create their own states, others yet fighting to secede from one state, and others still to capture power within their own state (Markakis, 2021)

The other question is that ‘why nations go in to armed conflict?’ is argued by Stephen Ryan and summarized as the individual selfishness is the main cause of conflict. It is this assertion of self-rule that gives the idea of a nation and its political character. Ethnic conflict identity is central to nationalist groups and nationalism is a political idea and practice which emerge of new order of sovereignty and territorial state. In these case nationalisms can push to the war and dispute. The states are more inclined to wage conflict because the nationalism group using violence to achieve its goals of sovereign state.

Thus, security and intelligence institutions can build information related with the type of conflict escalated as well as the effects that can be resulted from the war. Barry Posen, in his book ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict’ stated that the nationalist desire for a state which they perceive as group on behalf of their cultural and identity. They use force to achieve political desire of the nation and the legitimacy and sovereign nation states of a group’s territory (Barry R. Posen,2008). This kind of movements most likely lead to disputes. This statement is well suit for the horn of Africa countries.

Among the roles of security and intelligence institution, protecting people by providing information is core issues. It can influence the warring parties by indicating the dangerous side and the negative effects of National self-determination and its massive bloodshed. In the horn of Africa, the other cause of war is the failure of governments to protect minority groups, discriminatory political, economic and social policies. These also resulted the disputes between nations and lead to massive ethnic conflicts. Moreover, economic interdependence, international organizations, cross-border flows of technology and information and claims for popular sovereignty which can also lead to secessionism.

The question of sovereignty is creation of new sovereign states. It requires a change to the political system. Assumption of separatist groups expectations is after their independence; peace is more likely will happen. In this case the best examples are South Sudan national separatist movement and Eritrea disputes with Ethiopia. After long wars South Sudan became sovereign state separated from North Sudan. Currently, South Sudan nations built sovereign state and developing potential market economy. The efforts the government and the people towards furthering the resilience and integration of their country’s economy is rigorous (Jeremy Astill-Brown,2014). International and regional institutions, played mediating efforts to end the conflict. Clearly, all sides have behaved in a way that horn countries consider to be beyond the pale. Countries of the region including Ethiopia were cooperated for the stability of South Sudan (Jeremy Astill-Brown,2014). However, in the Somalia case this assumption does not work. Because, Somalia disputes with Punt land and Somalia land and it is not yet solved. In Somalia the bloody war continued. Punt land States and Somalia land have not got recognized and remained de facto state in Somalia.

The cases of the nationalist disputes are worried with the physical distinctions because the divisions influencing likelihood of nationalist sentiments and forming within a given region. The disagreements between nationals in all states is due to the nature of the conflict and the nationalist group political questions. The central factors of the ethnic conflict are identity, nationalist groups and simply imaginary and is raised by political leaders. The main challenges which that creates disputes among nations are: how we conceive of sovereignty as overriding idea at the heart of the international system. The state sovereignty has been weakened by a number of international processes. Globalization, development of terrorism, desire of the power and the development of modern technologies can also lead to conflict. For example, the fighting groups in Somalia are, mainly sticked to own the greatest influence, to own greatest power, to own greatest wealth, to own greatest territory, to own greatest economy, to win greatest influence in their country politics in the most creative and selfishness way.

However, many scholars debated on the ideas about why it is difficult to eliminate the war? The realist’s theorists argued that in the anarchic world war can happen at any time and place. This idea gives sense due to the anarchic nature of international politics. In our fundamentally inconsistent world, the world in which we live has endless questions and which will emanate from the hearts and minds of the people with multinational ethnics, with multinational interest which is spreading past and changing its characteristics for future and it is constructed on the eternal conflict and due to these facts eliminating war and conflict is hard task. The war and conflict in the horn of Africa, gradually bore more and more destructive results in some countries. In each warring groups, there bears an enormous number of losses: man, and women, young and older, resources and money, and territory and other important issues damaged. Particularly in Somalia and north Sudan conflict brings much more destructions.

II. CONCLUSIONS

In the history of world, the people have lived for only a little period of time without conflict and war from the traditional warring periods to modern technologies warfare globally. It is true that in the horn of Africa,

nations are fighting for their right, for the freedom and territorial control, nationality and independence. Still many countries are fighting in the horn of Africa. Hence, war could not be eradicated, eliminated and resolved from the region.

The states governments are also trying to solve conflict in collaboration with regional and international institutions. Still in the horn of Africa region, there are fighting groups. The traditional leaders and governance, nation and tribe, military and civil, the ruling elite and the rest of the population are fighting. Hence, the horn of Africa political conflict and chaos is mainly the result of poor attitude, narrow nationalism movements and lack of leader's commitment.

The international and regional security and intelligence institutions tried their best efforts of cooperation to end the conflicts from the horn of Africa region. But the complex nature of war and conflicts in the region, the lack of skill, poor resources facilities, lack of good governance, and weak commitment of the domestic political and military leaders are critical challenges. Therefore, security and intelligence institutions need to advance its power and potentials to end the war in a cooperated manner.

REFERENCES

- [1]. Alex de Waal: 2015: The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the Business of Power. Polit Press. P.1-263. Cambridge.UK.
- [2]. Ambassador Kelly Craft. November 4, 2019. Remarks at a UN Security Council Briefing on Peace and Security in the Horn of Africa. <https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-a-un-security-council-briefing-on-peace-and-security-in-the-horn-of-africa/>.
- [3]. Barry R. Posen: The security dilemma and ethnic conflict. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396339308442672>. P.27-74. 2008.
- [4]. Berridge ,G.R. Diplomacy Theory from Machievelli to Kissinger. NY 2001.
- [5]. Camilla Elowsonand Adriana Lins de Albuquerque; STUDIES IN AFRICAN SECURITY Challenges to Peace and Security in Eastern Africa:The role of IGAD, EAC and EASF. 2016.
- [6]. César Fernandes Cardoso: REGIONAL SECURITY IN HORN OF AFRICA: CONFLICTS, AGENDAS AND THREATS. Brazilian Journal of African Studies e-ISSN 2448-3923.ISSN 2448-3915 | v.1, n.2, Jul./Dec. 2016, p.131-165
- [7]. Doop, VolkertMathijs. 2013. How to handle your neighbours' conflict: Ethiopia's relationships with Sudan and South Sudan.
- [8]. Dugdall Pointon, T. Intelligence and war: 2007; www.historyofwar.org/concepts of intelligence in war.
- [9]. Frieden und Sicherheit: 21.02.2020. New and more complex security challenges in the Horn of Africa. <https://www.fes.de/themenportal-die-welt-gerecht-gestalten/frieden-und-sicherheit/artikel-in-frieden-und-sicherheit/>
- [10]. Henneberg I, Stapel S. Cooperation and Conflict at the Horn of Africa: A New Regional Bloc Between Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia and Its Consequences for Eastern Africa. Africa Spectrum. doi:10.1177/0002039720936689. 2020. P.339-350
- [11]. Henry A. Kissinger: Kissinger Diplomacy: 1994: London
- [12]. IGAD. Managing Peace and Security in Africa APPROACHES TO INTERVENTIONS IN AFRICAN CONFLICTS. The Africa Peace and Security Programme Institute for Peace and Security Studies Addis Ababa University. 2012
- [13]. Intelligence & Democracies in Conflict and Peace KAS/BESA International Conference Bar-Ilan University, October 18–19, 2009 <https://www.kas.de/en/web/israel/veranstaltungsberichte/detail/-/content/intelligence-democracies-in-conflict-and-peace1>
- [14]. Jeremy Astill-Brown. Africa Programme: December 2014: South Sudan's Slide into Conflict: Revisiting the Past and Reassessing Partnerships. Chatham House
- [15]. Welde Sellassie K.I. (2011). IGAD as an International Organization, Its Institutional Development and Shortcomings. Journal of African Law, 55, pp 1-29 doi:10.1017/ S0021855311000015
- [16]. Kidist Mulugeta, July 2014: The Role of Regional Powers in the Field of Peace and Security: The Case of Ethiopia. <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/aethiopien/10879.pdf>. p.1-33
- [17]. Markakis, John (2021). The Crisis of the State in the Horn of Africa. In: The Nation State: A Wrong Model for the Horn of Africa. Berlin: Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften. 10.34663/9783945561577-04
- [18]. Mesfin, Berouk. "Ethiopia's Role and Foreign Policy in the Horn of Africa." International Journal of Ethiopian Studies 6, no. 1/2 (2012): 87–113. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41756936>.
- [19]. Nagar D. (2012) The United Nations Role the Horn of Africa: The Case of Somalia. In: Challenging the United Nations Peace and Security Agenda in Africa. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83523-1_5

- [20]. Nilton César Fernandes Cardoso: REGIONAL SECURITY IN HORN OF AFRICA: CONFLICTS, AGENDAS AND THREATS. *Brazilian Journal of African Studies* e-ISSN 2448-3923 | ISSN 2448-3915 | v.1, n.2, Jul./Dec. 2016 | p.131-165
- [21]. Samson S. Wassara: Conflict and State Security in the Horn of Africa: Militarization of Civilian Groups. University of Juba, Juba, South Sudan. 2002. *African Journal of Political Science* 7(2) DOI:10.4314.v7i2.27330
- [22]. United Nations Security Council. Security Council Adopts Presidential Statement Urging United Nations to Strengthen Partnership with African Union. <https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sc14677.doc.htm>. SC/14677. 2021
- [23]. United States Institute of Peace. FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE Senior Study Group on Peace and Security in the Red Sea Arena. First published October 2020. ISBN: 978-1-60127-833-3. P. 56

Getachew Toma Bilate. "International and Regional Security and Intelligence Institutions Cooperation and its Effectiveness in the Horn of Africa (2010-2021): Mockups from Somalia, North and South Sudan." *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS)*, 26(12), 2021, pp. 16-26.