Challenges Encountered By the State and Civil Society in the Implementation of Post- Conflict Reconstruction in Kibera and Mathare Divisions, Nairobi; Kenya

Dennis Nyongesa Wamalwa[1], Frank Matanga[2], Kennedy Onkware[3],

[1](PhD. Candidate; Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology, Kenya)
[2](Professor of Political Science; Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology, Kenya)
[3](Associate Professor; Department of Emergency Management Studies, Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology, Kenya)

Abstract: *Reconstruction from conflict stricken societies is a complex, demanding task and major challenge for most states as well as the civil society globally. Reconstruction agenda involves building peace and securing political stability, recreating or strengthening the basic functions of the state administration, resettling internally displaced persons, demobilizing combatants, and rebuilding essential economic and social structures. In Kenya, the state and civil society encountered several challenges in the implementation of post conflict reconstruction programs in Kibera and Mathare Slums. The presence of corruption, nepotism, strained relationship between government and civil society, and overwhelming needs hampered the implementation of post conflict reconstruction strategies in Kenya. This paper examines the challenges encountered by the state and civil society organizations in post-conflict reconstruction after 2007/8 post-election violence in Kibera and Mathare Divisions, Nairobi; Kenya. Methodologically, the study utilized secondary sources with major emphasis on primary data collection.*

I. Introduction

Societies emerging out of prolonged armed conflicts and or terrorists' attacks are now facing fundamental challenges in transforming their war weakened economies and highly polarized political and social relations into rejuvenated economies capable of providing the basic needs of all their citizens (Addison 2003). The task of rebuilding a divided Kenya since 2007/8 post-election has been a daunting one. People's lives were damaged and destroyed hence the challenges of post conflict reconstruction included; the establishment of a legitimate and effective government, reform of the security sectors and economic and social revitalization.

The conflict divided people along ethnic lines when neighbors turned against neighbors in arms. The major task therefore was to rebuild trust between all sections of the society and find ways through which people can live together peacefully as one nation. Kalin (2006) builds on this observation by noting that 2007/8 post-election violence had a significant socio- economic repercussion in Kenya. On the macro level, economic and social infrastructures such as the systems for transport and communication, banking, healthcare, education and agricultural research and extension suffered extensive damage as a result of fighting. Okoth (2008) too observed that the conflicts generated a variety of serious problems associated with human capital, land and the environment. Human resource shortages are particularly severe in war-torn regions. For instance, tens of thousands of Kenyan professionals such as doctors, teachers and humanitarian workers were targeted during the conflict forcing them to move to safer places away from their working stations. In addition, educational opportunities decreased during the conflict time, as schools were closed or students participated in the conflict.

II. Research methodology

2.1 Research Design

The research design for this study was an exploratory comparative design that was undertaken within the study (2013-2015) period. This design was selected essentially in order to draw comparisons between two selected divisions. Further comparisons of challenges experienced by the state and civil society in both divisions were explored.

2.2 The Area of Study
The study area was Kibera and Mathare divisions as they were considered the hot spots of 2007/8 post-election violence (PEV) in Kenya. Muchiri (2010) maintains that they are the largest, most populated and poorest slums in East and Central Africa at large. Kibera and Mathare divisions are characterized by lack of basic services and infrastructure such as adequate access to clean water, sanitation, garbage collection, roads and footpaths, storm drainage, electricity and public lighting. Housing units are semi-permanent in nature. Social amenities are inadequate, with facilities such as schools and hospitals unable to cope with the population demand (Waki report 2008).

2. 3 Study Population.
According to 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census, Kibera and Mathare division had a population of 533, 484 (Kenya Bureau of Statistics, 2009). 453,175 (243,038 male) and (210 137 female) in Kibera occupying 232.488 area –sq km and 80,309 (44,098 male) and (36,620 female) in Mathare occupying 0.08837 area –sq km respectively as shown in table 2.1.

Table 2.1 Total population and Sampling size Determination for Household Heads in Kibera and Mathare Divisions

Kibera	Study Population(HHs)	Sample size (n)	Mathare	Study population(HHs)	Sample size (n)
Gatwekera	2217	22	3 A	1530	15
Kambimuru	424	4	3 B	2681	27
Kianda	1344	13	3 C	1925	19
Kisumu Ndogo	1105	11	4 A	5629	56
Laini Saba	2130	21	4 B	1810	18
Lindi	1818	18	Gathathuri	2141	21
Makina	2769	28	Kiamtisyia	2351	24
Mashimoni	905	10	Kosovo	2864	29
Raila	914	9	Kwakariuki	878	9
Silanga	1730	17	Mabatini	383	4
Soweto East	2149	22	Mashimoni	1692	17
Soweto West	622	6	No 10	994	10
-	-	-	Village 2	2854	29
Totals	**18,127**	**181**	**Totals**	**27,812**	**278**

Source: Kenya Bureau of Statistics (2009). Accessed from office of Nairobi Sub- County Commissioner, 2014

The study specifically targeted the following population; 45,939 household heads, 442 Government officials, and 117 Civil Society Organizations. The Government officials targeted included; 41 Village elders, 10 chiefs, 10 Members of county assembly (MCAs), 377 security officers, 4 Assistant Sub-County Officers, and 2 Assistant County commissioners as shown in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2 Number of sampled categories of the government (state) officials

State	Kibera		Mathare	
	Total Population	Sample size	Total Population	Sample size
Village elders	27	27	14	14
Sub-County Commissioner (DC)	1	1	1	1
Assistant Sub county commissioner(DO)	2	2	2	2
Security officers	200	20	177	18
Chiefs	4	4	6	6
MCA's	4	4	6	6
TOTAL	**238**	**58**	**206**	**47**

Source: (Records from Assistant County Commissioner's offices, Kibera and Mathare 2014)

On the other hand, the targeted population in relation to civil society included; 59 Non-Governmental Organizations staff, 36 Community Based Organizations (CBOs) staff, and 22 Faith-Based Organizations as shown in Table 2.3.

Table 2.3 Number of the population and sampled categories of the CSO's

	Kibera		Mathare	
	Total Population	Sample size	Total Population	Sample size
NGO's	33	10	26	8
CBO's	23	7	13	4
FBO's	13	4	9	3
Total	69	21	48	15

Source (Records from Assistant County Commissioner's office, 2014)

2.4 Sampling Strategy and Sample Size

This research drew a sample following the recommendation of Kombo and Tromp (2006) of 10% to 30% to be a representative for a study population. While (Kalin 2006) recommended a 20% to 30% as ideal to represent a target population under study.

2.4.1 Sample Distribution of the Household heads

The sample distribution of the household heads was categorized along the demarcated administrative units in the two divisions (Kibera and Mathare). A list of the entire house hold respondents per village was availed from the Deputy county commissioner's office out of which Mugenda and Mugenda (2006) proportional formula was applied to come up with an all-inclusive and representative household sample size.

According to Kombo and Tromp (2006), the sample size from a larger population can be determined by the formula:

$$S = \frac{N(CV^2)}{CV^2 + (N-1)e^2}$$

Where:
S =   Desired sample
N = Population
CV = Coefficient of variation (set at 0.1)
e   = Tolerance at desired level of confidence (set at 0.5 at   95% confidence level.
Substitution of the constituents in the relationship is done as follows:
S = 45,939 (0.01)
= 459.39 (Household heads)

From the study population of 45,939 household heads for both divisions, with 18,127 households in Kibera and 27,812 household heads in Mathare, a sample size of 181 household heads respondents from Kibera and 278 households from Mathare was picked to get a grand total of 459 household heads respondents.

2.4.2 Sample Distribution of state officials

The study employed various sampling techniques to get respondents in this category. Census procedure was used on Sub County Commissioners, Deputy Sub County Commissioners and Members of the county assembly. Purposive random sampling was also used in obtaining the sample on village elders, and chiefs. In Kibera, the sample population frame entailed; 27 village elders, 4 chiefs, 200 security officers, 1 assistant sub county commissioner, 1 sub county commissioner, and 4 Members of County Assemblies (MCAs). On the other hand, the sample frame in Mathare included; 14 village elders, 4 chiefs, 177 security officers, 1 assistant sub county commissioner, 1 sub county commissioner, and 6 MCAs (table 2.1 above)

2.4.3 Sample Distribution of the Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) Staff

There are several Civil Society organizations operating in Kibera and Mathare divisions. Their numbers were obtained from the National Council of NGOs through the Ministry of Culture and Social Services. However, preference was given to CSOs that were directly involved in PCR after 2007/8 PEV. Similarly, Mugenda and Mugenda's fomula was applied for this category. In Kibera sample population frame for civil society entailed; 10 NGOs, 7 CBOs and 4 FBOs while in Mathare were 8NGOs, 4 CBOs, and 3 FBOs (see table 2.2 above).

2.5 Data Collection

In this study triangulation method which is the use of different methods to obtain different but complementary data on the same topic was more appropriate. Primary data was collected through the questionnaires, interview schedules, FGD guides and observation check list. While secondary data was collected through document and content analysis guide to ascertain an in-depth analysis on the implementation of post conflict reconstruction programs. The combination of data collection tools was selected to enable the researcher have an in-depth understanding of the nature and extent of the problem.

2.6 Validity and Reliability of Data Instruments

The researcher used content validity so as to ascertain whether the tools measured what was stated in the objectives. This was done through cross checking with the supervisors. This meant that the researcher's content validity measures contained all possible items that were used in measuring the concept. In this study, a valid measure of 0.5 was acceptable as in spearman correlation coefficient.

The researcher used test and retest techniques where the same data instrument was administered twice to the same respondents after a period of 2 weeks. After the research instrument had yielded the same results the researcher went ahead and administered them to the selected samples in Kibera and Mathare divisions.

III.   Results and Discussion

Data collected was gleaned, coded and analysed through Excel and SPSS and the results were as follows:-

3.1 Challenges encountered by State and Civil Society in Post-Conflict Reconstruction.

After 2007/8 post-election violence (PEV) in Kenya, the individuals affected lost their primary means of income and were psychologically traumatized. Though state and civil society initiatives made major contributions like the empowerment of youth and women, fostering inter-religious dialogue, and dealing constructively with the affected communities in restoring peace and harmony, they encountered challenges in the process of implementation of these initiatives (Fischer 2000). Most of the respondents 358 (78.2%) observed that Civil Society and State encountered a chain of challenges in the implementation of post conflict reconstruction programs after PEV; as shown in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1 Challenges Encountered by Civil Society and State in the Implementation of Post Conflict Reconstruction Programs in Kibera and Mathare.(combined divisions) N=459

A Chi-square value $(\chi^2_{16,0.01}$ 14.067) showed that there was a highly significant (P<0.00) association between the challenges encountered in Kibera and Mathare. This shows that Kibera and Mathare divisions, sprawling slums in the heart of the Kenyan capital, Nairobi, which experienced scenes of violence after 2007/8's disputed elections, experienced challenges in the process of post conflict reconstruction. The study revealed that most of the challenges faced were as a result of the nature of the conflict that was experienced in the two slums:

> The neighbors turned against each other because of ethnic and political rivalries, the police used brutal force to quash clashes and protests and this made it hard to have the same groups work together during the reconstruction process for lack of trust in the neighborhood and the legitimate systems coupled with state and civil society rivalries (Village elder Mathare Focused Group Discussion, 2014)

The study also sought to find out how the challenges faced by state and civil society would be rated by the respondents across the four categories from the worst to the least. The summary of the rating revealed the following; insecurity was highest with state rating 42% in Kibera and 47% in Mathare while CSOs rated 74% in Kibera and 72 % in Mathare. Here, the CSOs were most hit by insecurity in both divisions because security was determined by the state apparatus hence leaving the CSOs at their mercy. The insecurity faced by the state

officials was mostly from the community members in both divisions who did not have trust in the state in both slums as the state was perceived the source of the conflicts (PEV). Overwhelming needs for support from the community members was rated second with 54% in Kibera and 62 % in Mathare by the state while 67.4% in Kibera and 63.2 % in Mathare for CSOs. Inadequate personnel in supporting the implementation of reconstruction programs was rated third with 42.5% in Kibera and 46.5 Mathare by state while 54.3% Kibera and 57.1% Mathare for CSOs. Fourth was corruption and nepotism with state rating at 52% in Kibera and 55% in Mathare while 22% in Kibera and 24 % in Mathare by CSOs, this indicates that corruption and nepotism was more rampaged among the sate officials in all divisions with very minimal among the CSOs staff. Hostility from the community towards both state and CSOs was rated fifth with 25% Kibera and 32% Mathare by state while 42.3% Kibera and 41.3% Mathare by the CSOs in this category, CSOs faced the highest level of rejection in both divisions as most of them were perceived biased in the offering of support through discrimination. The summary is shown in table 3.1

Table 3.1 Challenges faced by state and civil society in Kibera and Mathare

		High		Neutral		Least	
		Kibera	Mathare	Kibera	Mathare	Kibera	Mathare
Corruption and nepotism	State	52.9%	54.8%	31.3%	32.3%	15.8%	12.9%
	Civil Society	22.4%	24.7%	42.5%	39.1%	35.1%	36.2%
Insecurity	State	42.8%	47.4%	33.4%	36.7%	16.9%	17.1%
	Civil society	74.3%	72.1%	12.3%	11.4%	13.4%	16.5%
Hostility from the community	State	25.9%	32.2%	48.9%	32.3%	10.8%	12.4%
	Civil society	42.3%	41.3%	21.3%	22.4%	36.4%	36.3%
Inadequate personnel	State	42.5%	46.5%	25.9%	35.4%	23.6%	24.9%
	Civil society	54.3%	57.1%	22.3%	17.3%	23.4%	25.6%
Overwhelming needs	State	53.7%	61.6%	23.8%	26.7%	22.5%	4.2%
	Civil society	67.4%	63.2%	22.3%	26.9%	10.3%	9.9%

Source: (Field Data, 2015)

3.1.1 Insecurity

Analysis of the results showed that 74.3% and 72.1% of the house hold heads respondents from Kibera and Mathare respectively considered insecurity to have hampered Civil Society in the dissemination of the post conflict reconstruction programs. Conversely, the state also experienced challenges in the process of dissemination of the reconstruction programs. Though, provision of security was entrusted to the State (police, chiefs, assistant chiefs, and village elders), their poor co-ordination of security and the overwhelming incidences of violence became too high for the security staff to handle.

One of the village elders in Kibera said that "the insecurity in the area really affected the intervention and restoration of peace". This made it difficult to access the affected areas even if the services were available. The limited support by the state in providing security to the civil society staff hindered the implementation of the reconstruction programs in the conflict prone areas. These findings concur with the observations made by two of the key informants from both divisions:

> The place where the violence was high was very hard to access due to the hostility of the warring communities and the lack of security. This made the employees of the civil society fear for their lives (AMREF Medical personnel -Mathare, 2014).

> In fact, in Kibera our own staff from the then ruling party would not be allowed in the health facility by the community members from the opposition party Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) (Key informant medical field coordinator Kibera 2004).

Wanyeki (2010) agrees with this and argues that the national steering committee on peace building and conflict management did not have the necessary follow- up mechanism and reporting tools to adequately address the insecurity cycles in the violence prone areas in Kenyan informal settlements. The respondents from across the four categories were of the view that the reconstruction programs should have been developed in such a way that the security measures were strengthened to enable the realization of business opportunities to improve the livelihood of those affected.

Markussen (2011) notes that the ethnic tensions in Mathare and Kibera slums led to zoning of the slums along the tribal lines. For example, in Mathare there was a Pro-Party of National Unity (PNU) zone and in Kibera there was a pro-ODM with which was a no go zone for the opposing sides. This led to the growth of insecurity. Civil society organizations had little impact in combating insecurity concerns as they depended on the state that had the mercenaries to counter the conflicts. To combat this, according to the study findings, the state had to be effective in providing security and work with the civil society in enhancing reconstruction

initiatives amongst the affected communities which was a challenge on its own due to strained relationship between state and CSOs.

3.1.2 Corruption and nepotism

According to Apenguo (2010), corruption and nepotism has been a major hindrance in the dissemination of post conflict reconstruction programs in Africa. In agreement with these views, analysis of the results showed that 243 (52.9%) Kibera and 252 (54.8%) of Mathare household heads respondents respectively considered corruption to have hampered the provision of reconstruction programs. The State provision of post conflict reconstruction programs depended on relational attachments or from which ethnic group one came from. Though corruption and nepotism is neutrally considered by the respondents to have hindered Civil Society in the provision of reconstruction programs; as shown by 42.5% respondents in Kibera and 39.1% respondents in Mathare, the individuals who ranked it high (22.4% in Kibera and 24.7% in Mathare) makes it a concern to be addressed. In Kibera, for instance, most of the civil society organizations were operated by the members from the opposition (ODM) who would provide services to their people first. Likewise in Mathare, where members from the then ruling party (PNU) were dominant, so were most of the employees because of acceptability and accessibility. This made the provision of services easier to those who were from the same ethnic affiliation as the employees working in the state or civil society. In one of the focused group discussions, one of the respondents commented:

> Our leaders at the local level are the biggest cause of ethnic violence. If you had a problem with an ODM resident and complained to the chief, since the chiefs, with exception of only one, are form the opposition, the chief will shamelessly conduct the discussions in their ethnic language. Even before you intervene, you are told the matter will be looked into and that would be the end of the story (FGD 4 Women group Mathare, 2014).

3.1.3 Overwhelming needs

From the interview schedules, the findings identified inadequate distribution of resources to have hindered the reconstruction programs. Research findings showed that overwhelming needs from the large number of affected individuals stalled post conflict reconstruction programs development. Overwhelming needs was ranked highly (53.7% in Kibera and 61.6% in Mathare) to have affected State development of post-conflict reconstruction programs. Similarly, 67.4% and 63.2% of Kibera and Mathare respondents respectively highly ranked Civil Society to have been negatively affected by the large number of overwhelming needs from the affected individuals. The increasing number of victims in the camps led to the inability of the government and civil society organizations to relocate the survivors from the congested places in the slum as shown in Plate 3.1.

Plate 3.1 an Overview of the Kibera Slum Showing the Congestion
Source: (Field Data, 2015).

Failure to provide crucial services, including planning, the ever growing needs from the affected individuals led to acute shortage of space for families. Participants in the focus groups said the pressure for space created conflict between the communities.

A key informant observed:

> There was overwhelming needs from the community which became a challenge to humanitarian institutions. In the internally displaced persons's (IDPs) camps, the number of those affected was always on the rise and it became a challenge to the CSOs as they were unable to sustain and maintain all of them (Key informant Kibera 2015).

The large number of affected individuals impeded the limited resources allocated by the state and civil society to help the post-election violence individuals as observed by a key informant:

> After the 2007/8 PEV, we the chiefs and the assistance chiefs realized that we never had adequate skills on how to deal with both physical and emotional support to those affected. The large number of people affected provided a big challenge for us as we had never experienced such a magnitude of humanitarian need. We had never been given any training on post conflict reconstruction, which troubled our efforts in providing counseling and support (Chief - Mathare 2014).

The statement from the chief showed the overwhelming nature and influence of the effects of the post-election violence and the lack of preparedness of the state agents to handle the challenges posed by the conflict. These findings concur with that of Matanga, Bradshaw, and Muhindi (2012) who argued that the Kenyan political violence have a communal element based on the competition amongst the identity groups and display signs of human need frustration in which human needs are not evenly or justly met due to overwhelming needs of those affected. The state would offer very little to support the overwhelming needs of the affected individuals as it tries to stabilize from the economic impacts due to the violence.

3.1.4 Hostility from the Community

Analysis of the results showed that Civil Society (42.3% in Kibera and 41.3% in Mathare) experienced hostile reception from the communities affected. The rejection was a result of them being considered to be colluding with the warring communities. The biasedness of the Civil Society in the distribution of post conflict reconstruction programs was the primary contributing factor behind the hostility from the community. The state received less hostility from the community, but in other areas of the slum, the state officers were rejected as they were considered to have been the ones fuelling the conflict; this is depicted by 25.9% and 32.2% of the respondents in Kibera and Mathare respectively. Some community members felt they were being marginalized and oppressed by those affiliated to the ones in power. These communities felt they were being shortchanged and it was time to fight back and get their rights. This made it hard for the state and civil society to convince them and hence impeding the implementation of the post conflict reconstruction programs.

Responses from Mathare Women group focused group discussions revealed that landlords applied discriminatory criteria to exclude undesirable ethnic groups and tenants by hiring idle youth and criminal gangs to terrorize them. This made the discriminated communities hostile and never wanted any assistance from the ethnic group from which the landlords came from. In these patterns of violence, the participants claimed homes were often burned down thus triggering further cycles of violence. The discussions with community members of Mathare showed that the affected communities would unleash violence to retaliate, and the civil society and state would have limitations in containing or even stopping such violence.

The focus group discussions (Kibera Youth Initiative 2014) disclosed that whenever messages of ethnic clashes in different parts of the city and even in different parts of the country were received by youths, they invariably mobilized and executed revenge attacks on members of ethnic groups in the study communities who were perceived to be aggressors of ethnic clashes. This made the communities affected become hostile as their ethnic members were being tortured hence hindered the organization from rendering the services quips (Markussen, 2011).

3.1.5 Human Resource Challenges (Inadequate personnel)

Okoth (2008) observed that the conflicts generated a variety of serious problems associated with human capital, land and the environment. Human resource shortages are particularly severe in war-torn regions. For instance, tens of thousands of Kenyan professionals such as doctors, teachers and humanitarian workers were targeted during the conflict forcing them to move to IDP camps. In addition, educational opportunities decrease during the conflict time, as schools were closed or students participated in the conflict.

In Kibera and Mathare, 42.5% and 46.5% of the household heads respondents respectively ranked human resource challenges to have highly hindering the state in dissemination of services. Likewise, 54.3% and 57.1% of the respondents from Kibera and Mathare respectively highly ranked inadequate personnel during the

implementation of the post conflict reconstruction programs. The overwhelming needs from the affected and the large numbers of the affected persons strained the small number of personnel running the civil society organizations that were involved in post conflict reconstruction. One of the humanitarian agents argued:

> Bureaucracy involved in implementation of post conflict reconstruction initiative has posed a challenge in the implementation. The lack of facilitation by the government in provision of the necessary machinery involved in the reconstruction programs has led to the development of corruption amongst the security officers. All these challenges pose a threat to the implementation of the reconstruction implementation (Humanitarian agent from Center for Rights and Awareness- Mathare, 2014)

From the study findings, the state and civil society dealt with issues that were mostly policy driven and required knowledge of key issues, and professionalism tagged to activism (Kenya Red Cross Society, 2009). The pool of professionals was small and the state and civil society were unable to attract talented individuals and issue-based professionals because of financial constraints. An analysis of the responses showed that civil society were challenged through human resource constraints to deal with leadership, recruiting and retaining talent, and managing and developing people that would help them meet the demands of an every changing policy environment. Short-term earmarked funding left civil society organizations vulnerable as professionals were caught waiting for the next project that was never a guarantee. The "brain drain and strain" associated with CSOs was a major challenge to effective analysis and impact on key policy matters. The burden of fewer professional and a cadre of trainees who got trained and left for greener pastures was a great barrier to CSO s' productivity.

IV. Conclusion and Recommendation

The challenges of sustainable peace and security in the Kibera and Mathare divisions are based especially on the nature of possible interventions and the demands they put on the skills, attitudes and the material resources of the intervening parties. The implementation of post reconstruction programs requires a lot of finances, support from the government, collaboration with other state holders and clear guidelines to be followed. Corruption and nepotism, insecurity and lack of collaboration among the state and civil society organizations in Kenya have been a major hindrance in the enactment of post reconstruction programs in Kenya and elsewhere in the world. In the aftermath of conflict, States rarely have adequate financial, human and other resources to undertake effective reconstruction and rebuilding efforts. In this context, the involvement of multiple stakeholders is necessary.

In light of these findings, we recommend that; Public officials should adopt an inclusive approach that brings together both State, non-State players and stakeholders to solidify, embrace and support public service delivery capacities; The government should step up efforts to initiate and   enforce innovative policies; Night police patrols should be intensified especially in the areas that are yet to realize full recovery from the post-election violence in Kenya; The government should move in urgently to control the emerging culture of corruption, nepotism and impunity across the county coupled with lawlessness among the youth of Nairobi slums. Lastly, on-going post-conflict reconstruction efforts should be more pragmatic to address root causes of conflicts so as to avoid relapse.

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