

A Proposed Economic Household Portfolio Model On Land Acquisition and Utilisation in A1 Resettlement Areas in Zimbabwe

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Abstract: *The primary aim of the study was to construct an economic household portfolio model that helps to explain household behaviour in land acquisition and utilisation in A1 resettlement areas. The study used qualitative approach. A case study of two A1 resettlement areas in Goromonzi District in Mashonaland East Province was used to produce in-depth and comprehensive information. This enabled the researcher to use participant observation to describe the context of A1 farmers, identify the variables and analyse the interactions of the different household variables on land acquisition and utilisation in A1 resettlement areas. The proposed economic household portfolio model on land acquisition and utilisation analysed three levels of the socio-economic behaviour of the household: the individual member of the household and the intra-household dynamics between and among members; the whole household at the aggregate level and the interaction between the household, its members and the external economic, social or political environment (supra-household or social network). The interaction between household resources and household activities determine the acquisition, utilisation and/or disposal of land in A1 resettlement areas. Household resources and household activities are linked by two opposing flows, expenditure flow and income flow. The expenditure household flow represents both individual and joint household resources that are used to support household agricultural activities while the income household flow represents the income generated from agricultural activities of production and investment. The proposed economic household portfolio model on land acquisition and utilisation needs further development if it is to be used as a tool for analysing the distribution of land between married partners. The evaluation of the distribution of land would be just the beginning and constitutes a basis for further related research in terms of its contributions and insights.*

Keywords: *A1 resettlement area; assets; household; household activity; expenditure flow; income flow; model; portfolio*

I. Introduction

Literature survey on land distribution between men and women in Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America has shown that women are considered a marginalised social group in land ownership (Njaya, 2013). This is supported by a growing body of evidence in Latin America, Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa: Deere and Leon (2001, 2003) for various Latin American countries; Deere and Doss (2006) for Honduras and Nicaragua; FAO, 1997 cited in Doss, Gross and Deere (2008) for a number of countries in Africa and Latin America; Saito, Mekonnen and Spurling (1994) for Kenya, Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Zambia; UNECA (2003) for Lesotho, Zambia, Malawi, Botswana, Mozambique and South Africa; Agarwal (1994, 2003) for India and Malla (2000) cited in Doss, Gross and Deere (2008) for Nepal. The lack of gender focus in land ownership has negative consequences for married women as they are not considered for land redistribution and/or titling programmes and consequently lose the land they jointly own with their spouses in the event of separation, divorce, widowhood and abandonment.

In fact, in the literature on land and gender there was a tendency to aggregate households where the land was held by the household head who, in most cases was male. In the stipulation that land was held by the household head, Jacobs (2000) claimed that Zimbabwe was merely following international precedent. The aggregation of households and land users obscures the differential interests, inputs, rights and obligations relating to land use and control in rural Zimbabwe (Gaidzanwa, 1995). In this study, the researcher adopted a gender approach to develop an economic household portfolio model on land acquisition and utilisation in A1 resettlement areas. The proposed model allowed a more satisfactory and nuanced analysis of household behaviour in land acquisition, use and disposition in A1 resettlement areas. Such an approach provided useful information for designing policies that promoted women empowerment and gender equality and overall improvement in household welfare.

1.1 Theoretical Framework of Household Model

Gender is a complex phenomenon which requires a conceptual framework and a related methodological approach which will cover all the three levels of analysis of the economic behaviour of the household: the individual member of the household and the intra-household dynamics between and among members; the whole household at the aggregate level and the interaction between the household, its members and the external economic, social or political environment (the supra-household or social network) (Cohen, 1996). In this section, economic models of household decision-making will be identified and discussed as well as the conceptual framework of the economic household portfolio model on land acquisition and utilisation.

1.1.1 Economic Models of Household Decision Making

Neoclassical economic theory recognises two key units of analysis at the microeconomic level: consumers and firms (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2001) and treats them separately. All consumption activities are modelled in terms of the household (individual consumer) while all production activities are modelled in terms of the firm. According to the theory of consumer behaviour, the objective of the consumer is to maximise utility subject to an income constraint. The household's income is determined by the amount of labour time it sells at going wage rate. On the other hand, the theory of the firm states that the objective of the firm is to maximise profit by selecting optimal levels and combination of inputs and outputs. Households in rural areas engage in both market and nonmarket production and it is not possible to completely separate the household's consumption and production activities.

In this section, two polar economic models of household and intra-household decision-making are reviewed. The household model combines previously separate production and consumption models into a single model of a producer and consumer. On the other hand, the intra-household model disintegrates the household to reveal the role of individual preferences, resource sharing and bargaining power of marriage partners.

1.1.2 Aggregate Household Level Analysis

The aggregate household level analysis is associated with the Chayanov model, new home economics model and the farm household model (Cohen, 1996). The Chayanov model was the first attempt to integrate production and consumption decisions in the analysis of a peasant household (Cohen, 1996). According to the Chayanov model, the household seeks to maximise utility through the consumption of goods produced on the farm, goods purchased from the market and leisure. The new home economics model or unitary model is attributed to Samuelson's (1956) consensus model and Becker's (1974, 1981) altruist model (Ironmonger, 2001; Lundberg and Pollak, 1996). In the household economic theory, the household is regarded as a productive sector with household activities modelled as a series of industries (Ironmonger, 2001). The utility of the household is based on home-produced goods known as "Z-goods" (Cohen, 1996; Haddad, Hoddinott, and Alderman, 1997). The Z-goods are for home consumption only and the household gets income solely through wage work. The unitary model assumes that family members pool all their resources (including labour, food and information) and incomes and share common interests and preferences (Samuelson, 1956 cited in Haddad et al., 1997; Agarwal, 2003) or an altruistic head ensures equitable allocations of goods and tasks (Becker, 1981 cited in Agarwal, 2003) in order to maximise household utility.

The farm household model provides a full model of the household as both a consumer and producer and can be applied to non-agricultural households (Cohen, 1996). It assumes that the household seeks to maximise utility which is derived from the consumption of home-produced goods, purchased goods and the time spent in leisure. The household's efforts to maximise utility are constrained by the production function, the total time available to the household and the availability of wage work. According to Cohen (1996), the major contribution of the farm household model is that it provides a theoretical framework for analysing the interactions between the various activities of the household: production for the market, production for home consumption, wage work and consumption of purchased goods.

The above aggregate household models emphasize sharing, altruism and cooperation. There is mounting empirical evidence that refutes the altruistic assumption (Agarwal, 1997, 2003; Haddad et al., 1997; Strauss and Thomas, 1995 and Behrman, 1997 cited in Meinen-Dick et al., 2011; Quisumbing, 2003; Stowhase, 2009). The unitary model posits Pareto efficiency as the sole mechanism through which household members achieve their individual and common family goals. Markets and in particular, land markets are imperfect in developing countries such that resource allocation based on such markets may not be Pareto efficient (Shultz, 2007). Apart from losing ground in rigorous tests, the unitary model has failed to explain systematic intra-household disparities in developing countries (Haddad et al., 1997). These empirical results have strengthened the standing of intra-household collective bargaining models (Agarwal, 2003; Quisumbing, 2003).

1.1.3 Intra-household Level Analysis

Intra-household models or collective models were pioneered by Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy and Horney (1981), Chiappori (1988, 1992) and Lundberg and Pollak (1993) (Haddad et al., 1997; Stowhase, 2009). The intra-household models depart from the aggregate household models' assumptions of joint and uniform household utility functions and altruism and replace them with bargaining, conflict and unequal power relations between married partners (Haddad et al., 1997). There are two categories of collective models, namely cooperative and non-cooperative types. Both models use game theory to specify the bargaining process (ibid). The cooperative models assume the attainment of Pareto optimality in household decisions, pooled income, enforceable and binding contracts and symmetrical positions between spouses in relation to the availability of information and the ability to bargain (Haddad et al., 1997). Household members bargain over the use of pooled income and the outcome of the bargaining process depends on the individual members' bargaining power which is determined by their respective fall-back positions. If the spouses fail to reach agreement, both husband and wife receive the utilities associated with a default outcome described as the "threat point," "disagreement point," "breakdown position," or "fallback position" (Pollack, 2002). The factors that influence the fall back position include conditions in the labour market, conditions in marriage market, rules governing divorce and physical, financial, and human capital assets held by the individual marriage partners (Agarwal, 1997; Cohen, 1996; McElroy, 1990; Sen, 1987) as well as the perceived self-interest and self-worth (Sen, 1987). In Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981), the threat point is interpreted as divorce, while in the "separate spheres" model of Lundberg and Pollak (1993), the threat point is interpreted as a non-cooperative equilibrium within marriage (Pollack, 2002). The Nash bargaining model provides a conceptual solution in cooperative bargaining models of marriage. In the Nash bargaining solution, the utility received by husband or wife depends on the threat point; the higher a spouse's utility at the threat point, the higher the utility that spouse will receive (Pollack, 2002). According to Pollack, the empirical implication of Nash bargaining model is that a couple's expenditure pattern depends not only on prices and the couple's total income, but also on determinants of the threat point.

The non-cooperative models assume separate utility and non-pooling of resources by the household members (Haddad et al., 1997). The assumptions of Pareto efficiency, income pooling and enforceable and binding contracts are relaxed (Haddad et al., 1997). Instead, the models allow differing preferences between individuals, allow for individual production decisions and information asymmetry between parties with respect to the rules of the game (Wooley, 1988, Kanbur and Haddad, 1994 cited in Agarwal, 1997). In the non-cooperative models, the household is depicted as a site of largely separate gender-specific economies linked by reciprocal claims on members' income, land, goods and labour (Haddad et al., 1997). According to these models, individuals act strategically within a household to maximise self-interest taking as given the behaviour of other members (Chen and Woolley 2001 cited in Shultz, 2007). The non-cooperative models use the concept of Cournot-Nash equilibrium to analyse how an individual will cooperate with other household members when the utility from cooperation would exceed that of his or her selfish behaviour within the household. A threshold level utility from strategic behaviour is modelled as a threat point to cooperation where the threat is about a return to a non-cooperative behaviour in a separate sphere of a household (Lundberg and Pollak 1993, 1996; Shultz, 2007) rather than about quitting the household as in the cooperative bargaining models of Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) all cited in Shultz (2007). The non-cooperative model is more appealing if individual household members are assumed to intuitively know their personal utilities in separate spheres of the household and then use that information to change their bargaining power (Schulz, 2007).

While both the unitary and collective models allow public policy to change intra-household allocations of a good (or asset), only the collective model permits public policy to affect the rules of intra-household allocation (Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2000). Household bargaining models provide a formal framework for incorporating the role and consequences of power into economic models of the household decision making processes (Cohen, 1996). The social norms and external institutional conditions that influence intra-household interactions can be explicitly incorporated into intra-household models whereas under the aggregate household models (especially, the farm household model), the only external variables to enter into the analysis are market prices and wage rates (Cohen, 1996). Unlike the aggregate household models, the intra-household models provide a theoretical framework for analysing observed differences between men and women in time allocation, expenditure patterns and resources (Haddad et al., 1997) as well as the choice of business enterprise (Cohen, 1996). Haddad et al., (1997) argue that apart from losing ground in rigorous tests, the unitary model has failed to persuasively explain systematic intra-household disparities in developing countries.

In this study, the researcher argued that the FTLRP altered the bargaining power of married partners and hence their land rights. The collective model was used to analyse the distribution of land and related assets within households in A1 resettlement areas. The justification was that the collective model focuses on an individual as a unit of analysis and thus is able to address interests, conflicts and cooperation (bargaining) among the household members. An individual's bargaining power is determined by his or her control over

economic resources (Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2000; Agarwal, 2003). The second reason for using the collective model was that the person controlling the resource(s) is identified in the model which allows an analysis of the direct effects of placing resource(s) in the hands of different household members. According to Strauss and Thomas (1995) cited in Shultz (2007), the unitary model relies on unrealistic assumptions. The unitary model assumes that unobservable factors such as “invisible hand” and “love” account for the observed intra-household allocations while the collective models explain intra-household allocations using the concept of bargaining power (Shultz, 2007).

Although the bargaining models provide a useful framework for analysing gender relations and throwing light on how gender asymmetries are constructed and contested, they pay little attention

to some critical aspects of intra-household gender dynamics such as the role of social norms and social perceptions in the bargaining process and how these factors themselves can be bargained over (Agarwal, 1997). Agarwal observed that bargaining models say little about gender relations beyond the household and about the links between intra-household and extra-household bargaining power. In light of this, in addition to using the collective model, the researcher used Agarwal’s (1997) analytical description approach in order to extend the bargaining approach beyond the household and therefore be able to capture the complexity and variability of both intra-household and extra-household gender relations on land. The approach addressed the different variables of gender, power and class and how they affected access to and control over assets (for example, land, education and social networks).

1.2 Conceptual Framework of the Model

The conceptual model on land acquisition and utilisation in A1 schemes borrowed from anthropology, economics and feminism so as to enrich the analysis of household decision-making during the acquisition and utilisation of land. This was in line with the advice of Olsen (2006) who claims that a successful economic research programme is one that incorporates various ways of understanding the decision making process of individuals in the society and should include sociology, historical analysis of theories, philosophy and law. Anthropologists define a household as a unit which organises the consumption of a collective fund of material goods (Cohen, 1996). However Goody (1996) cited in Cohen (1996) argues that those who share a kitchen or even a hearth may not share food. According to anthropologists, there are variations in household structures (polygamous, monogamous, female-headed, nuclear and extended) and that different household structures are likely to operate from different resource bases and face different incentives and constraints. Economists are relatively silent on the composition and structure of the household (Cohen, 1996) and instead focus on the behaviour of the household using the theory of consumer behaviour (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2001). Feminists, straddling on both economics and anthropology look at the household through the additional lens of gender. In this study, an economic model portraying the household as a circular flow of portfolios was used to analyse the behaviour of the household in the acquisition and use of agricultural land in A1 resettlement areas. The model was used to trace the shift from the aggregate view of the household to the disaggregate view of intra-household decision making. The supra-household sphere represents social norms and external institutional conditions that influence intra-household interactions.

1.3 Study objectives

- To identify household assets required in land acquisition and utilisation in A1 resettlement areas.
- To identify household activities required in land acquisition and utilisation in A1 resettlement areas.
- To construct an economic household model on land acquisition and utilisation in A1 resettlement areas.
- To explain the implications of the proposed economic household model on land acquisition and utilisation between men and women in A1 resettlement areas.

1.4 Research questions

- What are the household assets that are required in land acquisition and utilisation in A1 resettlement areas?
- What are the household activities that are required in land acquisition and utilisation in A1 resettlement areas?
- How can an economic household model on land acquisition and utilisation in A1 resettlement areas be constructed?
- What are the implications of the proposed economic household model on land acquisition and utilisation between men and women in A1 resettlement areas?

II. Research Methodology And Design

The study used qualitative approach (Bryman, 2001). This was meant to get an in-depth understanding of household dynamics from the farmers themselves. A case study of two A1 resettlement areas in Goromonzi District in Mashonaland East Province was used to produce more in-depth and comprehensive information. This enabled the researcher to use participant observation to describe the context of A1 farmers, identify the variables and analyse the interactions of the different household variables on land acquisition and utilisation in A1 resettlement areas. Figure 1 shows a map of Goromonzi District illustrating geographical characteristics and the two study sites of Bains Hope and Ingwenya Farm.




Figure 1: Map of Goromonzi District showing the two study sites

Source: Surveyor General, 2013

III. Discussion Of Research Findings

The findings from the case study were mapped onto the proposed household model in order to identify factors that influenced land rights between men and women in A1 resettlement areas. The research findings are discussed under the following sub-headings: assumptions underlying the model; household portfolio system and land acquisition and utilisation; proposed household economic portfolio model on land acquisition and utilisation; implications of the economic household portfolio model on land acquisition and utilisation and practical contributions of the proposed model.

3.1 Underlying assumptions of the model

The conceptual household model on land acquisition and utilisation is based on five basic assumptions of intra-household behaviour:

- There are different intra-household arrangements which include pooled versus non-pooled income; cooperation versus non-cooperation; negotiation and bargaining versus outright conflict and joint versus separate allocation of resources (time, labour, land, capital) between married partners.
- There are different divisions within the household which include market and non-market activities of consumption and production and male and female domains of resources, activities and power.
- Household decisions regarding production, consumption and investment are influenced by individuals within the household, intra-household relations, the aggregate household and supra-household relations.
- Households are heterogeneous in terms of composition, structure and functions.
- Individual members within the household may have separate preferences, constraints and resources and therefore may make individual or collective decisions.

3.2 Household portfolio system and land acquisition and utilisation

In order to conceptualise the role of agricultural activity in household decision making and the household economic portfolio system, we incorporated ideas from the neoclassical economic theories of the consumer and that of the firm. The model was designed to analyse the economic behaviour of the household with regards to the demand for and use of land in A1 resettlement areas. Land generates a wide range of use-values and exchange values. In the communal areas, land represented values such as spiritual space, political territory and a host of material market values (such as agricultural use, biotechnological resources, energy sources, building materials, medicines and water-related resources) and non-market values. The model viewed

land as a source of material market values that generated income for the household (agricultural enterprise). The model viewed the household as a portfolio or system made up of household resources, household activities and a circular flow of the interaction between household resources and household activities. The systems perspective was adopted in this study in order to show the interactions between individuals and their corresponding activities and preferences within the household (Njaya, 2013) and beyond. That is, these individual and household activities also take place in a social environment which has direct and indirect effects on how these activities are performed and the people who perform them.

3.2.1 Household resources

There were five types of household resources (or assets) which included human (time, labour and skills of household members); physical (buildings, equipment and machinery, livestock and personal items like jewellery); financial (cash, savings and fixed accounts, unit trusts); natural and social assets. Natural resources included land and everything on it and water. Social assets included kinship networks and social and political groups. This proved to be a very important variable in the allocation of land in Goromonzi district as a majority of the participants (71.4 percent) indicated that they had obtained their farms through political networks. Household resources were held jointly or separately by the household members. In Goromonzi District, about 54.1 percent of the participants indicated that both husband and wife jointly decided on the acquisition and disposal of productive assets. However, over 54 percent of the married women indicated that the acquisition and disposal of livestock was the prerogative of the husband.

3.2.2 Household activities

Household agricultural activities included production, consumption, marketing and investment. Household activities were performed jointly or separately by the household members. A typical agricultural household in the study area was engaged in both market and non-market production and it was not possible to completely separate the household's consumption and production activities. In classical economics, the theory of the consumer is based on the household as the unit of analysis. Classical economics is silent on the household's production activities (Ironmonger, 2001). In order to conceptualise the role of farming in household decision making and the household economic portfolio system, the researcher incorporated ideas from the classical economic theory of the firm. The objective of the firm is to maximise profit through the selection of optimal levels and combinations of inputs and outputs (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2001). In this model, the household as a unit of consumption wished to maximise its utility while as a unit of production, the household wished to maximise profit from the agricultural enterprise or the A1 plot.

3.3 Proposed household economic portfolio model on land acquisition and utilisation

From the conceptual framework developed above, a proposed economic household portfolio model on land acquisition and utilisation is presented in Figure 2. According to the model, there is interaction between household resources and household activities. Household resources and household activities are linked by two opposing flows, expenditure flow and income flow. The expenditure household flow represents both individual and joint household resources that are used to support household agricultural activities. Household resources that supported agricultural activities included cash expenditures, labour inputs, inputs and seed from the Government and social networks that assisted in undertaking agricultural activities. The income household flow represented the income generated from agricultural activities of production and investment. The production and investment activities contributed to the household's resources. Household production involved the production of goods and services by members and non-members of a household for their own consumption and market. In economics, labour and capital are the two factors of production. In this model, labour consisted of the time and effort (both mental and physical) provided by household members and non-members of the household. The second factor of production, capital is the use of physical or tangible non-human capital including land, housing, vehicles and equipment. Draught power in the form of livestock used to carry out agricultural activities formed part of household capital used to produce goods and services. Household investment activities included actual acquisition of the A1 plot on which residential lodgings and farm buildings were constructed, acquisition of productive assets (for example, tractor or ox plough) and livestock (for example cattle or donkeys). Household or extra-household or both household and extra-household resources were used to carry out household investment activities. This often led to an overall increase of household resources particularly financial and physical assets. Given that the A1 plot was an agricultural business enterprise, the household produced market and non-market products. For example, where a household grew cash crops like tobacco then marketing became an important activity. Marketing was not an issue where the household grew crops or reared livestock for subsistence. In A1 schemes crop production was both for subsistence and market and thus the household was viewed as both consumer and producer.




Figure 2: Proposed household economic portfolio model on land acquisition and utilisation

Source: Author, 2015

Apart from the external influence of the social network on household activities, the model looked at the intra-household interactions and dynamics. Some of the dimensions of the portfolio system that could be used to assess the impact of the FTLRP included domestic division of labour, access to resources, gender and market and non-market production. The set of activities pursued by the household were a mix of the individual activities of its members. Cohen (1996), citing Guyer (1988), noted that these activities interacted in a variety of ways: from multiple, separate activities to more coordinated, integrated activities. In the study area men and women were involved in joint agricultural production or women could be involved in the agriculture enterprise while men pursued wage work and vice versa. In the case of joint agricultural production, men and women produced a given crop for which men performed certain activities and women others. A case of substitutable activities occurred when either of the spouses migrated for alternative employment (Cohen, 1996). The supra-household contributed to household agricultural activities through credit, “technical assistance” and labour. In Goromonzi District, there was no evidence of institutional credit being extended to A1 farmers. Instead, tobacco farmers received inputs from tobacco companies under contract farming where the farmers were obliged to sell their tobacco through the supplier of the inputs. The labour could be free or paid. The hired labour also reflected division of tasks between men and women. The division was extended to the types of crops grown by men and women on the same plot. Groundnuts, round nuts, pumpkins and cow peas were designated as women’s crops. Although women could have their own crops on women’s plots or tseu, the produce and/or income from such plots were used to improve the overall household welfare.

3.4 Implications of the economic household portfolio model on land acquisition and utilisation

The proposed economic household portfolio model on land acquisition and utilisation covers three levels of analysis of the socio-economic behaviour of the household: the individual member of the household and the intra-household dynamics between and among members; the whole household at the aggregate level and the interaction between the household, its members and the external economic, social or political environment (supra-household or social network). In Goromonzi District, the researcher observed that factors influencing land acquisition and utilisation could be analysed at these three levels. The socio-political environment was the major determinant of land acquisition in Goromonzi District. This was attributed to the political market that obtained during the FTLRP.

The model has different dimensions of household portfolio that can be used to analyse the impact of the land reform programme on intra-household allocation of assets between men and women. It would allow for an investigation of the socially defined divisions within the household with respect to the demand for and use of the land in A1 schemes.

The model treated the household as a permeable entity whose activities especially the acquisition and utilisation of resources were influenced by external socio-economic and political factors. The study showed that social assets were a strong determinant of women's land rights. Evidence from the fieldwork in Goromonzi District showed that belonging to the ruling party, ZANU-PF guaranteed one's access to land in A1 schemes. This means that the social environment cannot be ignored when analysing the gendered outcomes of the FTLRP on land acquisition and utilisation in A1 resettlement areas. The above varied uses of the proposed economic household portfolio model on land acquisition and utilisation showed that it can be used during the planning, design, targeting, implementation, monitoring and final evaluation of socio-economic development programmes concerned with asset distribution such as land reform, privatisation and economic empowerment.

3.5 Practical contributions of the model

In determining how to incorporate and mainstream gender in asset distribution programmes, policy makers could use the framework of the proposed economic household portfolio model on land acquisition and utilisation before deciding the number of beneficiaries in each programme. The framework would help to identify structural inequalities and factors that constrain equal access to and control over assets between men and women. Using gender analysis in the distribution of assets including land between men and women would help to understand the ensuing intra-household relations and expose gender-specific barriers which may prevent women and men from benefiting equally from development programmes. It is the researcher's considered view that unless these barriers are identified and addressed during the conception, design and planning process of the development programmes, the benefits would not be shared equally between men and women, boys and girls. This would not augur well for the country's sustainable development since gender is a developmental issue.

The proposed economic household portfolio model on land acquisition and utilisation would help the Government to mainstream gender in the planning, design, implementation and evaluation of asset redistribution programmes. Identifying and addressing gender-based constraints to resource access can lead to a virtuous development cycle where women's increased livelihood economic opportunities may lead to improved overall development outcomes. These development outcomes include enhanced gender equality, improved household welfare and increased efficiency in agricultural production and investment. The model would form the basis for structural analysis and policy evaluation of asset redistribution programmes such as land reform, privatisation and economic empowerment. However, on its own, the model may not be sufficient to explain the complexities of gender relations within and outside farming households. Nevertheless, the model may be used by researchers as a starting point to explore the dynamics of gender and power relations over household assets between married partners.

IV. Conclusion And Policy Recommendations

The proposed economic household portfolio model on land acquisition and utilisation can be used to analyse three levels of the socio-economic behaviour of the household: the individual member of the household and the intra-household dynamics between and among members; the whole household at the aggregate level and the interaction between the household, its members and the external economic, social or political environment (supra-household or social network). The interaction between household resources and household activities determine the acquisition, utilisation and/or disposal of land in a1 resettlement areas. The study showed that social assets were a strong determinant of women's land rights in Goromonzi District. Evidence from the fieldwork showed that belonging to the ruling party, ZANU-PF guaranteed one's access to land in A1 schemes. This means that the social environment cannot be ignored when analysing the gendered outcomes of the FTLRP on land acquisition and utilisation in A1 resettlement areas. Household resources and household activities are linked by two opposing flows, expenditure flow and income flow. The expenditure household flow represents both individual and joint household resources that are used to support household agricultural activities while the

income household flow represents the income generated from agricultural activities of production and investment. The researcher believes that the proposed economic household portfolio model on land acquisition and utilisation needs further development if it is to be used as a tool for analysing the distribution of land between married partners. The researcher hopes that the evaluation of the distribution of land would be just the beginning and constitutes a basis for further related research in terms of its contributions and insights.

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