

# **Montesquieuan Theory of Separation of Powers: Redefinition & Reconceptualization towards a Synthesis of Democracy & Dictatorship**

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## **ABSTRACT**

The Montesquieuan separation of powers (SOPs) was formulated as a problem-solving theory in 1748 to resolve corruption of power. Doing this, a desk review discourse methodology was adopted to interrogate the fundamentals of the theory including review of pertinent literature and selected governance realities. The diagnostic social science approach was approved to do this, to which its first principles is that, all political theories are subject to review and amenable to improvement; hence the endeavour at redefinition and reconceptualization. If anything, the evident modifications of democracy in practice in varied forms demonstrate its variability where it has been intermixed with dictatorship. This became more predictable because SOPs is means to end, and all political means are imperfect. One finding is that, the theory like the practice is much preoccupied with the structural independence of each of the triad arms of government. Similarly, the claim that the practice of SOPs would guarantee efficiency, good governance, and end abuse of power is patently misleading. Importantly, the theory neglected the predictable and critical role of primus inter pares among the triad. In all, the theory is largely superficial than realistic problem-solving because it lends more to structural differentiation, bureaucratization, mystification, indiscretion, and poor regulation. We were convinced that the theory is not imaginative enough to tackle the challenges of governance for transformational development as an ongoing enterprise. To this, we suggested that shared vision and system thinking for anticorruption is necessary for SOPs to be problem-solving, and this entail fair and firm dictatorship.

**KEY WORD:** Separation of Powers, Democracy, Dictatorship, Diagnostic social science, Anticorruption, Problem-solving, Primus inter pares

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## **I. INTRODUCTION:**

### **Some Interrogatory Questions & Propositions**

Prior to writing this paper, we did a desk review discourse on the prospect of the feasibility, practicality, consistency, and elasticity of political theories. After some spirited effort bearing in mind the materiality and variation of romanticism and realism in political economies, we were cautiously conclusive that not all political theories formulated centuries ago and still surviving till this instant have the aspiration, character, resilience, and enthusiasm for problem-solving. Second, confidently preoccupied with this perception, we exuded a synoptic realization that there are competent political theories to the extent that there are ineffectual political theories responsible for, and in the explanation of the causes of political forms with or without practical content for projected progress. Third, we reached a unanimous supposition that the entire human-created knowledge systems including political theories beginning from the Socratic age till the 21<sup>st</sup> century was *ab initio* suggested, experimented, verified, and/or prescribed either with firm principles for diagnosis or to create unnatural differentiations. In any case, our deductions go along with [Paige \(1999\)](#) that theories are not sanctified

because there are underlying forces and other exigencies that are evidently unyielding. Towards a lucid thought process, we consider that if a governance theory cannot provide satisfactory answers but mystification, yes, the logic is simply to review and sort it out so that scholars and leaders or scholars as leaders, better still, leaders as scholars will not continue to sanctify and deify the clichéd principles of such theories.

What's more, we deduced that no materialistic knowledge system is free from perversions whether envisioned or fortuitous. The fifth reason is that materialistic knowledge system is an age long and premeditated cognitive endeavour that is not lost to personal motivation where governance is reduced to a contest of thought processes with perverted theories passing as paradigm. Finally, we quickly reviewed the five preceding deductive proposals and resolved that in the business of theory building and theory proposal as recurring experience, in most cases it prospectively runs counter to problem-solving governance if political history of entities is not taken into context. This assertion is apparently profound enough in view of the existential role of ideological warfare (Clausewitz, Howard, Paret, & Brodie; 1984; Ake; 1979) between and among civilizations where theories are presented to the world as general truth as if they cannot be inadequate. The purveyor and propaganda of this oversimplification of reality from the logic of this assertion would neither expect nor probably entertain the pursuit of paradigm shift by others even in the face of changing realities. History may be self-evident about few leaders with courage of conviction, adaptable enthusiasm for action to pensively and perceptively review theories, take appropriate actions, and get going to the next level.

To illustrate these deductions we settle on Baron de Montesquieu's separation of powers as contained in *"The Spirit of the Laws"* (1748). The choice was informed by the need to interrogate the credulous portrayal of democracy as the best form of government by underwriters of libertarian ideology. Second is the claim by Montesquieu (1982) that the best form of government is one in which the executive, legislative, and judicial powers are separate while they hold one another in close scrutiny. Third is the assertion that the fusion of executive, legislative and judicial powers as it were under the Monarchy of Louis XIV or any other monarchy makes possible despotism. Fourth, that separation of powers makes possible good governance where everyone would be better off. The fifth speaks of how separation of power is fundamental to bringing about efficiency of and in government. Sixth is the assertion that the possibility of arbitrary excesses by government is severely limited. Lastly, the theory assumed that separation of powers is the best method of preserving individual liberty. After some profound and meticulous reflections we got determined that these seven conjectures could be sufficient reasons why separation of powers was carefully chosen to exemplify the prior six propositions.

The take-off point of Montesquieuan theory of separation of powers is the idea to address an extant challenge, that is, appropriation and abuse of public power, in a word, corruption. From history, we read of the French Monarchy, the Roman Republic's Divine Right of Kings, British Monarchy, and other Monarchies reputed for either infamy or strong character. Finding a way out of the challenge of corruption, Montesquieu proposed equality of power and freedom for each of the three organs of government. Secondly, serious as he was in his theorization, he did not contemplate the need for anyone organ having preponderant power over the other two; to be exact, *primus inter pares* (leadership) is needless to him. Thirdly, good governance on the word of Montesquieu would become a living experience when power is separately divided into rule making, rule implementation, and rule adjudication. Fourthly, with this, he was extremely confident that corruption of public power for private enrichment had been sorted out as he bid farewell to arbitrariness of power. Fifthly, arising from the preceding, it is objective to insinuate that Montesquieu was conceivably concerned more with equality of institutions and thought less of men at the summit of these institutions including institutional purpose. This takes us to the last, which is that, in spite of separation of powers Montesquieu thinks there was need to ensure cooperation among the tripartite as supposed stakeholders in development without having the values of integrity and competence in public affairs diminished.

Our debriefing of Montesquieu's separation of powers which continues has further revealed the need to ask some questions that may not be connected to public business but subjective to Montesquieu. In subsequent sections we illustrated our rational objection to equality of power among the tripartite arms of government and whether it has any consequence on the development of the public realm as part of the analysis of this paper. As we seek to hopefully find out, we asked if there was separation of powers elsewhere prior to the birth of Baron Montesquieu in 1689, and if any, how it was practiced. Was the Montesquieuan idea of equality of powers among executive, legislature, and judiciary an inspiration to Almond and Powell's (1966) structural differentiation to bureaucratizing the political system? Was Montesquieu seriously devising means of avoiding the mercenary character of corruption of power or merely a philosophical or academic excursion? Lastly, was the theory profoundly influenced by the theory of Adam Smith's division of labour, if ever, is labour divisible like separated power or can power which cannot be separated from labour be divisible considering that productivity and development are ostensibly fundamental to both labour and power respectively and mutually?

This scenario questions especially the last likely point to another question, which is, what could be the relation between political power and labour in economic or social sense? Our deduction is likely to be founded on the thinking that task or labour as a responsibility exist before power; that is, the authority and ability to get

things done cannot precede without a given activity to be performed; in other words, while labour is immanent in political man the associated power is derived only in social relations of production, exchange, distribution, etc. Similarly, the capability to get task accomplished is social, that is, it is cultivated. Sociologically, we reckon that roles exist before status but power confers not only status but used to execute roles respectively. Evidently, we will reason that before labour (task) undergo division and before power is separated the former must have organically existed. In this context it means that assigning different parts of an industrial, administrative, conceptual, or methodological task to different persons or institutions is meant to achieve two goals: productivity and transformation to advance the course of human progress. And to be exact, does this entails leadership and practically illustrating it? As we would find out, is productivity the goal of Almond and Powell's (1966) structural differentiation and equality or mere specialization of structural roles as Ake (1979) would critique it? And is Montesquieu's structural dispersal of power an inspiration for the later day theory of political development by these two scholars?

The starting point for the Montesquieuan theory is to forestall dictatorship which to the exponent is repugnantly a risk governance factor; hence, should be forbidden, but without thinking of the dialectical value that dictatorship could evidently be a governance model for rebirth. From the logic of the issue, Montesquieu didn't contemplate the feasible reality of treble dictatorship of the executive, legislature, and judiciary. If this wasn't a possibility, shouldn't he have averted his mind to the tyrannical realities of the dictatorship of global ruling class, corporate propaganda media, imperial firms, guerilla organizations, trade unions, etc. during his time with audacious power bloc in abundance to weaken State's capability let alone the tripartite arms? Moreover, in the case of the possibility of triple dictatorships, should there be a bigger dictatorship (*primus inter pares*) to regulate other dictatorships? Although, the theory of separation of powers was politically used to influence the Constitution making in parts of the world including the United States; however, why would Montesquieu insist on equality of organs of government as against the inevitable first among equals, that is, leadership as a desideratum even if the theory of equality is valid? Should Montesquieu have averted his mind to the fact that concept (dictatorship) as a principle affects varying perceptions and behaviours and could under inevitable range of possibilities manifest contradictory reality? Is it a predictable and timeless fact that where three are gathered leadership must prudently emerge, and was this too complex for Montesquieu not to have averted his mind to?

The next probable interrogation for Montesquieu is: if development in spite of its inevitability is a dependent variable of power, and if divergent ambition is also inescapable, can such separated powers between/among the triple arms of government facilitate progress of a nation? Again, where grand corruption profoundly manifests in a democracy with clear separation of powers which arm of government would constrain the other without being dictatorial given that the three arms ethically and constitutionally have the right but one of the arms is at least impassioned about anticorruption? In this context we consider it natural that since Montesquieu's concern is corruption of power- forbidden alternative, the reason he theorized separation of powers, the arm of government enthusiastic about anticorruption inevitably and logically becomes the *primus inter pares*, insofar that there is no leadership without anticorruption and no governance without anticorruption. To be in no doubt, even if the three arms of government are equal which is implausible, leadership is a preordained actuality like the Durkheimian "social fact" among persons let alone institutions. Our conception of political power is that it doesn't roam about because it is not without direction and seeing that interest must have direction whether the interest is debauched or principled. In other words, power and interest are not only connected but also conflictual, and it is the interest that power is employed to advance that eventually governs the quality of democracy, not excluding separation of powers.

Our empirical view which may likely point to a new theory is that the tripartite arms cannot in strict sense directly, competently, and sensibly be of equality in shouldering the burden of progress of nations, whether they each share the same vision or not, without leadership. Thus, as we found out, the certainty of leadership is in itself likely to be a limitation to the espoused independence of the arms of government whenever the vision and interest of, for instance, the executive, legislature, and judiciary are variously at variance with one another and without shared vision for governance in development. To further illustrate, in real-world economics land, labour and capital are tie-in, thus, they cannot do without one another in production; aside, one feature is unique to the factors- the right quantity and quality is determined by intellectual labour, the entrepreneur. Lastly, we hold the premise that the end of every undertaking may actually take the form of regularity, but the means are usually diverse like the diversities of performance-driven productivity are the end of all the means. Thus, in the production of similar product, like governance (dynamic means) and development (progressing end), it provides us with the fact that diversities of means exist, the reason separation of powers must be distinctively practiced because of dynamic differentiations of underlying forces that are very much prevalent in the history of all human conditions, or so we think.

## II. REDEFINITION & RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF SEPARATION OF POWERS

There is no doubting the apparent attraction and prevalence, we think through that the Montesquieuan theory of separation of powers contained some assumptions that made it necessary for redefinition and reconceptualization. To hopefully do this, we take on the diagnostic social science as theorized by [Abba, Hamisu, and Abdullahi \(2019\)](#). This problem-solving paradigm is of the idea that social science theories regardless of their strength cannot be free from either perversions or need for improvement or both. The second principle is that reality is dynamic and so theories must be adaptable enough to comprehend the dynamic forces in political economy. Third, the paradigm appreciates the principle that theories must have the duty to think dialectically else they will not be comprehensive enough for problem-solving. Fourth, theory must contain both value and fact, and where it is much more of value than unmistakable fact such theory will be amenable more to irrationality than wisdom and vice versa. Last but not the least, for fitting redefinition and reconceptualization of theories, the assumptions in theory must be interrogated, sieved, and improved upon. Bearing these principles in mind during our desk review discourse, we identified some assumptions which we consider inconsistent in the theory of separation of powers after reviewing the fundamentals. This review effort assisted us to have clear thought process and direction against the probable frivolities that Montesquieuan theory put up with. So, the task here is manifestly well-defined: critique separation of powers using redefinition and reconceptualization to know if it is dynamic and reformist or not.

A redefinition of separation of powers is a presupposition that most of the assumptions could largely be invalid to specific or broad society's configurations, levels of development, character of politics, the motivation of political will ([Abba, Hamisu, Abdullahi, & Alao; 2016](#)), adversarial or shared vision for development, leadership character, and other unique existential realities like [Senge's \(2004\)](#) "system thinking and mental models". Redefinition and reconceptualization are necessary because the theory of separation of power is considered befuddling to say the least. For instance, how can separation of power/checks and balances constitute the best means for the preservation of liberty? Why would Montesquieu and others put forward that freedom of each of the tripartite arms should not be threatened when actions and reactions - policy, implementation, and evaluation can be inconsistent with the vision for national development, or how can liberty as such bring about development as a dynamic progress? We seek to know what liberty is, and of course, the essence of independence of the tripartite structures when such freedom can be adverse to and a bulwark against reformist power for anticorruption, including the tenacious and audacious purpose for development.

The diagnostic nature of our redefinition and reconceptualization is to make obvious that some deductions of separation of powers are incoherent probably because of oversimplification. The theory argued as if it is ubiquitously invariable and a *coup de grace* of progress, yet it fall victim to the expected variations which the professed communist, capitalist, socialist, and democratic theories and nations have experienced. Till this moment history has continued to show that theories, ideologies, and all other *isms*, including their praxis are still radically experiencing unstable and, sometimes to a degree, enduring metamorphosis because they ultimately have no choice but to undergo changes at periodicity. So, if political realism could make these ideologies variable with the dynamics of time, the Montesquieuan theory definitely cannot fail to fall victim of political criticism, reconsideration, and adaptability. And so, our redefinition insinuates that the Montesquieuan separation of powers can pass as perverted knowledge whenever it cannot be used to unfetter, develop, and transform society and without the enthusiasm and underlying forces to be problem-solving.

The proposition we rely on to achieve the purpose of this redefinition is simply that, any theory that is not practically problem-solving but inflexibly executed irrespective of its incongruence to extant realities is perverted knowledge. Theories are not cast-iron in certainty and if political society cannot divest itself of diversities that are regular, it laid open the theory of separation of powers to steady review to avoid constraining progress. However, it call to mind the fact that it is not the thought process that produced separation of powers that inherently suffers from limitation but the failure to feasibly make it amenable to transfiguration. Trivialization is for sure part of the history of the theories and ideologies of capitalism, communism, socialism, and democracy because scholarships disbelieve the role of redefinition and reconceptualization. This reality forced some self-absorbed theorists to illusorily and romantically hang around dogmatism while others were duped into non-alignment to the two ideological blocs- East and West in the post WW II. Thus, redefinition and reconceptualization are possible by theorists that have and deploys political wisdom, knowledge of dialectics, self-discipline, and methodical against chauvinism of which most theorists of democracy of western scholarship rarely do.

The *cliché* that democracy is the best form of government is not an unusual rhetoric; it was famous with the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall where liberal democracy was used as *red herring* to replace the capitalist ideology to give the impression that something had changed albeit without change. From history we know that Montesquieu was in defence of this *cliché* to which he also asserted that separation of power is practicable only in democracy ([Montesquieu; 1982](#)), a claim suggesting that separation of powers cannot exist in other forms of government. We take this to be equivalent to the fallacy that division of labour is practiced only in industrial

societies, (Smyth & Li; 2004) or like the famed Fukuyama's (1992) delusion that the spread of Western liberal democracy is the *last-bus-stop* of system of government, implying extinction of ideological evolution. These speculative claims, we so think, have far reaching effect against rationality, diversity, practicability, dialectics, rebirth, and reform. To our redefinition, what is best is equivalent to ideal state which does not exist outside of man but in the mind. For sure, the ideal exist in man's vision, but what is challenging to political man is the approximate transformation of ideal into tangibly sure fact, and this requires analytic foresight.

A brief instance suggests that development is an ideal state of mind but not an ideal reality that doesn't even exist; thus, development is an open-ended, an interminable progression requiring unbroken ambition to innovate and renovate nonstop. Besides, since perfect human reality is a pipe dream, development like democracy is only achieved by approximation on a continual basis of learning, unlearning, and relearning (Toffler; 1970). So, it is not unpredicted that political adjectives like underdeveloping, underdeveloped, developing, developed, overdeveloped, overdeveloping, and/or overdevelopment are used racially, ideologically, and, of course, partially to describe state of development or the drive for creative next level or not. One thing that this says is that, nations like development itself are all permanently in state of political mutability. Till this day, there is no evidence of any nation on earth that has claimed to have reached the peak of political and socio-economic development (Acemoglu & Robinson; 2013) or even knows what constitute the zenith of development except the Fukuyaman ill-famed hallucination. Secondly, there is likely no nation that has decided to do nothing because the inherent desire for progress that is integral to man had been exhausted.

For this, separation of powers like democracy exists but its existence would have to perpetually undergo modifications as a conforming rule, albeit endlessly owing to differentials in different societies because it is a means to an end. We argue that dynamic end (development) is seemingly perpetually there to be sought even though they can still differ from one society to another; however, the dynamic means (forms of government) and the reforms carried out, including the kind of energy invested are diverse; however, this does not infer that development is not a means. The logic of our redefinition and reconceptualization is simply that nations with the honest ambition to make development living articulation of their citizens do not expend much of their resources on the illusion of bigoted political theories. Since nations are not made for theories but theories for nations, theories must be interrogated, sieved, cast off, blended where possible, and reviewed appropriately. So, we set forth that it is misleading for separation of powers as a framework of democracy not to undergo modifications when democracy itself is already modified and still undergoing modifications as a natural response to challenges and ambitions. Taken together, since separation of powers is at the heart of democracy (Montesquieu; 1982) it logically does not follow that it is not a means. But if democracy must be an end and separation of powers a means, it follows that it (democracy) is only a theoretical end. But we argue that because the theoretical end like democracy is not definitely tangible like concrete progress (Diamond; 2012), it must remain a means that it is and will remain so.

To be exact, democracy is a *theoretical end* because it is invalidly portrayed as the best form of government which belies reality. Of all the different appearances that democracy has taken, even the pretended democratic nations as developed democracies would admit that their democracies are in need of adaptation and development (Zakaria; 2003). At best, to offer a relief, Mkandawire (2005) suggested the need to "balance democratic theory and democratic practice". This balance may be nowhere to be realized because all democracies in the face of experience have been watered down; so democracy is what it is, a beautiful mental deduction created more or less in quality as a means. The Abraham Lincoln characterization of democracy as the government of, by, and for the people illustrates and reinforces our argument that democracy is a supercilious testimonial, unpromising ambition, an ultra-bourgeois optimism, an impossible hypothesis, or erroneous portrayal of experience. Lincoln definition brought forth three implications: that Lincoln was an irredeemable idealist; ignorant of the disposition of the human nature paradoxically to Hobbes (1980); and deliberately sets the unreachable aspiration to political man to evermore continue approximating the ideal system of government. However, to be fair to Abraham Lincoln, the last implication correlates with the human spirit to persistently make effort that must be constructive without being unflawed and despairing; hence, our theory of political approximation which political scientist have to study.

To illustrate, decision making is a political actuality that exist in all human affairs whether familial, political, bureaucratic, and juridical etc. Our perspective is that, the history of human existence up till this moment is the history of family, groups, village, societies, cliques, and nations whose decisions are ultimately taken by very few persons either to advance their egoistic or shared interest or fluctuate between the two as political will (Abba, Hamisu, & Abdullahi; 2019) decides. To be precise, it is fact to say that who and how many persons make decision and in whose interest is what distinguishes forms of government; so, to be scrupulous, forms of government does not require serious conceptual effort to originate. If this is historical, it means that what is basic is ultimately in whose interest as end, while the question: who makes decision and how many persons, are simply the means. Thus, from history the political will for self-obsessed or self-sacrificing decisions is common to all means, that is, forms of government. It also means that all forms of government can

be a possible or an impossible assumption not excluding democracy. We are also confident that all forms of government at all times are in need of development, just like development itself needs development. Comparably, change itself which manifest with development is a necessity in democracy; thus, it must also undergo change like political interest, a pointer that nothing human-created guarantees its own perpetuity.

Winston Churchill in one of his letters to British Parliament in 1947 intelligibly emphasized that sundry forms of government have been experimented and will be tested in this world of man's immorality and trials; thus, no one will fantasize that democracy is ideal or entirely prudent. To corroborate, democracy has undeniably been described as the worst form of government as Aristotle (1999) did while making distinction between types of government and who holds power between one, few, or many and the interest they all serve. So, we consider it misleading to intently assert one form of government called democracy in the Lincolnian or Western sense to be the best without providing the frameworks that are cast in iron and without acknowledging other forms of government like authoritarianism that empirically breaths and lives development. Notwithstanding Ake's (1996) conceptual fervidness for democracy, his scholarship was frank enough to confess of how the developmental successes in Southeast Asia were due to the foresight of authoritarianism's adaptability to certain values which he likened to democracy. Dialectically, democracy if it must also be successful as experiences have also demonstrated in most countries within the context of transformation and development, must also mimic certain political virtues of authoritarianism or dictatorship to avoid being illusive to progress. Logically, when form as means is illusive it reliably brings about an illusory end; so is it any wonder that the so-called democracies are not at ease in most part of the world. To avoid this requires that means and its frameworks have to be adapted in manners that are coherent and useful to society and nations rather than the propagation of abstract delusions that feeds on incompetence, corruption, ignorance, extremisms, and other schisms that are potential to, and in actuality igniting and prolonging varied forms of crisis.

To be consistent, we argued that to continue in this illusory indoctrination of "democracy as the best" (Dahl; 1989) and separation of powers existing only in democracy is to reaffirm both as beautiful hot airs in theory but desperately living a lie in praxis. It perhaps suggests that the usefulness of democracy and separation of powers is possible, of course, but only when they are adapted and made adaptable to diverse realities that are usefully transformational. However, not to do this is likely to bring together clusters of bizarre political cultures and practices that are inconsistent with prior traditions that were developmental, if anything, within the context of crisis management (Baubion; 2013). If it is true that every age is modern, it means that what is called tradition was once modern; thus, the modernity of all nations is founded on its erstwhile traditions (Abba, Hamisu, & Abdullahi; 2019). So, whether the substance of the erstwhile traditions of democracy is allowed to add up to the modern and modified ones depend on the degree of fantasy that is allowed or not. For our perspective, any form of government that lay claim to modernity but prove inadequate to be flexibly problem-solving does not only leave nations incompetent but vegetate in political obliviousness. This is all the more that modernity is innovation and innovation is enlightened progress on existing systems and practices.

The theory here is that, variant forms of democracy exist in all societies, first as time-honoured value, second as crisis management strategy, and third as means to transformation. Then again, our theory takes seriously that the disposition and predisposition to greed and perversion by the three arms of government present them as dictatorial and oligarchic, yet in a democracy. This in itself is an adaptation but an irrational type because both greed and perversion cannot be useful to theories of development that is pragmatic. As a useful value of redefinition and reconceptualization, an adapted and adaptable democracy and separation of powers becomes not only modified but a means to an end. An affirmation of this implies that there are no best means, the more reason they are means, because what is best has no alternative and cannot be used to attain other best (Abba, Hamisu, & Abdullahi; 2019) because they do not exist *ab initio*. We argue that there are only best ends to be attained, but because means are imperfect to be best, attaining ends becomes difficult because it is the optimum where best or ideal is imperfectly attainable. So, it is proof that in a world of diversities modification must occur as political will or condition prescribes, and when it happens it cannot be one form of modification else it remains its former self. So, with different nations, obviously there must be problem-solving systems, and not doctrinaire adaptations to democracy, separation of powers, rule of law, capitalism, and/or socialism, etc.

This last fact makes it well-defined why modification for the purpose of problem-solving is a distinctive part of our redefinition and reconceptualization. We came up with two propositions to help clear our doubts about the need for theories and their principles to be problem-solving rather than to exist as doctrinaire model. The first is: for every strategy there is a modification ultimately, except the goal is already achieved with no further effort required which is unrealistic; and the second is, every political system is an aggregate of modifications *ad infinitum*. If these two propositions are valid it is coherent to yield to the thinking that to take care of problems and thus get preoccupied with searching for innovative solutions should be the purpose of government. We consider this a necessity against unviable practice and its efficacy is, as a rule, through the practicality of dictatorship. So, if democracy is a system of government in praxis as a means to an end, it implies

that there is no one means to reach an end because there are usually distinct rules for means to end. Precisely, democracy cannot be a system in theory to bring about explicit progress, but in praxis and such system must be varied like dictatorship. Taken further, it means that democracy if it doesn't constitute best as attributed, then it is merely a theory of mind, and so far, human mind is a hotbed of diversity of machinations.

We redefined and reconceptualize system in praxis to mean that the varied forms of democracy is delimited by purpose, leadership, environment, cognitive and cultural dynamics, etc., to which their distinctions have to be noted by scholars and political leaders. But, this does not mean that a theory like the theory of democracy can't be a system since a system must constitute structure of ideas namely, separation of powers, sovereignty of the people, checks and balances, rule of law, independent judiciary, free press, etc. We find it crucial that this distinction and exception has to be made so that conception is not mistaken for experience following our reasoning that system is tangibly existential else it does not exist for observation. For instance, the assumption is that free media like rule of law and independent judiciary is a functional framework for democracy. If this is suitably in context it is not unnatural that free media have diversity of susceptibilities, ambitions, or reputation for self-absorption for power to push for certain interest that are consistent or not with Government. Not unusually, actions of the media may not be overregulated but there is no freedom from political cost just as there is no freedom from regulation, otherwise it becomes a recipe for muddled lawlessness.

More generally, it will be wrong to construe that the media is not an active social force in the contestation for power or a feasible accomplice for or against incumbent power depending on which interest is threatened or served. So, when government responds equitably against conceited action of the media for traversing the political perimeter fence of moderation, should it be labeled dictatorship, and if it must be so do, what is the problem with such dictatorship? This being the case, it suggests that it is usual not to have one democracy even if liberal democracy in praxis, but democracies that is variously a degree of fusions of forms of government in differentiations. It will even be more cognitively idle and wide off the mark to categorize countries that democratize basic economic requirements, opportunities and empowerment and social provisioning as dictatorship purely because the form of government is not liberal democracy. This state of mind is part of the perversion that obviously inspires global tyranny of imperial countries pretending to be beacon of superlative form of government, yet so unsettled to tolerate distinctive independence of others (Abba, Hamisu, & Abdullahi; 2019) whom are disingenuously described as dictatorship.

Following the role of decision-making as a predominant vocation of a few coexisting with the role of self-centeredness and corruption in all forms of social existence, the certainty of dictatorship in democracy is already assured. At our desk review discourse we argued that a democracy that is motivated for development or otherwise will predictably be dictatorial and may not take seriously the Montesquieuan separation of powers whenever it is openly seen as obstacle. So, political and economic transformation of a nation, for instance, is an altruistic competence for the executive that has wider constituencies and wherever egotistical power materializes against such transformation, expectedly it will be met with ruthlessness. As Ake (1996) would say, development of the human condition is "the sovereign law", so conformity should be in harmony with what works rather than so much with how it works, but this is not to discount methodology. Further illustrations are that, in psychoanalysis it is proven that the ego would always want to have the sole control, be the main architect, and to have the freedom to conform to whatever is partial to without opposition. Similarly, in philosophy ego as a human element would want to be manifestly distinct from others and would do anything to achieve this whether the means is debauched or not. We liken these two political psychodynamics to the immanent reality of dictatorship to be altruistic, developmental, reformist, kleptomaniacal, repressive, and imperialistic, etc. in all forms of government, including democracies.

### **III. SYNTHESIS OF DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP: ILLUSTRATING FEW FACTS TOWARDS A NEW THEORY OF DEMOCRACY & SEPARATION OF POWER**

Synthesis of democracy and dictatorship may appear mystifying to some scholarships which, in general, shouldn't be. But the bewilderment is logical to the extent that there must be more than one perspective to theory and actuality. Fixated exponents of democracy have been more theoretical and bigoted compared to those of dictatorships that have proven to be more realistic and liberal to learning and innovativeness. Why would democracy talk so much of fairness as against firmness when it is commonplace logic that political system or government cannot be fair without being firm? So, the starting point of our new theory of separation of power is to take seriously the assumption that no society and government can succeed satisfactorily if it is not both fair (democratic) and firm (dictatorial). Obviously, the firmness of political system is seen to be critical because of the many underlying social forces within and outside government that are predisposed to unfairness against the system to the point of ruining whatever democratic (fair) efforts or dictatorially equitable efforts made. Accordingly, the new theory of separation of powers is also of the assumption that the primacy of the synthesis (balance) of justice and regulation is a resolute precondition for political responsibility and

development. What is likely to emerge from this is the illustration of political prudence from the synthesis which will clearly make possible the reduction of political risk like corruption, terrorism, etc.

From the logic of these two assumptions and the possibility of the proposed synthesis, it presupposes an illustration of the limitation of the human agency and political imperfections. But the key idea is that the political defectiveness of the human agency may be similar, but indeed cannot be the same. Observably, the speed and degree of development of nations cannot also be too close to call because of the disparate underlying forces for and against democracy or/and dictatorship. Similarly, development of some nations has also been affected by the political prudence to synthesize both dictatorship and democracy even with the so called Montesquieuan separation of powers. Aside, diversity of the motivating force for political power, character of individual leadership, and related inadequacies are further distinctions. In another breath, it is also existential a fact that the entire history of the world is in large part the history of wars, corruption, conquests, domination, banditry, looting, piracy, brigandage, espionage, overthrow, murder, hawkishness, and terrorism instigated so much by democratic nations (Chussudovsky; 2003, Fanon; 1963) till this day of the beginning of the third decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Evidently, ruthless wars and democracy have a long history of mutuality to which many literature have referenced Pentagon, CIA, Council on Foreign Relations, Bilderberg Group, Trilateral Commission, Wall Street, Hollywood, Private Foundations, and globally funded terror organizations as vendors of intemperate tyrannies (Chomsky; 2016; ) with relative consensus, coalition or solidarity of ruling powers, euphemistically called public private partnership. On balance, the levers of dictatorial power ultimately decide and have decided the momentum and prospects of both anarchic and progressive institutional development in most ostensibly developed democracies. Chomsky (2016) illustrated this with what he described as “Obama’s global drone assassination campaign, a remarkable innovation in global terrorism” to which the Trump regime also toed the line in the terror drone assassination of Iranian General, Qassem Soleimani, consistent with the Clinton and Bush doctrines. To this, we are of the credible preposition that global dictatorship is an extension of domestic dictatorship in the so called democratic society where separation of power is conveniently respected.

So, it is rather elite relative consensus for specific agenda that most likely determines the character and utility of separation of powers. Such elite consensus must express democratic spirit for it to achieve development; but, the consensus would have to be intensely dictatorial because of the historical battle between the public and private realms. This is the inevitability of dictatorship in democracy manifesting in both the public and private realms to which intellectuals and political leaders must perceive. However, when in large measure the two converge with superior value for human content then organic development would most likely be experienced. In this context, for democracy to succeed a dictatorship infused with innovative diagnosis to continuously and qualitatively transform the human content becomes a necessity, to which both have coexisted for ages. Although democratic theories (Dahl; 2006) would still be drenched in the delusional thought that dictatorship within the framework of unaffected obligation to development is an antithesis, history of nations is manifestly replete with the coextensiveness of democracy and dictatorship. This history has become very familiar and persuasive because we so think that political systems’ desire and commitment, for instance, to development of state and market capabilities could be vulnerable. We insist that development cannot reasonably rely on democracy if it must be profound with confident impact because the latter alludes much more to illusion. To this, there is need for redemptive political formula to make up for the weak enforcement mechanisms and political inertia as weaknesses that typifies democracy.

Thinking of what this governance principle could be in specific, we settled for anticorruption as a classic illustration and workable ideology. For now, let us say that it is delusional to advance the cause of democracy without anticorruption, and the latter would have to be dictatorial if it must succeed because corruption is dictatorial in all ramifications. Anticorruption as a dialectical system lay bare corruption as the building of obstacles that are antithetical to democratic and developmental values of legitimacy, accountability, integrity, fairness, innovativeness, and inclusiveness. Like primitive accretion of wealth, grand corruption is despotically lawless and thick-skinned; it thus disparages the good intentions of democracy and development. We firmly and existentially presume that anticorruption would have to be profoundly dictatorial if it must succeed since corruption is a metaphor for dictatorship. From here we can reconcile with the theory that, for separation of powers to be developmental in a democracy it must purposely embrace anticorruption as a preventive and risk management strategy to be made shared value among the tripartite organs of government. Where this is lacking, the executive arm or whichever arm has the determined and uncompromising vision for anticorruption would have to be unyieldingly firm and dictatorial. Although, there are arguments that anticorruption must be democratically fought (Saliu; 2006), that is, it must follow rule of law; however, we consider it a credulous suggestion because corruption itself is not democratic and the goal of the corrupt and the corruptible is to sadistically weakens institution and render them unworkable and degenerate for further corruption.

For anticorruption as a democratic and developmental value to be internalized by the tripartite executive, legislature, and judiciary there has to be, if we must borrow from Senge’s (2004) “shared vision and



systems thinking”, Emilie Durkheim’s “organic solidarity”, and Dierkes’ et al (2007) “stakeholder vision principle”. It is largely only within this context that peer review (checks and balances) can be purposefully driven without much institutional and personality self-absorption in the relationship between the tripartite arms. However, if the collaboration between arms of government illustrate Durkheim’s “mechanical solidarity” in political signification, it so speaks to the prevalence of institutional antipathy, disregard, lethargy, incompetence, and self-preoccupation most especially by arm(s) of government that fails to take seriously the broad and organic value of representation, human content, justice, and anticorruption. These are egoistic challenges that would not allow for robust growth of legislative synergy and oversight function as it discourage innovativeness, negates anticorruption values of transparency, accountability, integrity, and problem-solving mindset and capabilities. It is also our take that these egoistic challenges also help to cheapen the significance of risk/crisis management and institution building efforts, inspire perversion of rules including the budget process, and of course, make broad values for development improbable.

Thus, we make it existentially obvious a fact to argue that the success or failure of state/government is certainly not because of forms of government. Our perspective is that, forms of government are mere theories and no theory can be practiced by political man without limits and limitation. Rather, it is the nature of the thinking and solidarity in defence of the human content, the kind of investment made for the preservation of the human content, and the continuous nurturing of innovative problem-solving mentality. Thus, it is neither democracy, separation of powers nor dictatorship that should be defended but whether the purposes of government as theoretically espoused and defended are inclusively and responsibly practiced with redemptive consequence. So, the argument shouldn’t be dedicated to defending whenever it is a militarized, social, liberal, capitalist, presidential, representative, constitutional, parliamentary, authoritarian, illiberal, or monarchical type of democracy with different types of separation of powers. Rather, it is to search for variant forms that uniquely and consistently make the growth and development of human content the preponderant value in praxis. However, to reject this because it would not advance the political provincialism of the defenders of a given democracy is to take intellectual dogmatism to the limit of misconception and sentimentalism.

To resolve this kind of provincial scholarship that are usually taken to the extreme, it is existential a fact that separation of powers must be taken as a means that it is, and because it is a means it must certainly be inadequate to address all governance issues. Expectedly thus, this point to another existential fact that there have to be diversity of explanations that is unique to prevailing context and subsequently have to be sought whenever the extant practice of separation of powers is not making development part of the ongoing reality of a nation as a broad category. Not leaving up to the sanctified theory it lay claim to, the Montesquieuan propositions can only be taken with pinch of salt because they cannot be entirely believed and practiced without innovatively reviewing, sieving, and harmonizing the differing existential risks, challenges and possibilities. So, we assert that insofar that there is neither nirvana nor perdition as two extremes on hominid earth, best case scenario are not practicable. Following our existential fact principle which should be part of the new theory of separation of power we contend that democracy and democrats do not exist in unmixed form, and if they do it is ultimately in misconception. Secondly, if democracy like separation of powers is an ambition and not an ideal and democrats are ambitious in this regard, this idea presupposes one interesting fact, that there is a limit to attaining a height, that is, a given ideal state because of the certainty of human limits and limitation.

To close, democracy and separation of powers wherever they are practiced and with whatever modifiers and modifications do not have the escape mechanism from perpetrating gratuitous corruption, injustice, dishonesty, and unrepresentativeness. In other words, each of the arms of government has its share of dictatorship in the struggle to maintain its principled or unprincipled independence against progressive or retrogressive interdependence. However, the dictatorship of the executive is usually misleadingly exaggerated in contrast to the legislature and judiciary, for instance, by mass media and civil society organizations that paradoxically constitute selves into competing dictatorship. To illustratively inquire, is it not dictatorship when the legislature gratuitously serves institutional self-preoccupation to be discriminatory against making laws that are liberating or prefers to be bribed rather than carry out the statutory oversight function? Similarly, is it despotic when Judges from unelected judiciary are heedlessly and capriciously neither fair nor firm in delivery of judgment and with many miscarriages of justices and inconsistencies? What of dictatorship of judicial interpretation or the oligarchic disposition of the highest court against State Constitution (Dierkes; 2007) as a final arbiter on earth? As we saw earlier, popular and/or electoral sovereignty in terms of power to decide things is mythical because power in a democracy is either used democratically or dictatorially, and both (democracy and dictatorship) do in reality served dialectically conflicting and harmonizing purposes. So, it is not plausible that a form of government would neither be democracy nor dictatorship as Dahl (1973) incoherently asserted because according to him power has already being invested in so many people (polyarchy) in the same manner separation of powers should be based on equality.

#### IV. THE NEED FOR PROBLEM-SOLVING PARADIGM AGAINST EXTREME IDEOLOGICAL ASSUMPTION & EXCESSIVE FORMALISM

In our concluding reflections for action, we dusted up Adolf Hitler's lived experience of democracy as a crafty and innovative capability to slowly but surely in manner that is characteristically remorseless remove people's safeguards while they groan in pain, yet admired and loved because of the few miserable nickels and dimes thrown at them. For Hitler, disempowerment, brutalization, and offering a trifling sum to the people while they are in their vulnerable and wretched condition, will still make the people to be uncritically respectful, perhaps, evermore because their thought process would tell them of a superman without probably ever realizing that it is the superman that render them powerless. Three issues are unmistakable from Hitler and his Nazi Party; one, democracy makes the greater number of people dead to the world because people are impressionable more to fantasy than to actuality, yet it is democratic to the vendors that are hard at this because it is democracy. Two, people's credulity to fall for the illusory promises of democracy for failure to interrogate the motivation of the ruling power elites that lacks liberating vision are still undemocratic because what is democratic should be constructive even if dictatorially arrived at, a political fact that somewhat underscores the dictatorship of the majority. Three, with ruling elites that are averse to anticorruption, transformation of human content is not an interest for democracy, thereby making separation of powers a weird possibility and an obstacle to broad development. And fourth, democratic theorist would have to deeply interrogate the conundrum between a democratic process and a dictatorial process to know which serves decadence and progressive sophistication respectively within the context of anticorruption.

Further, we are however convinced that democracy with separation of powers or not cannot bring about *de rigueur* end by mere practice except if there is in existence a governing power elites that are profoundly reviving and reinforcing of social citizenship, and this would likely entail dictatorship. The challenge with democracy including separation of powers is that its moral fascination to the world is more the motivation than the transformational benefits (Olsen; 1993:575). Could this be one of the reasons for the unscientific refutation of any dictatorship that makes transformational advantages handy for the people without the illusion of liberal democracy which in itself is a watering down of a democracy that needs development (Ake; 1996)? Our deeper reflections underscores an existential proposition for political theorists that dictators (dictatorship) that are contemplative of the purpose of existence, nature of man or human nature, purpose of justice, and with robust consciousness for psychic accountability are more driven with substance than with theory, even though they are cautiously not oblivious of the latter. Conclusively, it behooves on political theorists and scientist to know that human nature is a dialectical differentiation and what is required is to be broad enough to acknowledge the inherent contradictions in human nature and the need to be politically perceptive enough to know which of the differentiations is significant for progress at given point in time and epoch.

Two more issues can evidently be reflected upon within the context of the choice between developmental dictators (Liden; 2014) who would ultimately opt for natural law as against rule of law to which liberal democracy, an altered democracy like liberal democracy takes seriously. Two issues further came out between developmental dictatorship and developmental *laissez-faire* democracy during our concluding reflections. While the latter spuriously promised political nirvana when it probably had economic and social perdition in mind, the former would not promise equality, freedom, and popular sovereignty and rule as Rousseau (1994) and Locke (2008) would because they probably know too well that they are in all practice not attainable. Similar to the preceding is the promise/prescription of western political development scholars - equality, structural differentiation, and cultural secularization (Almond & Powell; 1996) that are also largely fabricated and have become something like the Frankenstein Monster that has become jawbone in the throat that can neither be gulped down nor brought forth but must be spewed forth. Our concluding outcome from our reflection and interrogation is that, what is loftier and practicable for both developmental dictatorship and developmental democracy is the regulative capability which Almond and Powell (1966) partly acknowledged as part of democracy. However, both scholars failed to realize that before regulative capability including distributive and responsive capabilities, there must be the causal/decisive capability which we call productive capability, and in certainty, causal and regulative capabilities can only be organically productive with dictatorship and certainly not with *laissez-faire*. So, future research may seek to contend with our sure assertion that productive (production) capability is the foremost capability which is for sure characteristically and integrally dictatorial from whence regulative capability follows.

Also, considering that the latter (*laissez-faire*) is not known to be at any time under delusion to be gratuitously generous and caring, impervious dictatorship is inherently part of it because of its vow to nonconcrete economic efficiency/profitability at the expense of social provisioning, except for nations that competently intermix the two like the Scandinavian countries which again entails its own form of dictatorship as considered necessary. Thus, it is an invalid mistake to deny *de rigueur* dictatorship in any political economy since dictatorship like democracy is modifiable if existing governance vision is instructive enough. This perspective puts a ceiling to Acton's (2013) famed precept that "power corrupt and absolute power corrupt

absolutely” if the disparate spirit of human nature and experiential knowledge are any guide. Our concluding reflection which we regard as very valid in reality is that, absolute power (dictatorship) is not immune from firm principles brought to bear on government as a machinery to express political will for innovative civilization. So, from our reflections we are conclusively contending that absolute power is also not immune from a human mind in/with power constructed to focus on continuous mobilization of people without vacillation. As a wrap-up, it is conclusive and self-evident that since human nature is not all bad but can also be good, Acton like Montesquieu should rather be made to realize that the so called absolute power does not exist in its pure form, and where they have existed and still exist, they have been made governable and subject to review and limitation. So, absolute power, if ever there is any such in real politics might not be all corrupt absolutely because power in its so called absoluteness has historically shown to be liberating.

To briefly illustrate, the topmost political leadership of Rwanda has till date attracted caustic criticisms for leaning towards authoritarianism. Coming out of a genocidal war, the emergence of Paul Kagame in the post-interneccine crisis as President unpretentiously requires two tasks: to be fair and to be firm to all, first during the healing and reconstruction period and secondly, the unbroken phase to reinvent governance for productive civilization. To effectively do this within the context of the history of Rwanda, it compels not a political and or personal choice between democracy and dictatorship for the political leadership, but to approve and practice the two off and on as dynamic social forces dictates equitably or otherwise. The political wisdom to know that democracy in its self-indulgence can be detrimental to development knowing full well that to be fair to all at a time is impracticable, necessitated a disciplined, diagnostic, and developmental dictatorship (4Ds) that have to be firm from time to time. Probably guided by this, Paul Kagame has carried out policies that have led to significant transformation of Rwanda from the backwoods of fragmentation into a probable “middle-income country due to the rapidity in institutional modernization, growing infrastructural development, and efficient bureaucratic governance, and massive innovative use of technology” (Russell; 2019). Whether this will be sustainable depends on the presence of Lee Kwan Yew’s triumvirate principles of meritocracy, integrity, and pragmatism; secondly the honest persuasions of the majority of the Rwandans to appreciate, bear, and live with these principles in practical politics; and thirdly, the people’s ultimate choice between democracy and development.

To further illustrate is the reality of China Standing Committee of the Central Political Bureau of the Communist Party comprising of seven members as the topmost leaders with policy making powers. This Committee to say the least comprised of men with requisite firm principles and core competencies who undergoes humanly best guidance through the Chinese Selection and Promotion System of meritocratic principles and anticorruption. This group of seven Politburos does not make the Chinese President who is also a member too powerful as to threaten the much sheltered stability. Our take is that notwithstanding the removal of presidential term limits, Chinese President may be very powerful, China’s uniqueness of removing roadblocks to her progress will not find the National People’s Congress, the highest organ of state power and parliamentary body wanting. This is because there are politically constitutional means to resolve intractable issues in manners that are pragmatic in order not to endanger national and geopolitical stability, cohesion, security, and development. Secondly, there is a judicious threshold to which Chinese leaders would not push their personal interest, but to do so would attract the ultimate political prize. The obvious reasoning here is that, democracy as *laissez faire* and as orthodoxy (*toeing the line*) is inspirational to multiple centers for mischief making which threatens cherished values like national strength (stability).

The take from these illustrations is that, if emergence of policy makers is built in most part on a system founded on profound moral, behavioural, and technical competencies as is largely the case with the Chinese political system recruitment, it wouldn’t be of importance to question whether they are democratic or dictatorial. The system of political recruitment is very elitist no doubt; however, it exemplifies what democracy should be because it is meritocratic, equitable within the context of competence and incompetence, and reasonable with quality control. For our concluding reflection from the two illustrations, it is grave injustice to politically appoint or elect persons that lacks value for excellence, anticorruption, and justice even when the process of appointment or election is democratic or within the rule of law. Alexander Pope and Deng Xiaoping’s enduring maxim coherently summarized respectively that anything that is superlatively governed is best. Thus, it is inconsequential the political ideology provided that human content constantly undergo quality transformation. This perfectly illustrates our biases against the so called ideological extremes that have rendered the world more vulnerable to global chauvinism and extremism. However, in all of this, we are conclusive that the theory of “power corrupt and absolute power corrupt absolutely” from which separation of powers emerged, is philosophically narrow. Our synthesis is that, political man in power with power doesn’t evidently have total control of his political economy because of the existence of other despotic outfits that buffers state power and policies for mercenary interest. Secondly, power, absolute or not, is not by nature corrupt, but the nature of the human mind behind it. And thirdly, if separation of powers in a democracy is found to exist for self-indulgence, it is thus, an invitation to discipline dictatorship.

Purposely, Montesquieuan disciples should develop an innovatively and broadminded problem-solving consciousness against the dedicated and excessive formalism of separation of powers. There is need to avoid reducing democracy to mere abstraction instead of an approximation that it is and should be if ever it is a form of government to be serious with. One point at issue that future research should take seriously is that democracy in practice is an approximation and should be made adaptable to advance the cause of human and institutional progress. If separation of powers is reduced to excessive formalism democracy is likely to remain a theoretic abstraction like the illusion that political sovereignty resides in the people or that rule of law is absolute, which is another fallacy. The likely outcome is the absence of representative elite consensus between the three fulcrums of power needed for development; however, when this reality is not contributing to progress an involuntary consensus may be considered necessary or be forced down by a developmental dictatorship. This brings out yet again how the theory of elitism (Michels; 2000) would for all time be an authentic review of the theory of democracy which should only be reconciled or integrated. Elites inexorably taking decisions ostensibly on behalf of others may be seen as necessary risk; however, it is the consensus for transformational progress by the representatives of each of the tripartite arms of government that should be of superior value insofar that representation for policy formulation, execution, and review is an immanent fact.

## **V. CONCLUSION AND POINT AT ISSUE FOR FUTURE RESEARCH**

As a final point, there is no liberty in political orthodoxy (separation of powers) insofar that political man is heedless to the human spirit to be directly fair and firm. This is what the Montesquieuan democracy has been unable to resolve because of its self-delusion, the reason the moral attraction of separation of powers has left much crisis to be desired. At least, corruption which was the basis for separation of powers is perhaps a worsening feature of rule making, rule implementation, and rule adjudication in most societies, if not, why is the world so much faced with many crises in the unfolding claims to increasing civilization. For our perspective, nothing could be more democratic than a problem-solving, self-sacrificing, and innovative dictatorship that is fair and firm from which public policy practically preserves the human species from disorganization and social misery. We resolved that it is undemocratic not to have a *primus inter pares* among the three arms of government to ensure a progressive shared future in anticorruption. There cannot be independence in abuse of power but only in anticorruption and the leadership of the triad can only be led by an arm that is competently attracted to anticorruption and progressive innovations, and this entails political will for anticorruption (Abba, et al; 2020) by political reformers. Thus, the independence of each triad would have to be severely limited by interdependence for anticorruption to which the *primus inter pares* must be dictatorial fair and firm. Today, the value of the Montesquieuan theory of separation of powers is apparently diminishing in actuality because of the new realization to be competently committed to the substance of the larger and farsighted picture of progressive civilization. The moral fascination for it is now submitting to the rising reflection and awareness of the so called institutional independence that has lend more to autonomy to corruptly use power for subjective gain than to address basic issues of society.

Today, liberal democracy is predictably and apparently on life support, or so it seems because of the many illusions and falsehoods they theorized, prescribed and propagated in the name of democracy, to which our line of reasoning has apparently validated. Life support is usually a desperate health condition, to get out of it requires not medical orthodoxy but whatever is diagnostic. There is nowhere that liberal democracy can be found as theorized, the very reason fair and firm dictatorship that is much more the reality should be the focus of future research. Thus, when modification is inevitable, the search for modifiers even if dictatorial, should be the very basis for future theory building that takes off from inductive to deductive thinking. Like the herbal mixture extracted from roots, stem, and leaves considered as a nonconformist effort, what is important is the series of progression of healthy life that it helps to give warranty to. As a step forward, what is considered significant in this paper is certainly not excessive formalism or ideological fixation or both. The political dynamism of our perspective lends credence to one fact: that the theory of separation of powers is not imaginative enough to be relied upon as a principle of public governance or social organization.

Against this reality, we suggest that a synthesis of democracy and dictatorship is against all odds and expectations inescapably basic for organic civilization with problem-solving as inspiration. If future political theory of separation of powers is to be constructively consequential it means that the insistence on independence of the arms of government, free elections, multiplicity of political parties, and “monopoly of legitimate use of violence” (Weber; 2002) should be reviewed within the broader context of human nature which is imperfect and therefore arbitrary. To pick out free election out of others is the brutal reality of election rigging which in itself is a despotic robbery of the right and power to voice the choice of representatives of which both the voter and voted are inspires. If ever Baron Montesquieu should review his theory of separation of powers to know if it is useful not to particularize group but to shared interest, he may consider doing it within the context of the extant political culture and character of politics. Political culture in large part and in this context is an underlying structure of political structure, systems, and institutions including arms of government. Conclusively, we

consider the importance of political culture because it determines whether solidarity between the arms is organic or mechanical and whether elite solidarity is progressive or reactionary. An absence of organic solidarity would mean anomic separation of powers which consequently leads to fractured interdependence, weak complementarities, fragmented anticorruption vision and effort, and negative elite solidarity against national progress, thereby inspiring organized self-indulgence on a large scale.

To this, we conclusively suggest that democracy and separation of power must be redefined and provoked within the context of the presence of progressive elite solidarity which should lead to organic solidarity for societal transformation. However, for reason that reactionary elite solidarity is dialectically inevitable, a prodevelopment executive organ has to be dictatorial; and fair enough, history has not left us without reformist dictatorship with enduring capacity for transformation than under even a reformist democracy; on balance, a reformist democracy has no choice than to be dictatorial, else it is overwhelmed with deluge of varied crises as is the experience today in most parts of the world. Plausibly, future research may be interested in why self-sacrificing dictatorship is dominant with the values of autonomy, expediency, decisiveness, social order, public spirit, and problem-solving than most democracies that have much fidelity to preoccupation with obedience to formal rules, illusion of equality, and warmongering. Researchers may find out if there are more short-sighted dictators in democracy than in a dictatorship because of the multiple layers of executive, legislature, and judiciary. Thus, three questions are crucial: how are arms of government dealing with the constraints of society through anticorruption and what are the contributions to human progress? Are there commitments to innovative and enduring development of productive forces of society? Are meritocracy, honesty, and pragmatism criteria for political recruitment and performance review of leaders?

Future Political Science research may devote energy to critical organization of the structural relation of the three arms of government into a strong social capital. Critical discussion among the triad is fundamental where the *wheat* of anticorruption is separated from the *chaff* of corruption. Such critical discussion which expectedly is problem-solving must entail mutual sacrifices to enable public province overcome private tyrannies in public sphere. African Scholars and political representatives may consider taking seriously the African maxim that “no matter how hot the water from your well, it will not cook your rice- a fundamental principle, not only of Physics, but also of Political Science” (Cabral; 1966). This is deliberately directed to African scholars and leaders, except for very few because they are the ones that are yet to come to the informed realization that “the development of a phenomenon in movement, whatever its external appearance, depends mainly on its internal features, detailed knowledge, efforts, and honest sacrifices” (Cabral; 1966). They are also the ones that are yet to take seriously, that political exception must be made out of every political rule in order to productively race against time while intellectually informing the world that problem-solving is internal to all societies. This is proven by ensuring that the productive principles of democracy and dictatorship are adequately harnessed within the context of development of the productive forces of society to make the triad purposeful for a holistic and innovative civilization. To practically achieve this, what is required are not nationalists as internal bandits that are materialistic and prejudiced but political *avant gardist* with the exceptional nerve to compulsively and consistently put his vision into public action and service.

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