

The domestic influencers of Nigeria's Foreign Policy

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Abstract

As a teacher of Nigeria's foreign policy for close to two decades, I have identified certain gaps in the explanations of why Nigeria take some certain foreign policy options. These gaps are sometimes because analysts of Nigeria's foreign policy sieve their views from periodical inflections which invariably project Nigeria as a spontaneous one file foreign policy reactor. The gross implication of this is that Nigeria appears not to have core value when it comes to foreign policy formulation. Many claim that Nigeria's foreign policy lacks structure as well as strategy, but that is because such observers pay little attention to pattern in Nigeria's policy. This work explores the domestic impetus of Nigeria's foreign policy and in fact sees Nigeria's domestic affairs as the super-structure on which all foreign policy determinants of Nigeria rest. This approach maintains that Nigeria relies on her local aspirations than external stimuli in the production of her foreign policy.

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I. Introduction

Concepts in social sciences are very difficult and sometimes elusive to define. This is especially so in the sub-field of international relations which not only deals with human behaviour, as Light and Groom (1985:9) warns, but is also dynamic, unpredictable and ephemeral. In one of the classical studies on foreign policy, Joseph Frankel (1968:1) defines the concept as:

"Decisions and actions which involve to some appreciable extent relations between one state and another".

He further clarifies the distinction between decisions and actions, noting that "decisions take place in the decision-maker's mind whereas actions take place in his environment" (Frankel, 1968:83). His state-centred approach to foreign policy, however, fails to capture the critical roles and importance of non-state actors in international relations. By so doing, his approach undermines extra-state influences on the international system. According to Holsti (1995:83), foreign policy is defined as:

"Ideas or actions designed by policy makers to solve a problem or promote some change in the policies, attitudes, or actions of other state or states, in non-state actors (e.g., terrorist groups, liberation movements and international financial institutions), in the international economy, or in the physical environment of the world".

Again, the shortcoming of Holsti's definition is that it ignores the possibility that foreign policy sometimes helps to maintain the *status quo*. Unlike Frankel, the strength of Holsti's definition is his consideration of non-state actors as the object and subject of foreign policy, since they sometimes play pivotal roles in shaping the foreign policy of states (Ojo and Sesay, 1988). For instance, even though they were non-state actors, liberation movements during the apartheid era in South Africa pursued independent foreign policies that defined their relations with other countries and global institutions. Cecil Crabb (1972) states that:

"Foreign policy consists of two elements: national objectives to be achieved and means for achieving them. The interaction between national goals and the resources for attaining them is the perennial subject of statecraft. In its ingredients the foreign policy of all nations, great and small, is the same".

Gambari (1996) equated the aims and means of foreign policy when he wrote that:

"At a more practical level, foreign policy activities are aimed at getting the other countries to appreciate and, if possible, endorse your own viewpoints and support your own objectives in the international system".

The state is frequently perceived as the only subject of international law (Crabb, 1972; Handrieder, 1967). Although important, this emphasis does not adequately reflect the realities of the contemporary international system, as non-state actors have roles to play in foreign policy formulation and execution at state

and global levels.¹ Another shortcoming of Crabb's definition could be located in the erroneous assumption of uniformity in the foreign policy of states. Even though, on a general level, the *raison d'être* of every state is to satisfy domestic needs, at the same time, there is a strong element of difference between the foreign policy of hegemonic leaders/states and that of secondary states. The aim of a hegemonic leader is to, among other things, satisfy its interests and those of secondary states, as noted by Cafruny (199). On the other hand, a secondary state is not that eager to look after the interests of the hegemonic power, probably due to the economic, financial and military disadvantages accruable from such an enterprise.

Kurt London (1972) defines foreign policy as the "sum total of those principles which have grown out of a nation's history, beliefs or ideologies, power potential, and its cultural predilections".

London's definition appreciates the differences in states' objectives within the global system. This is contrary to Crabb's equation of the policy objectives of small and big states, forgetting that "each nation has its distinctive traditions, social and intellectual orientations" (Adefuye, 1992) in foreign policy formulation. In summary, for the purposes of this study, foreign policy is defined as the employment of mutual interaction between domestic and external environments in achieving a state's interest that could not be achieved in isolation, taking into consideration the availability of elements of power. London's definition adequately fits this, especially as it grasps the broad determinants of a state's foreign policy objectives.

In broad terms, two variables determine the foreign policy of a state, as captured by Frankel (1963), Reynolds (1994) and Holsti (1995). These variables are the domestic and external environments. In the Nigerian situation, domestic variables that played decisive roles in shaping foreign policy include the country's historical legacies, Civil War, oil politics/boom, military involvement in politics, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). On the external level, geographical location, involvement within international organisations and the general nature of international systems are key factors.

AFRICA AS THE CORE OF NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY.

This notion can be traced back to nationalist leaders such as Herbert Marcoulay, Nnamdi Azikwe, Tafawa Balewa, Ahmadu Bello and Obafemi Awolowo, to mention but a few, who were of the view that Nigeria was the pride and beacon of Africa, and that the country should be consulted on any issue that impinged on the continent. For instance, during the formative years of NAM, when Nigeria was not invited to the 1955 Bandung Summit, Nnamdi Azikwe of Nigeria said:

"I may say without fear or contradiction that any decision made at Bandung on the future of this continent that does not take into account the fact that every sixth person in Africa is a Nigerian, is bound to be a flower that is born to ...blush unseen and to waste its sweetness in the desert air" (Phillips, 1964:64).

These leaders based their argument on the advantages that Nigeria possessed over other states on the continent, such as its untapped human and natural resources. Therefore, Nigeria was convinced that it should lead the continent in order to achieve its political, economic and socio-cultural objectives. Nigeria's contribution to the formation of the OAU (1963), the Niger Basin Commission (1964), the Chad Basin Commission (1964), the EEC-ACP trade agreement (1975) and ECOWAS (1975), are pointers to this.

It was against the backdrop of the events and circumstances above that the post-Civil War regime of General Murtala Mohammed introduced the Adebayo Adedeji Panel to review Nigeria's foreign policy and recommend its future directions. The Panel, in turn, placed Africa at the cornerstone of the country's foreign policy (Obasanjo, 1990:125; Fawole, 2003:46), instead of the Commonwealth of Nations, as was previously the case. This shift was informed and reinforced by the experiences of Lagos during the Civil War, especially the huge amount of solidarity that the majority of member states of the OAU had accorded the country by withholding recognition from the secessionist Biafra.

A practical reinforcement of this shift, as mentioned earlier, was the consistency and resolution with which Nigeria supported different liberation movements, both at the coordinating headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, and in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), South West Africa (Namibia), South Africa and Lusophone states.

Domestic Factors and Historical Legacy of Nigeria's Foreign Policy

Nigeria was colonised by Britain, and for administrative and political exegeses, a system of indirect rule was introduced in two of the three protectorates. The UK amalgamation of the three former protectorates of Northern, Western and Eastern Nigeria in 1914 set the template for political disunity in post-colonial Nigeria, perhaps as a result of differences in culture and historical background before the colonial era, and also variegated colonial administrative experiences (Owoeye&Amusan, 1999:26). These caused the three main ethnic groups to perceive and react to various political developments differently, an action which tended to influence the formation of political parties and their foreign policy manifestos in the build-up to independence in 1960. Thus, when Chief Anthony Enahoro, a Member of Parliament (MP) from the AG, proposed a motion in 1953 for the independence of Nigeria in 1956, the Hausa/Fulani delegates from the North vehemently rejected it, for fear that their more educated and westernised counterparts in Southern Nigeria would use such an opportunity to seize and retain power. Also of importance was the fact that, while the AG called for a dynamic

non-aligned foreign policy, the NPC advocated conservative pro-British foreign relations, while the NCNC wanted consular relations with South Africa (Gambari, 1982).

Despite their political differences, the three major political parties formed on a regional basis, i.e. NPC, NCNC and AG, agreed on some foreign policy issues but proposed different ways of implementation. When the electioneering campaign to usher Nigeria to independence was at its peak, the three political parties were in unison to work towards the eradication of all forms of colonialism and racism in Africa. They also agreed on the need for Nigeria to play a hegemonic role in Africa, as a matter of "manifest destiny" and politico-diplomatic exegeses. The three political parties called for membership of the Commonwealth of Nations, the United Nations, and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). They also advocated respect for the sovereign equality of all states and territorial integrity through the maintenance of existing borders inherited from Britain. These constituted the main thrusts of Nigerian foreign policy up to 1994.

FEDERALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY IN NIGERIA.

The formal creation of Nigeria by bringing a patchwork of different ethno-nationalist groupings together, explains partly why federalism was adopted as a system of government at the time of independence. The introduction of federalism as a system of government allowed the three regions (later four regions, with the creation of the Mid-Western region) to have separate foreign policies on key issues such as the Arab-Israel war and the recognition of the apartheid government in South Africa. Federalism, as practised in the First Republic, necessarily created contradictory positions on foreign policy matters. While the Eastern region recognised the state of Israel and its South African allies, the Northern region declined recognition and even the existence of Israel as a state. The leadership of the NCNC that controlled the Eastern region finally advocated the opening of a Nigerian consulate in South Africa (Gambari, 1982:77). These, and many other, contradictions forestalled the emergence of a unified and assertive foreign policy under Prime Minister Balewa, and resulted in a very cautious foreign policy implementation.

Military Rule and Nigeria's foreign policy

The military's involvement in politics, with the *coup d'etat* that ended the six-year rule of the civilian administration, did not radically change the perception and implementation of Nigerian foreign policy. The links with Britain (colonial legacies) affected Nigerian policy (Ademoyega, 1981:121) regarding the South African apartheid system. Despite General Ironsi's (January 1966–July 1966) and General Gowon's (July 1966–June 1975) administrations' lack of accountability to the electorate on foreign policy, they had minimum contact with liberation movements, probably so as to not offend Britain, or as an attempt to go against Ghana's and Tanzania's perceived leading roles in the anti-apartheid struggle in Southern Africa. This could be attributed to a lack of interest in the internal affairs of other states (contradictory to the expected attribute of a hegemonic leader, as discussed in Chapter 2), and to the need to alleviate poverty in Nigeria through economic development plans which were expected to be financed by the West, the major supporters of apartheid policy in South Africa. The character of military rule was one of the factors which drove Nigeria's foreign policy to become more proactive from the 1970s onwards. With the demise of participatory democracy, policy-making became unitary, that is, decisions no longer had to go through elaborate parliamentary committees. Under the military, the Supreme Military Council (SMC), which later became the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC), was the highest decision-making body, comprising senior military officers. This body, alongside the Federal Executive Council (FEC), which included civilians, formulated foreign policy.

In 1975, when South Africa was involved in the conflict in Angola, the Nigerian military government perceived this as an affront to the OAU, as well as an opportunity to put its hegemonic stamp on African issues. The Murtala government virtually recognised the MPLA as the only representative of Angola, with little or no consultation with the SMC, FEC, and the Minister of External Affairs (Garba, 1987:2122). This craving for hegemony, prestige power and legitimacy in Africa unfortunately caused some division within the OAU, especially as some members perceived Nigeria as an emerging minimal hegemony (see Chapter 2) whose intention it was to dominate and not to lead.

OIL BOOM AND NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

The oil boom of the 1970s contributed in significant ways to raising the profile and visibility of Nigeria's foreign policy, not least towards apartheid and white minority rule and Africa in general. Clearly this allowed Nigeria to enjoy a comparative advantage over other non-oil producing African states, and to widen the scope for pursuit of hegemonic leadership on the continent. A clear demonstration of this was provided by Nigeria's reaction to the Yom Kippur War of 1973. As the sixth largest oil-producing state in the world, and the undisputed leader in Africa, Nigeria benefited tremendously from the increase in oil prices. Four-fold windfalls in terms of foreign exchange earnings effected Nigeria's domestic and foreign policies. At the domestic level, the general standard of living of citizens increased, as massive importation of goods to meet growing local demands increased. Unfortunately, the country's lack of domestic productive capacity to satisfy local needs

encouraged Nigeria businessmen to surreptitiously import manufactured goods from South Africa via third parties, especially MNCs with close links to France and Britain. Despite this "round tripping" to evade sanctions, and Pretoria's deliberate move towards pursuing Outward Policy (that is South Africa's route to the international community ran through its neighbours to the north and the rest of Africa) (De Klerk, 1999:48), it was cheaper to import from South Africa than from Europe or America. Despite this, the increase in living standards of average Nigerians paved the way for closer scrutiny and attention to anti-apartheid struggles at home and abroad.

Oil Power and Integral Hegemonic Leadership

At the international level, in particular, Nigeria pursued an "integral hegemonic leadership" role, showing an interest in issues hitherto left to the whim and consideration of superpowers. The first signal, as noted by Aluko (Olusanya&Akindele, 1990:323), came in the sales of crude oil at concessionary prices for African states to cushion the effects of rising oil prices. Mr Philips Asiodu, the then Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Mines and Power, made the first public announcement about this decision on 18 July 1974, and reiterated it in his address to the Old Boys Association of the famous Barewa College, Kaduna, in September 1974 (Aluko, 1981:205). According to Asiodu, Federal Government had "already implemented ...reduced prices for African countries against the sharp peaks in times of scarcity and readiness to allocate oil to African countries for their internal needs" (Aluko, 1981:205). Some conditions were, however, attached to this gesture, including that the beneficiaries must have a refinery and must not re-export concessionary oil to a third state (*Nigeria Tribune*, 1975:20 March, *New Nigerian*, 1975:28 February).

Also, of significance is the fact that oil power was used to influence some African states to recognise the MPLA as the only representative of the people of Angola, against the long-standing commitment by the OAU to a government of national unity in that country. On a broader level, oil wealth contributed equally to Nigeria's pivotal role in leading the negotiations by ACP states with the European Economic Community (EEC), culminating in the Lomé 1 Convention of 1975. Within West Africa, oil power was used to navigate the complex labyrinth of Francophone West African politics in the build-up to the formation of the ECOWAS in 1975, at the time when France was actively sponsoring an alternative economic grouping, *Communauté Economiques de L'Ouest* (CEAO), in the same region (Nwoke, 1990:63). Beyond Africa, Nigeria's quest for recognition and hegemony informed "spur-of-the moment" spending sprees, personalisation of diplomacy and leadership intentions, probably as a demonstration of Gowon's commitment to pay the salary of civil servants in Granada and Guyana (Aluko, 1981:201; Fawole, 2003). All in all, the oil boom era stimulated dynamic Nigerian foreign policy, including the successful pursuit of "secondary boycotts" with the nationalisation, and with full, effective and prompt compensation (Akinsanya, 1980:16-93) of the assets of British Petroleum (BP) in 1978. It was in the same manner that Barclays and Standard Banks, two British financial giants, were also taken over by the government, all, so as to twist Britain's arm to decline diplomatic support to white supremacist regimes in Africa.

Oil Power and Minimum Hegemonic Leadership

The international oil glut of the early 1980s severely affected the Nigerian economy and downgraded the country to a "minimal hegemony". This period coincided with an about-turn in the country's foreign policy, as the assertive dynamism which was previously its hallmark became difficult to sustain in the context of an economy in collapse. Although Africa remained the centrepiece of Nigeria's foreign policy, the imperative of running an economy in disarray forced Nigeria to accept the harsh Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), at the dictation of the World Bank and the IMF. With the pursuit of various kinds of neo-liberal economic dictations- austerity measures, privatisation, commercialisation, etc and the economic situation of the country worsened.

One of the most important foreign policy outcomes of this, from the above, was the gradual shift towards constructive engagement on the question of apartheid in South Africa, at the prompting of the United States and Britain. Gradually, also, Nigeria's frontline states' support for arms and the liberation struggle was eventually replaced with quiet diplomacy. In 1992, when the Foreign Minister of Nigeria, Professor Ibrahim Gambari, was to make an official visit to South Africa, Pretoria declined to issue him a visa (Dipeolu, 1997. December 25). Because secondary boycott was far less effective in terms of achieving results, Nigeria found itself hobnobbing with countries such as Israel and Portugal, who were known to be actively supporting the apartheid system.

In terms of institutional consolidation, whatever diplomatic gains Nigeria achieved during the Gowon and Obasanjo regimes, such as the expansion of the country's missions abroad and recognition of SWAPO, MPLA, ANC and PAC, were eroded by the *prebendapolitics* of the Shagari era and that of the military regimes of Generals Babangida and Abacha. The squandering of oil wealth, coupled with intense bureaucratic rivalries (discussed below), further contributed to Nigeria declining anti-apartheid posture.

CIVIL SERVANTS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE FIRST REPUBLIC

At independence, Nigeria adopted a loose federal structure, with more power allocated to the three regional governments. This caused the regions to hold different foreign policy positions on the question of apartheid and the Arab-Israeli problem, just as they negotiated separate loans and assistance from international financial institutions. This, in part, caused the Christian-dominated Western and Eastern regions to be less assertive on the apartheid question. This would also have contributed to the support accorded to Israel and South Africa by the Eastern regions of Nigeria.

The Second Republic and the Role of Civil Servants in the Foreign Policy of Nigeria: The Second Republic ushered in an American-style presidential system of government, with foreign policy power residing with the Executive President. Only the Senate (mostly its foreign affairs committee) could influence treaties, posting of ambassadors and foreign relations agreements. Late Professor IshayaAudu, like his predecessor during the First Republic, only played a peripheral role in foreign policy formulation and implementation. Once again, civil servants came into prominence in decision-making. Against the government's position on the apartheid system, some civil servants diverted material and financial resources meant for the ANC, PAC, SWAPO and MPLA to the FNLA and UNITA, even though the last two enjoyed the support of the US, UK, France and South Africa. Most Nigerian politicians, at the time of independence, did not have an interest in foreign policy issues, seeing them mainly as distant concerns without any effect on the daily routine of the country. This position is clearly explained by Professor Akindele (1990:161) in *Nigerian Parliament and Foreign Policy, 1960-1966*. This lack of interest appeared to have encouraged Balewa and Shagari, during the First and Second republics respectively, to give foreign policy power to only a few trusted friends in their governments, such as Nuhu Bamali and Umaru Dikko.

Conflict of Interest between Different Ministries

Lack of interest in foreign policy by civilian heads of Nigerian governments, and the complex nature of international politics, made room for unhealthy competition in the formulation and execution of foreign policy issues by various ministries. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Cabinet Office (Presidency) sometimes moved in different directions in policy execution regarding the South African question. The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), which was supposed to be a think-tank for the head of government, played a greater role in foreign policy formulation and execution under the Murtala/Obasanjo regimes. Bolaji Akinyemi's (NIIA Director-General, 1975-1985) special relationship with the two Heads of State generated animosity with General Joe Garba (1987:96), the Foreign Affairs Minister (1975-1978), on the question of Nigeria's position towards the apartheid system. Conflict between various ministries was also noted. From the time of independence, the Department of Information had fought a relentless war against the Foreign Affairs Ministry regarding the projection of Nigeria's image abroad. The situation degenerated into personal conflict between Foreign Minister Jaja Wachuku and Chief T.O.S. Benson, Information Minister (Aliyu, 1989:5). The issue of International Economic Relations (IER) led to inter-ministerial rivalry between the Ministries of Trade and Industry, Finance, Economic Planning, Petroleum and Energy Resources, Foreign Affairs and the Central Bank. For instance, representation in various international financial institutions such as ECOWAS, IMF, World Bank and EEC continued to be a major problem.

Bureaucratic Minorities in Foreign Policy Formulation and Execution.

Also worth considering, as observed by Kaarbo (1998), is the influence of minority civil servants in shaping the state's foreign policy position and implementation? They adopted a series of tactics to achieve their objectives, in the form of reward and cost strategies. Even if the power to decide was not given to these actors, control over resources to carry out actions was often at their disposal. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there was stiff competition within various units and among senior officers regarding the recognition of liberation movements. As noted earlier, this caused some foreign affairs' staff to direct funds meant for liberation movements in South Africa to UNITA rebels in Angola, against the interests of the Nigerian state (Wilmot, 1989:7-8; Interview. Dipeolu 1997 25 December). Furthermore, despite the perceived pro-apartheid attitude of Chief GatshaMangosuthu Buthelezi and his Kwa-Zulu homeland government, the Nigerian government recognised him and his party (Inkatha Freedom Party) as one of the representatives of liberation movements (Dipeolu, 1997. December 25). Owing to the personal ambition of some of the top Nigerian civil servants, and the problem of ethnic rivalry whereby some civil servants were loyal to their region rather than to the national government, little headway was made in terms of the implementation of anti-apartheid foreign policy.

Private Individuals and Foreign Policy.

By its very nature, foreign policy-making is the exclusive preserve of a few people (Stuchlik, 2005:6). Individuals' contributions to foreign policy formulation and execution bring with them certain problems. Private individuals often lack relevant information about foreign policy, and are more likely to be compared to seasoned

diplomats who possess more information about foreign policy (Frankel, 1968:72). However, there are certain instances in which the attentive public and the elite (Stuchlik, 2005:9) have inputs in foreign policy formulation. They do this by means of membership of various interest groups, contact with parliamentarians, or influencing the opinions of relatives and friends (Stuchlik, 2005:9). In this wise mass media, private individuals and the opinions of pressure groups did shape aspects of Nigerian foreign policy (Fafowora, 1984:93). Basil Davidson's (Garba, 1987:21)⁴ relations with Alhaji M. D. Yusuf (Nigeria's Inspector General, 1975-1979) partly influenced Nigerian policy on South Africa, when Pretoria gave military support to UNITA and FNLA against the MPLA during the Angolan civil war (see Chapter 4).

Organised Private Sectors (OPS) and Nigeria's Foreign Policy

The economic imperatives in Nigeria's foreign policy from the 1980's onwards led to the prominence of Organised Private Sectors (OPS) in Nigerian foreign policy decision-making (Nigeria. MEA. 1989, cf. Umoren, 1992:193). This was as a result of the introduction of economic diplomacy as a new cornerstone of Nigerian foreign policy by President Babangida and his Foreign Affairs Minister, Ike Nwachukwu. According to the latter:

"For the first time in the history of the conduct and management of Nigeria's external relations, the role of the organised private sector has been recognised accordingly. We have thus consciously, but in a gradual manner involved the private sector agencies in all aspects of our external relations" (Nigeria MEA. 1989).

In the same vein, Major General Ike Nwachukwu (*The Guardian*, (Lagos). 1988.5 July:6), the Nigerian Foreign Minister, stated that:

"At the ministry of external affairs, we believe that the basic issues of foreign policy are well within the grasp of the private sector... We have decided to take the private sector into confidence so that they can make contributions to our bilateral relations with all countries with which we have economic co-operation agreements".

In economic relations, institutions such as the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN), Nigerian Association of Chambers, Industry, Mines and Agriculture (NACCIMA), and Nigerian Employers Consultative Assembly (NECA) played active roles in foreign policy formulation (Ukeje, 1995:60). In July 1991, the OPS were employed as bait to renew diplomatic relations with Israel. In 1994, at the inauguration of President Nelson Mandela, some businessmen, among whom was ShehuMalami, later to be Nigeria's first High Commissioner to South Africa (1996-1999), accompanied General SanniAbacha to South Africa. The objective of the government was to explore business opportunities in and possible technology transfer from, the new South Africa.

The introduction of economic diplomacy was one of the most contradictory economic programmes so far introduced in Nigeria. The intent was to seek economic co-operation with any state ready to do business with Nigeria, regardless of the political situation and morality of the state concerned. This, coupled with the influence of the OPS, could have impelled Babangida to recognise the South African government by inviting President de Klerk of South Africa to Nigeria in 1992. Pik Botha, then South African Foreign Minister, and his representative in the UNO, Jeremy Sherer, were believed to have encouraged this initiative through Ambassador OluAdeniji, then Nigeria's permanent representative at the UNO in Geneva (Interview. Sherer 1997).

There was, however, a limit to the extent that the OPS could influence the foreign policy of Nigeria. Despite the blank cheque handed to the OPS for foreign policy by means of economic diplomacy, some economic issues were considered to be too sensitive to be in the hands of businessmen. As far back as 1978, for instance, Chief O.A. Lawson, the NACCIMA chairman, called for "abetter understanding between Nigeria and the apartheid government of South Africa" (Ukeje, 1995:60). Lawson's position was criticised at both government and individual levels, as a sign of the tacit recognition of the apartheid system.

NIGERIA AND HER NEIGHBOURS

Contiguous states' influence on a state's foreign policy cannot be underestimated in foreign policy formulation and execution (Patten, 2005). Nigeria is bordered by the Republic of Benin to the west, Niger Republic to the north, Chad to the northeast, and Cameroun to the east. On the southern flank, apart from the Atlantic Ocean, Equatorial Guinea and São Tomé e Príncipe share a common border with Nigeria via the Gulf of Guinea. All these states affect Nigeria's foreign policy and hegemonic and prestige ambitions. It is worth noting that the countries which have common land borders with Nigeria are all Francophone countries. One of the implications of this for the Nigeria-South Africa question is that many of them were allies of France, which had economic, security and technological relations with apartheid South Africa. This influence on Nigeria's anti-apartheid policy cannot be overlooked. For example, these states could have been used to launch a pre-emptive attack on Nigeria if so wished, since, after all, South Africa and the International Red Cross had used Cameroun and Benin to send relief materials to Biafra. This could be attributed to the support given by some French-speaking African countries to Biafra. Also significant is the influence of São Tomé e Príncipe and Equatorial Guinea. These countries share sea borders with Nigeria. The South African government courted them so that they would send arms and relief materials to Biafra during the Civil War, as explained above. Their strategic locations are of importance to the military stability of Nigeria. The contiguous states of Chad, Niger

and Mali depend on Nigeria for handling their imports and exports. This gave these states little choice, outside of Nigeria's policy objectives, in terms of their own international relations. At the same time, Nigeria was forced to embark on a policy of good neighbourliness in order to check the infiltration of Nigeria by way of porous land borders, in the form of cultural and technical bilateral agreements.

Despite the oil glut in the 1980s (Adebayo, 1990), Nigeria was forced to commit resources to the economic development of Togo, Benin, Niger, Cameroun, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, partly to check South African and French military influence in those countries. For instance, Nigeria gave N5 million to Equatorial Guinea to host the Central African Custom Union (UDEAC) Summit in 1987, despite Malabo's support for South Africa during and after the Biafran war. (*African Confidential*, 1987, 28(17)). The Shagari government's financial and military commitments in Chad from 1979 to the early 1980s cost about \$50 million, ostensibly, as the government claimed, to check the influx of refugees, safeguard national security for promotion of a peaceful relationship with neighbouring countries, and dissuade Islamic fundamentalists (Vogt, 1981). However, this exercise seems to be more hegemonic in nature. Nigeria's concentration on the development of unfriendly states such as Gabon, São Tomé e Príncipe and Equatorial Guinea could be linked to the military threat that South Africa might pose to the stability of Nigeria. It was the view of different governments in Nigeria that South Africa's relations with Libreville and Malabo stemmed more from political and military than economic motives (Interview. Role 1999. November 12).

Natural Resources and Foreign Policy

Natural resources such as gold, crude oil, natural gas, vanadium and asphalt, to mention but a few, also determined Nigeria's foreign policy. Nigeria's gas reserves are among the world's largest, estimated at 3,451, 000 million cubic metres, but as much as 18,000 million cubic metres of gas are flared off every year in the Nigerian oil fields of Escravos and Forcados {AC, 1995. 36(13): 4}. The use of gas and crude oil to further Nigeria's foreign policy has been dealt with in this chapter. At the same time, untapped resources such as gold, bitumen and vanadium could equally be used to project the country's future relationships, even though South Africa has a comparative advantage in its production of gold and platinum. Nonetheless, Nigeria still used its oil power against Western countries that backed apartheid, including the USA, which receives huge quantities of Nigeria's crude oil (Nigeria, as of 1997, was supplying an average of 691,000 barrels of oil a day to the USA) and some EEC countries against the apartheid policy (*Pretoria News*, 1997. 12 November).

Topography and Nigeria's International Relations

The topography of Nigeria is an advantage in so far as it remaining a hegemonic leader in Africa is concerned. This is because different climatic conditions favour the production of most food and cash crops. Unfortunately, long decades of Nigeria's integration into capitalist international economic relations, has increased the potential for importation of consumable items. The variety of vegetation in Nigeria, from the rain forest belt in the South, to the savannahs of the North, is sufficiently diverse to cater for Nigerians' needs, even though a lack of technological know-how means that the country has to depend on importations from the West; including supporters of apartheid policy in South Africa. This could have been a major reason for Nigeria's inability to successfully pressurise South Africa at the international level.

Structure of the International System

At the time of independence, Nigeria pursued a pro-Western capitalist option, less out of choice than as a result of its colonial provenance. Out of necessity, therefore, successive Nigerian governments warmed up more to the West than countries in the Eastern bloc. A practical example was that of the former Soviet Union, which was only allowed to have a limited number of diplomats in Nigeria when it was granted diplomatic representation in Lagos between 1960 and 1966 (Ogunbadejo, 1986:250251; Fawole, 2003:43). On the other hand, the UK and USA had no such limitations in terms of their diplomatic representation. In fact, the Balewa government of the 1960s turned down economic aid from the Communist world. Indeed, regarding communism, Prime Minister Balewa, in January 1958, informed the House of Representatives that:

"I should like to state here that my colleagues and I are determined that while we are responsible for the Government of the Federation of Nigeria... We shall use every means in our power to prevent the infiltration of communism and communistic ideas into Nigeria" (cf. Idang, 1973:50).

It was only the imperative of the Civil War (1967-1970) that caused Nigeria to readjust its pro-Western foreign policy preferences, when the federal government approached the Soviet Union for much-needed arms and ammunition, as well as mercenaries, after Western allies denied Lagos access to similar resources and facilities.

North-South Factor

The North-South economic divide is another factor that affected (and continues to affect) Nigeria's foreign policy position. It is important to remember that Nigeria championed the negotiation of the EEC-ACP

that eventually resulted in the signing of the Lomé 1 Convention in 1975 and others subsequent to it. At the time, Nigeria was not in need of economic co-operation with European states because crude oil, the main source of foreign exchange in the country, was not included in the preferential list of the Lomé Convention. Indeed, according to OluSanu (Interview, Sanu, 1997; Sanu&Onwuka (1997:4), Nigeria's former Chief Negotiators of the Lomé Convention agreements during the negotiation phase, Nigeria's aim was more to gain political (hegemonic) leadership than to achieve economic objectives. It was the opinion of the Nigerian government at that time that, with the oil shortage within non-oil producing Africa during the 1970s, South Africa could easily entice more states to its side, especially the weak frontline states of Southern Africa, by making Pretoria's Sasol oil available to them.

Middle East Factor Another factor that determined Nigeria's foreign relations was the Arab issue. The Hausa/Fulani Muslims in Northern Nigeria, in terms of population and access to political power, dominated Nigeria's foreign policy. This perhaps explains why the Babangida government joined the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1986, even though his public claim concerning that controversial action was to create "a forum in which we (Nigeria) can mobilise support for the battle against racism..."(Newswatch, 1986). Babangida probably, as had been the belief of past Nigerian and other African leaders, equated Zionism with the racism of the apartheid system (Garba, 1987). This study will further investigate in Chapters 4 and 5 the *leitmotif* for Nigeria's signing up to the OIC, and ultimately conclude that this step was taken to open another window of opportunity to external support for the government's economic reform agenda, through grants and loans from Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. It was also a time when Nigeria needed the goodwill and support of OPEC, an organisation dominated by oil-rich Arab countries, in order to increase oil quotas and, invariably, oil revenue (Soremekun, 1988; Nwankwo, 198). Inevitably, the decision to join the OIC generated heated public debate until the Nigerian government rescinded its decision. In a broader context, Arab-Israeli conflict has determined Nigeria's domestic and foreign policies, especially as the country is roughly divided into north (Moslem) and south (Christian) (Bukarambe, 1986).

The Great Powers Factor

Relations with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member states also played a significant role vis-à-vis Nigeria's position in the international system. The economic power of the developed North, with their control of international trade, finance and investment, contributed to Nigeria having to depend on them, not only for foreign direct investment (FDI), but also to create employment for the teeming population and enable the transfer of technology for general economic development. Since, at the same time, Nigeria desired to win the war of liberation in Southern Africa where the West had political interests, cultural affinities and economic objectives, it was logical that government, especially from the mid-1980s onwards, had to mellow on the apartheid question (Ojo, 1986:437).

International Organisations.

The move towards various types of quasi-world governments and the creation of supra-national organisations set limits on Nigeria's choice in its foreign policy. The various ratified treaties and membership of different international organisations such as ECOWAS, OAU, AU (African Union), NAM and UNO, restricted Nigeria's foreign relations. For instance, the OAU clause on solidarity among member states was applied during the Nigerian Civil War, thus causing the majority of African states to reject Ojukwu's secessionist Biafra. The same clause was brought to bear in late 1995 when the nine Ogoni environmentalists were executed, despite international appeals for clemency. Despite Balewa's distaste for violence in the liberation of African states, Nigeria contributed to the anti-apartheid struggle in Southern Africa in the 1960s, as a member of the OAU. As a member of the UNO and OAU, Nigeria had to abide by the rules and regulations of these international organisations, even when the interests of the nation were at stake. For example, in times of dire domestic need and concern, Nigeria had no choice but to participate in the UNO joint operation (UNO Interim Forces in Lebanon) between 1978 and 1983 (Ogomudia, 1997:118). It also contributed forces to a similar effort in Cambodia under the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia between 1992 and 1993. On some occasions, of course, participation in international organisations comes with certain responsibilities that could run contrary to a state's national interests, orthodox concepts of state sovereignty, and economic development of its citizens. (Solomon, 2001; Patten, 2005), as the case of Nigeria's involvement in the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia and Sierra Leone demonstrated.

Having discussed the determinants of Nigeria's foreign policy, it is this study's intention to turn to the basic principles of Nigeria's foreign policy, as discussed by Olusanya and Akindele (1986), and to see whether or not these are in accord with the hegemonic and prestige intentions of Nigeria regarding the South African question.

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